Autocracy can give you Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew or North Korea’s Kim family, says philosopher and political strategist Neil Sinhababu. Democracy cuts off the worst outcomes.
In this episode, recorded three days after the 2026 US midterms, we discuss democracy as a way to prevent mass suffering. Following Amartya Sen, Neil Sinhababu argues that elections give policymakers strong incentives to prevent famine, war, and genocide among those who can vote them out. We ask who that leaves out (foreigners, future generations, and nonhuman animals) and whether he believes experts might rule better. Neil explains why he is a partisan Democrat, why even a single vote or small donation can matter, and why he gives 10% to global poverty causes and about another 10% to Democrats, for instance through a senator’s leadership PAC (political action committee). We press him on what partisanship might cost causes such as AI safety and animal welfare. He closes with what he calls his “extreme strategy” for US constitutional reform against the current “tyranny of the minority” (creating new states to pass constitutional amendments), and with his long-term vision: a democratic world government, with US-China cooperation on AI as an immediate first step.
Guest
Neil Sinhababu is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore, where he has taught since 2008. He holds a B.A. from Harvard and a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. His book “Humean Nature“ (Oxford University Press, 2017) defends a Humean theory of motivation, on which desire drives all practical reasoning and action. He has also written on ethics, where he defends hedonism (“Naturalistic Arguments for Ethical Hedonism”), on politics (”In Defense of Partisanship“), Nietzsche (”Nietzsche on the Eternal Recurrence,” Cambridge University Press, 2025), and Heidegger (“Heidegger’s Argument for Fascism”), among others.
Hosts
Suffering & Social Change is hosted by Adriano Mannino and Nils Althaus. Adriano is Professor of Philosophy at the Munich University of Applied Sciences and was previously a Technology & Human Rights Fellow at Harvard and a postdoc at UC Berkeley. Nils is an independent researcher and science journalist for leading outlets in the German-speaking world, and originally a biochemist.
Mentioned in this episode
Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value“ (Journal of Democracy, 1999)
Our World in Data, “Famines,” with data on famines and political regimes since 1870
The Impact Counter, a model by Brooke Nichols (Boston University) that estimates deaths following the USAID cuts; the US government disputes these estimates
Neil Sinhababu, “Humean Nature“ (Oxford University Press, 2017)
Neil Sinhababu, “In Defense of Partisanship“ (in “Ethics in Politics,” Routledge, 2016)
Neil Sinhababu, “Naturalistic Arguments for Ethical Hedonism“ (guest essay at utilitarianism.net)
Neil Sinhababu, “Consciousness Is In Your Head. I Consulted Einstein“ (Nautilus, 2023)
Albert Einstein’s 1945 article in The Atlantic Monthly arguing for a world government (as told to Raymond Swing); background at Open Culture
Margaret Floy Washburn, “The Animal Mind“ (1908)
Zach Barnett, “Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome“ (Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2020)
Raquel Meyer Alexander, Stephen W. Mazza, and Susan Scholz, “Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures“ (Journal of Law and Politics, 2009), the study of lobbying for the 2004 tax holiday on overseas profits
GiveWell, the charity evaluator whose global poverty recommendations Neil follows with part of his giving
From US history: the three-fifths compromise, the Dred Scott decision (1857), and the Civil Rights Act (1964)
Chapters
00:00 Cold open
00:56 Introducing Neil Sinhababu
01:47 Why democracy? Preventing famine, war, and genocide
10:23 Uninformed voters and the Singapore exception
15:21 Who is left out: foreigners, future generations, animals
18:37 The USAID cuts and who should control AI
22:45 Would rule by experts do better?
27:10 Moral progress and Swiss direct democracy
32:43 How slavery shaped the US Constitution
38:55 Can future generations and animals be represented?
42:14 Einstein, and what Hitler cost philosophy
46:08 Why Neil is a partisan Democrat
58:44 Gay marriage and the limits of nonpartisan work
1:03:51 Division of labor, and AI safety under Trump
1:08:21 Does a single vote matter?
1:13:48 Charity or politics? Moral opportunity costs
1:19:11 Why Neil funds a senator’s leadership PAC
1:24:37 Senate, presidency, or secretary of state races?
1:34:28 After the midterms: a thousand new states
1:42:38 Would that mean civil war?
1:46:18 The UN and taking AI out of private hands
1:50:59 A world state, and an offer to China
1:53:28 What if a world government goes wrong?
1:55:39 US-China cooperation on AI
Transcript
Lightly edited for readability: filler words, false starts, and repetitions removed, some sentences smoothed, no changes in content.
Cold open
Neil Sinhababu (0:00:03) What I tell my students here is: autocratic systems, the range is gigantic. In terms of best case to worst case, the worst case goes all the way down. But with democratic systems, you basically cut off the bottom half of outcomes.
(0:00:21) The best case is you get someone like Lee Kuan Yew. On the other hand, there’s the Kim family in North Korea, and you could get them too.
(0:00:29) Elon Musk specifically is responsible for these USAID cuts. He and his DOGE team went in and did that. And now, last I checked, something like half a million children are dead. He didn’t even save much money here.
(0:00:42) I give my 10% to standard GiveWell global poverty causes, as I pledged to a long time ago, but then I give about another 10% every year to Democrats.
Conversation
Adriano Mannino (0:00:56) This is the Suffering & Social Change podcast. I’m Adriano Mannino, and my guest today is Neil Sinhababu. Neil is a philosopher and a political strategist. He’s an associate professor at the National University of Singapore and has very wide-ranging interests, from metaphysics to ethics to political philosophy and political strategy: both impressive, grand global strategies that might allow us to achieve democratic world government one day, and the strategic and tactical nitty-gritty of US electoral politics. I should also say that we’re recording this three days after the US midterms, and we’ll certainly get to talk about what just happened in the US and what it all means. Neil, it’s great to have you on the show today.
Neil Sinhababu (0:01:46) It’s great to be here.
Adriano Mannino (0:01:47) To start us off, Neil, I think it would be valuable to talk more generally about what democracy is and why you think it’s valuable. There have been many arguments for democracy. One thought, for instance, is that there is something egalitarian, perhaps fair or nonhierarchical, about the principle “one person, one vote.” Another starting point might be the liberal idea that we each have rights and should be able to exercise autonomy or self-determination, say, when it comes to our bodies or our speech, and then, when matters are more collective, we should each have an equal say in collective self-determination. There have been epistemic arguments for democracy, along the lines that democracy allows us to bring many and diverse viewpoints and experiences and a lot of different information to the table. But I take it you would argue that democracy is valuable for a different fundamental reason.
Neil Sinhababu (0:02:41) Yes. The thing that I like best about democracy is preventing such terrible things as famine, war, and genocide, things that kill a lot of people and have historically caused a huge amount of death and destruction in the world. Amartya Sen won the Nobel Prize in economics in part for showing that the incentives provided by democracy are incredibly good at preventing famine. There are debates about whether there has been any famine at all under a democratic government. Obviously, crop failures happen. There are floods, there are droughts. You don’t get rid of the weather through democracy. But what you do is set it up so that the policymakers have really strong incentives to feed the hungry people, because if they don’t feed the people, they are out of jobs, and their party will be hated by the survivors for perhaps generations.
(0:03:35) So there are very strong individual and social incentives for any policymaker to make sure that starving people are fed. And this is what raised life expectancies in India in a very steady way from independence forward. There was technological progress in the rest of the world during the British Empire. But for some of these periods in which technological progress was going on, life expectancies in India were going down. And it’s because the British Empire’s policymakers didn’t really have any incentive to feed starving Indians. What they cared about was extracting resources so that they could fight wars with Germany and things like that.
Adriano Mannino (0:04:10) And I believe there are shocking Churchill quotes from the era, right?
Neil Sinhababu (0:04:15) Yes. At one point, I think it’s Leo Amery, who is another British official, I sort of remember him remarking: if there’s a famine going on in Bengal, why hasn’t Gandhi starved yet? It was this kind of callous attitude, somewhere between indifference and hatred, whatever that kind of prejudice against Indians is that Churchill had. I’m glad that Churchill beat the Nazis, but this is just monsters versus monsters at a certain level. If you’re an Indian, you have to look at it that way. A famine that kills three million during that period, that’s really serious stuff. There are periods where you get death tolls in the 5 to 10 million range in a year or two. It’s just grim. And once you get a democratic government in, the policymakers know you’ve got to feed the people.
(0:05:11) And this is a pattern throughout the world. I don’t think it’s an economic system issue, because capitalist and communist countries both have tremendous famines. Communism has the biggest, with Mao, but there is also the Irish famine under the British Empire, with a huge proportion: the population starts out at something like eight million, and then one million die and about a million or more emigrate to get away. You can have that under a free market system. As a matter of fact, since the Irish were so poor, the little food there was got exported to other places, because the Irish didn’t have enough to pay. So the economic system isn’t so much the issue. The thing is, do the policymakers have an incentive to make food go there? And this goes for other kinds of catastrophes too.
(0:06:04) So, war. Obviously, democracies do fight wars and kill citizens of other countries in wars. That does happen, but they are much more careful about the lives of their own than autocracies are. Russia is the grim example of today. In a democratic country, you cannot pull all these guys out of the countryside, where they’re living their lives and drinking vodka and doing all the things Russians do, and then just send them to die in these meat assaults, where you just rush some guys out there and they’re going to get shot, and at least if they get shot, you know where the opposing snipers are, or stuff like that. These kinds of tactics don’t make any sense in a democracy. You just get kicked out of office if you do that in a democracy. Much lower death tolls made Lyndon Johnson not run for president again. Democracies do make mistakes, but once you make that big a mistake, it’s over.
(0:06:58) And Donald Trump is seeing this with his war on Iran. This is something that really did impact this election, I think. It’s not so much in the death toll way, because that’s been small, but they made a strategic blunder that resulted in Iran getting control of the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices going up, inflation. Now the truckers who would be voting Republican a lot of the time are seeing their diesel prices high, and they don’t want to vote for the guy who made them pay more and made their businesses less viable.
Adriano Mannino (0:07:26) In terms of famine, I just recently came across the most up-to-date data, and I think it’s quite impressive. Going back to 1870, I think there’s debate whether there has perhaps been one clear mass famine in democratic regimes, actually quite recently, in Nigeria from 2016 to 2019. But that’s basically the only example. And then, as you mentioned, there are dozens and dozens of examples in nondemocratic regimes, with the death toll piling up to clearly north of 50 million. So is it fair to say that your theory here is that democracy is basically an incentive alignment mechanism and therefore hugely instrumentally valuable?
Neil Sinhababu (0:08:09) Yes, that’s my story for it. And I think some of the other advantages that other people talk about, with protection of rights and equality, go in there with that. If you just have a constitution that has rights in it, what is there to enforce that and make sure that it gets followed? A regime could just keep that on the books and ignore some of the rights, and if the judges do the things that the regime wants, it might just be a dead letter. But if you have free elections where people can vote, then if you try to do something that really abuses or violates a lot of people’s rights, they’re going to vote against you. The way democracy locally protects against things like genocide is a sign of that. People talk about the tyranny of the majority, and maybe there are versions of that, but you don’t get democracies doing actual genocides to their voting populations.
(0:09:08) If you have a nonvoting population there, things can happen that are very bad for the nonvoters. But if you have a voting population and you threaten the voters with genocide? Oh my goodness. No one’s going to vote for you in that population. And if they have enough power to have the vote, that gives them a certain kind of influence, where they’re going to be in coalitions to prevent anything bad like that from happening. Say you have some kind of disagreement between the labor side and the corporate side in your country. Well, the minority that was going to get killed in a genocide is going to be like, “We’ll sign up with whoever is going to stop us from getting killed in a genocide,” and there are going to be immediate compromises in parliament or wherever the system puts the power. So I think it’s really good for protecting rights too. Also, people realize, “Hey, you’re doing it to that voter?”
(0:09:59) Unless there’s some really strong racism, and usually if there is, people get disenfranchised first. That is the way it works. Hitler had to do it that way. If Hitler had kept the voting system in place, who knows if he could have done all this stuff, and once World War II started going wrong, the voters might have pulled the plug. But no, he did it in the order that the autocrats who want to commit genocide have to: you take the vote away first, and then...
Adriano Mannino (0:10:23) What about the standard concern that many voters are low-information? And often for a pretty good practical reason, I guess, because it’s not unreasonable, at least on its face, to feel quite politically powerless in many places. You just have one vote, and in order to cast a really informed vote, you may have to invest a lot of time, and you may have a family to feed and other interests in life, and may quite rationally prioritize those. Is that a concern, or does it not really arise, because you’re focusing mostly on people voting with their stomachs, say, when it comes to famines, or just expressing that they’re suffering intensely? Although I guess the question there would be whether this could misfire if they misunderstand the causes of their suffering, and so on. So to what extent is this a concern?
Neil Sinhababu (0:11:15) That is a real concern. And I am not going to make the argument that democracy makes optimal political choices on fine-grained matters. It could be that some other system does, if you get a really, really good ruler who happens to be autocratic and just sets up everything perfectly and makes all the decisions as well as a democracy would, or better. It’s a possibility. Has it happened?
Adriano Mannino (0:11:48) Where? Where you’re joining us from?
Neil Sinhababu (0:11:51) Yes. In Singapore, I’ve got to say, they did all kinds of things right. And one of the big things is that they did the urban planning right. People talk about the harsh laws, but I think the real thing that made this place work was how they built the city in an incredibly functional way. Eighty percent of the citizens live in government-leased housing, because the government realized this is the way to do it: we are going to plan out the housing and plan the entire urban environment. The way it works here, so many people live in these tall HDB apartments; Housing Development Board is what it’s called. And often there’s a bus station or a subway station at the basement or ground floor. So you live in your tall building, and you can go down to the ground floor and get your breakfast, and they subsidize the cheap food down there.
(0:12:45) The whole hawker center culture of cheap food stalls comes from government-subsidized rent, because urban rents are expensive unless the government is thinking, “We need to subsidize a food supply for our citizens, so we’ll give you a cheap rent.” And it’s a competent government. The first thing they did was crack down on corruption, which is endemic in the region around here. So you can’t bribe the health inspector; if you’re selling bad food, you’re going to get shut down. So you have cheap, safe food. You can eat the unhealthy food if you want to, it’s here too, but at least it’s safe. So you go down to your first floor and eat that. Then you go down one more floor into the subway station and go to your workplace. Maybe you have lunch somewhere at your workplace, where it’s subsidized. Then you come back, you have a hawker center dinner with the kids, and you go back up.
(0:13:37) And it’s all public transit, all tall government-leased buildings with subsidized rents. They have set that up so nicely. They’ve put people in a position to succeed by setting them up within an urban environment where things really work. That’s what I think is the great secret to victory here. They had a centralized government under a guy who was not that into sharing power, and it turned out that he had the right ideas. So he built these really nice things for everybody, and the people liked it. Now, there are issues where you might say policy could be better in this way or that way if you did something more democratically. But the guy was competent. Now look, the best case is you get someone like Lee Kuan Yew. On the other hand, there’s the Kim family in North Korea, and you could get them too.
(0:14:28) You do not want the Kim family of North Korea. That’s the low end. So what I tell my students here is: autocratic systems, the range is gigantic. In terms of best case to worst case, the worst case goes all the way down. But with democratic systems, you basically cut off the bottom half of outcomes. That’s worth so much. And maybe you miss out on some super-top outcomes, but look, I just want the famine, war, and genocide deaths to not happen. And if we mess up, and we did mess up with Donald Trump, this election in the US showed us that when things start going wrong, the people can realize it. And they’re like, “No, no, no, do not keep going that way. We are going to change course. We’re going to do it now.” And yeah, I’m impressed.
Adriano Mannino (0:15:21) So again, if I understand correctly, the theory as we’ve laid it out now is that democracy is a great incentive alignment mechanism that will tend to prevent mass suffering among the domestic population, and maybe even more specifically among those parts of the domestic population, which hopefully would be large, that are directly subject to democratic rule and can also influence it. But now, obviously, there’s the issue that there are other parts, even of the domestic population. You may have people who recently immigrated and who may not be enfranchised yet, not necessarily even for unjust reasons. Obviously, you have children, you have the elderly, and maybe people with disabilities who cannot vote. And then you have the large outside population that may also be very strongly affected by domestic democratic decision-making.
(0:16:18) So the rest of the world, which obviously tends to greatly outnumber the domestic population: foreigners, citizens of foreign countries. Then you also have future generations. You also have the nonhuman domestic and global population, which may also be able to suffer, and quite intensely. Does your instrumental argument break down, or at least get a lot weaker, when we factor in all of these populations? Because presumably, if one central aim is to prevent mass serious suffering, we wouldn’t want to claim that it’s only the domestic population’s suffering that matters.
Neil Sinhababu (0:17:01) Right. I accept that the voters are the people who get the biggest advantages. The elderly and children are related to voters, and voters will care for their elders in general and care for their children in general, so there are advantages to them there. I do think lowering voting ages makes sense, because we do have bright kids coming up. It’s not that they’re perfect. They may be less good on average than the rest of the voters, I’m not even sure about that. But I think that overall they’ll get it right more than wrong, on average across the entire population. And that’s the reason to include them in the group. They could be bought off by weird offers of favors, but really, that happens all over the place. That happens to all kinds of populations.
(0:17:58) So overall, I can’t really say that there’d be big disadvantages there. There, I think, we can do some extra things. But some of the other populations are a lot harder. Nonhuman animals and future generations are just really hard to plug into a voting system, because how do you make sure that their preferences are felt? Animals just cannot use the voting system effectively to express preferences, for reasons of animal intelligence and interaction with human language and things like that. Future generations are just not here, and they cannot express their preferences that way. But the thing I’ll say...
Adriano Mannino (0:18:37) But even with foreigners, right, in some ways an easier case. The Trump administration comes in, and one of the first things they do is really cut down USAID, leading to a massive victim count. So maybe let’s start there. Do you have institutional design ideas for how to bring in the current global population?
Neil Sinhababu (0:18:57) Yes. Well, there is one huge idea, and that is: we need to develop international institutions, bring the rest of the world in, and move toward a global liberal democracy. Right now, we’re seeing new technologies come online that are causing all kinds of danger, and difficulties in coordinating on how to deal with the threats posed by AI. That’s something where we really need some way to coordinate the world. And we are facing opponents here from the private sector, I think. Elon Musk specifically is responsible for these USAID cuts. He and his DOGE team went in and did that. And now, last I checked, it was something like half a million children are dead, and then hundreds of thousands of adults, but that’s probably increased since the time I checked. It’s just really terrible what happened there. It basically showed...
Adriano Mannino (0:19:55) For our listeners, USAID, of course, is the US Agency for Global Cooperation Development, which is active in all kinds of areas: global health, but also global democracy aid, which has also collapsed.
Neil Sinhababu (0:20:09) Yeah. Just to give people an idea of what kind of thing they were doing that was saving all these children: there was an HIV prevention program for children where they do tests on pregnant women to see if they are HIV-positive. And there’s a drug they can give these women that’ll prevent transmission to the baby. If you give them the drug, the child can go on and live a healthy life. But if you don’t, the child comes out without a proper immune system because of the HIV. For a young child, this means that in the first couple of years of life, they just get destroyed by terrible bacteria and die. So you have all these children who are born into the world with no fate but to die of a terrible illness. And that just befell half a million children because of Elon Musk cutting USAID. He didn’t even save much money here. The cost of the program per life saved is below $5,000, and that’s to change something from a child who is born and dies terribly to one who lives a healthy, happy life.
(0:21:13) That we were doing this so cheaply was an amazing thing for America to do, and now we are not doing it. And that is just terrible. So how could he do this? Well, he is the world’s richest man, with all kinds of money that can control the legal system, with political connections to the president, with all of this. So that kind of private sector power must be reined in. It’s to the point where, as far as who controls AI, I hope that it can be controlled by reasonable people in a liberal democracy. But between Xi Jinping and Elon Musk-type people and his allies controlling it, I might choose Xi Jinping over Elon Musk and his allies in Silicon Valley. Those people are just so terrible.
(0:22:02) And when Musk talks about, “Oh yeah, we might just be biological boot loaders for something else,” I’m just like, at least Xi Jinping does not want humanity to end. At least he’s worried about a certain large population. I think he wants Chinese people to live. And I think he is at least reasonably positive toward humanity continuing. But this kind of absolute misanthropic stuff we’re getting out of some of the Silicon Valley people is so dangerous. And they are in a position to make the choices. So this is the time where I think we need some way to rein in the dangerous technologies and take them out of the hands of these people who do not care about the rest of humanity.
Adriano Mannino (0:22:45) So as you just mentioned, one thing that could help mitigate the problem of foreigners who are affected by democratic decision-making not really being included is strong international institutions, ideally something like a democratic world government, to provide some check. We’ll certainly return to that later on. But I guess it’s also important to keep in mind that even if democracy struggles here, it’s probably the case that all alternative systems would do even worse. Is that fair to say? Or do you think there might be other, nondemocratic systems, maybe more epistocratic systems, so systems that give more power to those allegedly in the know, some kinds of experts, that might do better in terms of taking an impartial stance and bringing in the global population, and indeed also, returning to future generations, bringing in those? It’s a little less intuitive, morally speaking, to really give equal weight to future generations as well, let alone nonhuman welfare subjects such as animals.
Neil Sinhababu (0:23:52) With epistocratic systems, I don’t see that there is that much advantage. If you get the right epistocrats, yes, but who knows if you will? There are all kinds of possibilities there. I do think experts are important to have in the government, in jobs like, okay, we’ll have a Federal Reserve, we’ll have regulation done by experts. But overall, I think the best system for setting that up is to have a fundamental one-person-one-vote democracy. Don’t mess around with that, because what will happen if you do is that incentives will get messed up as far as respecting certain people’s interests. And that’s destabilizing. You’ll tilt the entire way the future is conceived toward, “Oh yeah, well, in the future, that annoying race, why don’t we try to make sure that they’re not here anymore?” or something like that.
(0:24:47) Once you take them out of the voting system, you get problems of that sort. So just keep the basic voting system democratic. And then you’ll have incentives upon the experts. Sometimes it won’t be that good, because sometimes the experts will do something genuinely farsighted and positive, and there will be problems with democracy. But I don’t see that there’s any advantage to other kinds of systems. The experts could do all kinds of things that interfere with whatever other power you have in your system. If you have some kind of authority who you trust as an autocrat to pick the experts, well, the experts will sometimes do something that the autocrat doesn’t want, and then you have a problem. You could even have experts against experts, if you divide up your government into expert communities in certain ways, and then how do you get the most powerful experts to generally win?
(0:25:44) I don’t even know if there’s a way to do that. So overall, I just do not see that there is an epistocratic solution that really works in a good way, something that doesn’t end up with the experts being captured in some way, or with the experts not ending up making a difference. Or they’re not experts. The future is just hard to figure out, even for well-intentioned people. And there are plenty of ill-intentioned people who aren’t going to care. So I don’t really know how you are going to generally solve that problem, except for one big thing you can do if you have the world government set up that kind of way: a good way to make sure the future generations actually are there is to make sure that people don’t all die right now. And things that are going to kill the people right now, or just harm the people right now, if you send us into some kind of post-apocalyptic situation in the intermediate term, nobody now wants that.
(0:26:42) And that’s a real threat to the future as well. So there’s enough of an alignment there. If you look at the people in general, the people in general are going to be the ones who give birth to the future generations. So there’s at least something that aligns you there. There’s nothing that aligns you perfectly, but I can’t see that anything is better than this. So for all these different populations, I can’t see that there’s anything better. Maybe democracy fails in some ways, but again, there’s not much that really does better.
Adriano Mannino (0:27:10) Now, there is of course a spectrum between full non-epistocratic democracy on the one side and a dictatorial kind of epistocracy on the other. And I’m still wondering if you’d perhaps say that current American democracy could benefit from adding some distinctly epistocratic elements. Relatedly, I’m also wondering what your view is about what tends to drive moral progress. Here’s one example that’s just coming to mind: in Switzerland, where I am from, women only received the right to vote in the 1970s. And this is because we have a comparatively very direct democracy, which you can also rather easily organize in a state of under 10 million people. Now, of course, you could argue it wasn’t a real democracy until the ‘70s, because it was the male population that took a handful of votes denying the female population the right to vote.
(0:28:08) I think these efforts started in the early 20th century. People also tried the judicial route and failed. Then they also tried at the ballot, and they finally succeeded only in the ‘70s. Now, compare this to other Western nations with less of a direct democratic tradition. There, what has tended to be the case is that morally comparatively enlightened elites just instituted women’s suffrage in the early 20th century. So I was wondering what your rough story is about what drives moral progress. To the extent that it is part of the elites that maybe start to talk about animal welfare and animal rights, or the welfare of the potentially vast number of future generations and their potential abject suffering, all of these less morally intuitive things that may be really important from an impartial perspective: might that lead to a bit of a case for a kind of epistocracy? Or would you still say no, it’s just too risky, how are we really going to select those supposed moral experts? I’m just curious about your thoughts.
Neil Sinhababu (0:29:20) I just don’t know if I can expect elites in general to be better than the general population. The Switzerland case, look, I’ll grant you that case. I don’t really know the details much. In general, I like representative democracy better, because of all the complicated decisions that people don’t have time for. And then, if something goes wrong, you throw out your representatives. So they have the incentives to do stuff right. Overall, that’s my case for it. But on expanding suffrage, for example, you might worry: if you limited it to elites, would they just contract suffrage away from everybody toward them, and make some kind of Russia, where the elites are all trying to just get their people killed?
(0:30:11) You could have that too. So try to avoid that. I think when people think about epistocracy, especially certain kinds of people who I would agree with on a bunch of substantive issues, who might be in a position to become elites, there’s this kind of thought of, “If I were in charge, I would do the good thing, but no, democracy prevented it.” But you might not be in charge. It might be Vladimir Putin.
Adriano Mannino (0:30:43) Yeah. Now, just coming back very briefly to the Swiss case: I think this is one negative example, but I did not mean to pass judgment on Switzerland overall. You just made a critical remark about direct democracy, and I know you favor more representative systems. I’m actually very uncertain about this, because I could cite many positive examples from Switzerland as well that have been enabled through this direct democracy. I think one of your arguments is also that it might, if I recall correctly, overburden citizens. I don’t really think that’s the case. We just have ballot votes on national policy matters maybe every quarter or so, and I don’t think people feel overburdened. One political science finding is that political participation tends to be lower in Switzerland than elsewhere. But maybe that’s also a good thing, because people always feel like, “Look, if I really want to participate, because I have to, because I’m in trouble or things are going badly, I always can.”
(0:31:36) And I have very extensive rights to initiate ballot votes, and so on. Another thing that’s maybe great is that we have a kind of proportional government. It’s not a presidential system. We have a multiparty system, and all parties basically share the government proportionally. I think that’s part of the reason we don’t have as much of a problem with right-wing authoritarianism, and we basically have no takeover risk. In the US, obviously, you have two parties and a primary system. So as a demagogue, and I think we’ve seen this happen just now, in the past decade, if you have 25% of the vote share, you can capture one of the parties, and then you can capture the entire government. In Switzerland, there has actually been a similar Trump-like figure, but they were only able to capture basically 25%, and that just means one quarter of ministries and so on. And I know you also have very interesting thoughts on different constitutional architectures in general, and in the US in particular.
Neil Sinhababu (0:32:33) Yeah. Just on the things you’re saying about the Swiss case, I think it’s also important that Switzerland is a lot smaller than some others.
Adriano Mannino (0:32:39) Yeah, of course. There are lots of potential confounders.
Neil Sinhababu (0:32:43) Right. As far as the US system goes, there are just a lot of bad features of the US system, undemocratic features, that I think led to the rise of Trump. The first time around, there were popular vote versus electoral vote issues. The story about that is, historically, kind of horrendous. Back when the Constitution was being written, they had to bring all the states together. The 13 colonies had become 13 states, but they had to unify, because they were having all kinds of problems. Nobody could get a proper navy going, because a state cannot run a proper navy; you need the whole nation. The British were impressing, that’s what they called it, kidnapping American sailors at sea, and you had to stop that. All kinds of problems like that were going on.
(0:33:34) So they needed to get everybody in, and the South was a slave regime at that point. You have a northern set of states that want something close to genuine democracy. I put this on a spectrum; it always has to be. Obviously, they weren’t letting women vote at that point, but it was closer to democracy, closer to universal suffrage, than you had before. Just like you call a five-story building tall in a place of tiny villages but not in a big city, it’s a democracy in that sense. So the North wanted democracy, and they thought they had it for a while during the process. But James Madison, whom people respect a lot for all kinds of things he did to build institutions, was really interested, during the Constitution-writing process, in making sure the South could maintain slavery in perpetuity.
(0:34:34) And the system he built was great for making sure that happened, especially the Electoral College system. They already had a proportional system for allocating seats in the House of Representatives. And that would just take in the entire population of the region. And of course, if it’s the entire population of the region, that includes the enslaved population. Now, the really grim thing about running proportional types of things under a slave system is that the slaves count for how much representation a place gets, but of course, nobody’s letting them vote. So all their voting power is, vampire style, drained out of them by their masters. And that’s how the masters keep them enslaved, because they count as people for the purpose of voting. The three-fifths compromise was set up, in presidential elections, to determine representation: how much representation do they get for the slaves?
(0:35:33) Well, three-fifths of a person. The interesting thing about it is, if you’re a slave, you actually want to count for zero, because that will prevent your power from going to the master, who is the only one who can vote. You can’t vote. You want to be zero to disempower your master and thus give more power in the national legislature to the Northerners, who really don’t like this slave thing. It’s just totally alien to them. And the North was where the abolitionist sentiment was the strongest, because there were nice people who were looking at this horrendous human rights situation. But Madison pushed to get them to pick up their proportional system from the House of Representatives vote allocation and put it into the Electoral College system. Madison was just absolutely genteel about it.
(0:36:24) He said, “Here’s what’s going to happen. The South will not have any say in electing a president if you do it that way. And because I’m a gentleman, I’m willing to go along with this for national unity.” And all his Southern fellow representatives were like, “Whoa, whoa, whoa! We are not going along with this.” He was the smart guy who communicated in a way that was so nice to the North, but he knew his Southern allies were going to move once the smart guy saw it. And that’s what happened. And that’s why America does not have a national popular vote. We made so many compromises with slavery in the beginning just to get the system together. I’ve read these old debates where they’re discussing the framing of the Constitution. And there is this point where James Madison says to Northern representatives, “Well, you know what’s going to happen if the South doesn’t get enough of a say? Probably what’s going to happen is the South is going to end up aligning with some European power to conquer the North.” That’s the reason why it’s really important to give the South enough power.
(0:37:21) And this is the mafia boss saying, “A nice democracy you’re trying to set up there. Shame if something would happen to it.” It’s just kind of chilling what this guy does. And he builds the system that locks in slavery until 1857, which is where the system crashes into itself. The way it goes, when slave states have all this power in picking the president, is that you get presidents who have made the compromise with slavery all the way through. They filled the Supreme Court with pro-slavery justices who make such extreme pro-slavery decisions. This is the Dred Scott decision by Roger Taney in 1857. With that, the freed slave Frederick Douglass, who is just one of the most brilliant political observers of the period, sees this coming. He’s like, “Yes, you have gone too far now, and you’ve made the decision that is going to make the entire slave system collapse.” The North votes in Abraham Lincoln in the next election.
(0:38:16) And he is going to do something about the slavery problem. Lincoln comes in with an intention not to start a civil war. He’s open to buying the slaves their freedom: slave owners, here, take this money and free the slaves. And they won’t take it. They refuse the money, and they go ahead and fight a war and get destroyed. I wish they’d taken it. You don’t have to fight a war. It’s probably cheaper if they take the money than to have to smash everything. But Sherman has to burn Atlanta to get that done. So, well, that’s what it is.
Adriano Mannino (0:38:55) Speaking of democratic institutional design historically, maybe we can go back one more time to those vast populations that can maybe not be directly enfranchised, especially future generations and nonhuman animals, nonhuman individuals. Do you have any great takes on how to best bring them into a democratic institutional picture? Or is the best we can do just to try to campaign effectively, to try to influence the political culture such that public policy improves with regard to the potentially vast suffering, and I guess, in the case of the animals, the actually really vast suffering of those populations?
Neil Sinhababu (0:39:41) I think that under a liberal democratic world government, if you get there... We’re talking about big steps, but these are big issues. If you take that first step, suppose you get everybody into a system like that.
Adriano Mannino (0:39:58) Or maybe take the US first.
Neil Sinhababu (0:40:01) Yeah. Well, so the US...
Adriano Mannino (0:40:03) Is all we can do for the animals just the usual kind of influencing and campaigning? And also for future generations.
Neil Sinhababu (0:40:10) The influencing and campaigning, I think, gets easier under that kind of system. Let me go to why. Right now in the world, there is all kinds of ethnic division all over the place. But the kinds of ethnic division you see, at least, don’t get that severe: to some extent there’s regionalism in the US, but it’s not as severe as the things that start wars. And the only time we had a civil war, we had to resolve a giant human rights abuse, slavery, and make people change a giant economic system. That was what it was. But once you get a broadly democratic system, people recognize, “Okay, the way to resolve our problems is through voting and those kinds of mechanisms rather than that.” So you get people to do less nationalistic, militaristic identification, and you can get people to come together as whatever the largest body within your political system is. It’s more natural for them to come together as that.
(0:41:15) Under a liberal democratic world government, it’s humans. That’s the first thing we get. Now, if it’s humans worrying about future humans, that looks a lot better than if it’s Israelis and Palestinians worrying about future Israelis and Palestinians, because then there are these super narrow groups that are all looking at their own. And with the conflicts between them, it could be, to take the one where the AI problem is showing up, Chinese versus Americans or something like that. It could be all kinds of things like that, which can’t coordinate effectively around the human problems of making future generations survive. You have all these little local identities. People criticize woke stuff for being identity politics, but by goodness, nations themselves, the map is identity politics. We’ve centralized power in all these little things that become their own identities and that don’t care about the future.
(0:42:14) So my hero in all of this: I have the extremely unusual opinion that Albert Einstein was the greatest philosopher of the 20th century, not only for getting us past Kant, not only for building a system that showed us the world...
Adriano Mannino (0:42:30) It’s an underrated take, I think. And great for voicing it.
Neil Sinhababu (0:42:36) Sorry, didn’t mean to... In the big ethics book I’m writing right now, Einstein is the first chapter, which gets you the system that shows you the world first, Einsteinian naturalism. From that, you proceed to be able to discover a universal, objective moral truth. But what he does at the end of his life: after the nuclear bombs are dropped, he sees the danger immediately, and he sees the solution immediately. As soon as World War II ends, he realizes we need some kind of democratic control framework for the new technology we’ve built that could destroy the world. And he sees that if people around the world collectively have some way to take control of what happens with this world-destroying weapon, well, they will choose the survival of themselves, and future generations along with them, over letting these things proliferate so that they could kill us all.
(0:43:29) Einstein sees that right away. He’s campaigning for it. He’s writing newspaper articles and magazine articles about it. So I just follow him in this. And I look at the political philosophy that followed him. I look at people who centralized things in nations. Rawls, for example, is thinking primarily about national governance. And here we are in an era where problems are international and our theories are very national. And I wish that Einstein and friends could have gone on to populate the future of philosophy. It’s something Hitler stole from us, because when he kicked the Vienna Circle and all of Einstein’s buddies and all the good academics of Europe out, and many of them fled to escape being killed, he disrupted some of the greatest philosophical interactions, which could have shown us beautiful things. Just to talk about the history of philosophy, this is something I’ve been seeing over and over again that’s deeply underplayed and under-recognized within my own field.
(0:44:28) There are theories being built in the early part of the 20th century, into the 1920s, that are so much better than what we have mid-century. Margaret Washburn is this amazing psychologist who writes a book called “The Animal Mind” about how to attribute psychological states to animals. She writes this in 1908. It’s the leading textbook on how to think about the animal mind for 25 years, and then behaviorism comes up and it’s gone. And one of the things I’ve seen there, in the loss of some European ideas from the Vienna Circle, from the European psychologists, Wundt and Titchener, from all these people: what happens in the world, I think, is that you have two world wars and a global depression, and academia gets severely disrupted. So all our transmission of ideas, the new generations of professors, we just get knocked back so badly.
(0:45:19) And then there’s a founder effect with certain mediocrities who show up mid-century. I am not impressed with Quine and Wittgenstein. These people, Heidegger, my goodness, there are all these people who come up, and they are not as good as their predecessors. And still, because of founder effects, they get to create the future, and the past gets reinterpreted in a way that makes these founders of what starts from there look... The past just gets forgotten or misinterpreted or regarded as stupid in some kind of way. And charity to the new founders requires some kind of lack of charity to those before. So that really damaged us. And that is something Hitler took from us. I look back at that earlier era, and I’m trying to bring back as many of those things as we can, so that we can recreate what is lost.
Adriano Mannino (0:46:08) We’ll dive more into global dynamics and global cooperation, potentially even global democracy, shortly. But I first wanted to ask you about partisanship. You’re taking this impartial moral stance, which aims at preventing the suffering and promoting the happiness of all morally considerable individuals. And relatedly, and we’ve heard your case for this, you want to preserve or create democratic institutions that enfranchise as many as possible. So morally, you’re taking an impartial stance, and then politically, if you favor a democratic institutional architecture, you’re in a sense also taking the stance of an impartial referee. But at the same time, for decades now, and you’ve been a bit unusual within the group of people who maybe agree with your fundamental ethical stance, you’ve also been a radical partisan, right?
(0:47:11) So you’re not just a small-d democrat, you’re a large-D Democrat. Do you think there are objections here that you take seriously? Let me just voice one. If you take the kind of ethical stance that you do, where reducing the suffering of all sentient beings is quite crucial, then ethically, at least for now, and this is regrettable, you’re kind of orthogonal to what most people tend to believe, including what the mainstream within either party in the USA believes. Now, I’m sure you’re momentarily going to make the case that you are still much more aligned with one side here than with the other. But still, might there not be lots of issues where a ton of suffering is on the line and that have not been politicized yet?
(0:48:03) And isn’t there a danger in being so radical a partisan? For instance, maybe many people who tend to vote Republican might be very open-minded toward improving the fate of the animals, and maybe making them at least suffer less in the hellscape that is factory farms. Another potential issue that comes to mind is the recent shift that we have seen in terms of gay marriage, say. Couldn’t one argue that what really drove change is that attitudes just shifted in a bipartisan manner? And couldn’t there be an argument that being a pretty radical partisan here might at least sometimes, or often, as some might perhaps argue, be counterproductive? If you took a different moral starting point, where you were fully aligned with the moral sentiments that prevail on one side, I think that would be a different argument, but you’re not. And so you’re trying to use parties as instrumental vehicles. So are there any concerns that trouble you here about being so radically partisan?
Neil Sinhababu (0:49:10) There are all kinds of concerns. You weigh the options and you look at one and the other, and that’s what it is. I should get into what it is about the Democratic Party that has made me stick to it since I was in high school in North Carolina back in the mid-’90s. As a teenager, before I could vote, I was already participating in my Democratic Party institutions. It doesn’t work exactly the same way in every state, but the way it works in North Carolina has become more and more the way it works nationally. And here’s what this is. There are the two parties, and you can see what the alliances are. In North Carolina, there are basically white nationalists. It used to be more Christian, now it’s more of a racial thing, but the racism was always there. The religion has declined a little bit, there’s declining religiosity, but it’s still there in many ways.
(0:50:06) The alliance of that and money was the Republican Party: that and very wealthy interests. And the Democratic Party was basically everybody who was threatened by one group or the other sufficiently, or saw their interests sufficiently at risk, that they had to form a coalition with each other. And it was groups that really have very deep demographic differences. You’d get lefty university professors who have high levels of education and a decent salary, and you’d get the poor African American population, who often have the lowest levels of education and aren’t paid very well. So why are those people in the same party? Well, they see the opposing coalition as a threat to their interests and what they care about. That was the way this went.
(0:50:53) Now, this kind of concentrated alignment, where everybody is focused on the interests of wealth and everyone is into this racial ideology of the majority, you get in many other countries. India has it too: you get the alignment of wealth and Hindu nationalism against the coalition of everybody else. In the UK, their multiparty system is very complicated, but sometimes the alliances shape up in that way. It’s much more complicated in a multiparty system, obviously, but in two-party systems, things often go that way. And the US has moved itself steadily more and more into that. We used to have more moderate, elite Republicans. The key moment to understand, I think, is how we got to be this way from the 1950s, when it’s kind of hard to tell the parties apart. They’re really mixed all over the place.
(0:51:55) I’ll just give you a history of the parties in the US and how they got to be the way they are. In the ‘50s, what you have is three different bodies stuck in a two-party system. The Republicans are wealthy, educated elites. They basically have the Republican Party to themselves, but they often lose congressional elections. They can’t hold Congress, because that’s just one body. The two bodies on the other side, the Democrats, are Northern urban labor union poor people and Southern poor farmers who are white. The Black population is disenfranchised, and the way it works with the Southern whites is that they are with the North on “give more resources to the poor,” but their special interest is “don’t let the Blacks vote.”
(0:52:51) Now the Civil Rights Act comes, and this is a thing which, in the ‘50s, you might have expected the Republican Party to drive. But things shake out differently. Lyndon Johnson really sees this as something that needs to be done. He’s president at the right time. Also, Cold War issues are coming up, and we want to make friends in Africa, and the Africans are saying, “Okay, so how do you treat Africans in your place?” And that’s a bit of a sore spot. So they need to get that off the books as fast as they can. So they do that. And now you’ve enfranchised the Southern Black people, who are immediately in an alliance with the Northern urban people, who often include Blacks who moved north to get away from all the oppression in the Jim Crow South. That’s how the North got to be very, very civil rights friendly: the Great Migration north. And now you get this alliance that we have today between the urban city dwellers and the poor Southern whites [correction: Southern Black voters] who just won the Mississippi Senate race.
(0:53:51) So that comes on as an alliance right there. It shifts that way, but the Southern whites didn’t get what they want. The racial battle in the South is one that they are now unhappy with, and they are pitted against the Southern Blacks. And you get, okay, the money needs some allies, of any kind. And so you get the alliance you see now, an alliance that Elon Musk, I’m sure, very much likes, between misanthropic money and white racism in America. It’s an alliance that a South African, apartheid-friendly guy from the old days might feel a real affinity for. So he came on and did what he could to promote that alliance. And from North Carolina, I can see the counter-alliance developing, this coalition of everybody who is under threat, because the white nationalists and the money are so naturally aligned.
(0:54:55) That counter-alliance is one that looks more like the rest of the world’s population. It has the minorities, it has all these different people. And what kind of ideology do they have? Well, you can’t make it Black nationalism, because, hey, there are whites in the alliance, like the gay white people, and they’re not for that. And you can’t make it some kind of gay supremacy or something like that, because the Black people are not going to go for that. The straight Black people are just like, “Okay, that’d be ridiculous.” So what do they do? Well, with diverse alliances, the principle around which they can organize is some kind of universal human rights and equality, and some kind of broadly fair economic distribution. They can go for that, because it’s just such a mix. You’ve got to treat everybody equally. That’s the only way you can set up this ragtag mix of different people into some kind of coalition with a functional ideology that they can all align behind.
(0:55:54) That’s what you get in these super diverse coalitions of everybody else. The only organizing principle left to them is some kind of universal, ethical, human rights type of principle. To go back to your question about future generations, about what we do with animal rights: if you have a coalition that has some kind of philosophical justification around universal systems of rights, well, it has to be philosophical. It can’t be ethnic nationalism and it can’t be money, which are the two other gigantic forces that actually drive politics in the world. So you have that kind of group, the universal human rights people, and that, I think, is much more fertile ground for anything you want to do with animals, because, okay, animals are kind of like us.
(0:56:47) Let’s see how the human rights considerations expand to them. Future generations, well, they’re humans too. They’re humans of the future. So the human rights considerations go over to them too in some way. There are all kinds of things that can get in the way, all kinds of philosophical obstacles, but I think the best philosophical solutions actually have a lot for the animals and for the future people. So you will find much more fertile territory for getting your systems that respect animals and future people going in that kind of coalition of everybody else. It shows in foreign policy. Democratic politicians do make mistakes on foreign policy issues, but in general, when there is some kind of foreign policy disaster... The Iraq war was one of these big cases. That happened under a Republican president. Democrats did vote for it, often under weapons-of-mass-destruction errors and things like that.
(0:57:40) But the mobilization to stop the war came on the Democratic side. And by the 2008 election, every single major Democratic candidate wanted to get troops out of Iraq. That was an agreed-upon thing within the party. And it was a Democratic president who got the troops out. Later, there are all kinds of Biden mistakes, but he does get the troops out of Afghanistan. That’s something he does early on. The first two years of Biden, I do think, were pretty good. For the next two years, there was a changeover in chief of staff. The guy for the first two years, Ron Klain, who ran his campaign, is actually very animal welfare friendly. I have a lot of good things to say about Ron Klain. When Ebola broke out in West Africa, they basically put Ron Klain, because he was an inside guy who knew how to coordinate government bodies, on stopping Ebola. And that’s why people don’t know about Ebola breaking out in West Africa in 2014. He did it so well, you don’t know about it. But then they got this new guy, Jeff Zients, for the second half. And that’s where a lot of things started going wrong.
Adriano Mannino (0:58:44) So if I heard you right, and correct me if I’m wrong, your basic case for practical political partisanship is just that you believe that one of the two coalitions, in the US in particular, is better, or perhaps much less bad, than the other. And I take it one argument you gave for this is also of an epistemic nature and runs through the demographic composition of one of those two coalitions, the Democratic one, which tends to be much more diverse. And as you argued, that might also influence their epistemics, such that they would have to center maybe more impartial concepts to do with equal consideration, equal rights, and so on. I’m still wondering what the strategic upshot of that is. Does that mean that, according to your view, the political strategy should first and foremost just be to make the better or the less bad side win, maybe at the cost, if it is even a cost on your view, of polarizing many issues in the process? Because in public discourse you would be associating many issues that may or may not have bipartisan appeal with one side, and then just going all in and trying to make that coalition work.
(1:00:03) Is that basically the main strategic upshot? Or does your view still have room for the importance of a lot of truly nonpartisan work as well? And maybe you could also comment on the issue I raised, of what recently happened with the cause of gay marriage. Is your model there that this issue was basically also politicized and clearly associated with one side of the spectrum, but then somehow still ended up having bipartisan appeal? What happened there? To what extent was it important that on the other side of the spectrum, we had similar advocates and maybe also truly nonpartisan advocacy groups?
Neil Sinhababu (1:00:40) On gay marriage, I see that as a cause that succeeded in the US. Obviously, society came together in all kinds of interesting ways to be supportive. There was general, broad-spectrum public discussion that moved things forward, and greater acceptance of gay people doing things on TV. You can kiss a girl on TV now if you’re a girl, and you can kiss a guy on TV if you’re a guy. That’s just a new thing that came up at a certain point. And that was broad cultural stuff. But what really did it, as far as getting the legal changes, was the judges Obama put on the Supreme Court, who were most of that majority. And there were some old ones from a time when the Republican Party was a little bit more of a high-minded party.
(1:01:31) They were basically holdovers from a previous period. But the more partisan Republican judges of more recent years were less favorable toward it, Scalia and people like that. The way this ended up working, just because the opposition was so strong on the Republican side, was that the opposition was going to come from one side and the support was going to come from the other. I’ll just tell you the North Carolina side of this, because it’s pretty dark. When I was living in North Carolina, this is the 1990s, we twice reelected Jesse Helms to the Senate. This guy had been, back in the ‘60s, an opponent of Martin Luther King. He wanted segregation of the races, all that kind of bad stuff from back then. And in the ‘90s, as a religious conservative, he was opposing funding for a cure for HIV, because he thought this disease was part of God’s plan for gay people.
(1:02:30) When you have that in the Republican Party, and that sentiment running as deep as it did, of course this has to be a partisan cause. One party is against it in this horrendous way that’s going to cause death. So it had to go that way. And a lot of issues just have to go that way, where it’s the two judges Obama puts on that end up tipping the balance on the Supreme Court. There are other things, though. I’m interested in the fact that, for example, animal welfare issues have not yet become that partisan in the US. Maybe that’s for the best. I don’t know if I’d advise them against it, but I would not with great confidence advise animal welfare people to really make a loud and proud push with the Democratic Party, because I just don’t know what would happen.
(1:03:28) They have a powerful industry against them. Would we get some kind of polarization toward a party that just aggressively commits animal cruelty? I don’t even know what would happen. That is just unpredictable to me. But sometimes, when the opposition to you is clearly coming from within politics, from one side, the only opportunity you have is to work through a party. So that’s it.
Adriano Mannino (1:03:51) Could there also be some kind of strategic division of labor among progressive forces, where some pursue the tactic, as we might say, of just making the less bad side win, and others maintain a more nonpartisan posture and try to create support for crucial high-stakes issues, also very neglected ones? Again, take future generations or animal welfare: things that matter a lot from the point of view of reducing suffering in particular, but that may not, or not yet, or may never, have mass appeal, where perhaps you can do things in a more nonpartisan way also, or sometimes even exclusively. Another thing I’m wondering about is whether and to what extent the strategy of making the right or the less bad side win may sometimes just require too much time to work.
(1:04:46) Take, for instance, what’s currently going on in AI: truly unprecedented developments, and plausibly also unprecedented, truly catastrophic risks for global society. But we’re stuck with a Republican administration and a president who manifestly doesn’t understand the issue or take the concerns seriously for another two years. Now suppose we were to politicize issues of AI safety and of the reduction of catastrophic risks, or even mundane risks, which can also be pretty bad. Might that not be counterproductive, because we just have no option but to try to work with the current administration for the next two years? And the next two years may indeed be incredibly crucial with regard to further developments and deployments of the technology.
Neil Sinhababu (1:05:42) Look, if people want to solve problems by working through the Republican Party, I hope they can solve their problems that way. It’s just harder to get anything done on that side. Obviously, they have the power. Well, now you’ve got a divided Congress, so it’s Congress against the president, and things may get more complicated that way. I don’t know exactly what to do about this right now, but the president is concerned with home renovations to a very large extent, rather than any matters of national policy.
Adriano Mannino (1:06:17) He may soon have a robot army at his disposal to speed all of that up.
Neil Sinhababu (1:06:21) Yes. So it’s just really hard to know how to interact with this administration, given that not only is he completely disconnected from real issues in a horrifying way, he has surrounded himself with advisors who are primarily there for their loyalty to him. So how we interact with this is just unclear. Look, if somebody has some kind of strategy for that, they should try it.
Adriano Mannino (1:06:52) But what do you think about the thought of division of labor here generally, Neil? So among the people who share your values and your broad strategic outlook, some would really focus on making the right side win, and others might really try to go all in with regard to working with the administration.
Neil Sinhababu (1:07:08) Sure, and that’s fine. Look, people should just do whatever is going to make the good thing happen. And if they see an avenue on the Republican side, go for it, if there’s something you can do over there. If you can make it work, do it. But on the other hand, how to vote is the main thing I’m looking at there. Donations are a little bit tricky, because there are just so many things you can give money to, and so many choices are nonpartisan, and some of them are effective. I give my 10% to standard GiveWell global poverty causes, as I pledged to a long time ago, but then I give about another 10% every year to Democrats. So that’s how I do this. And you can do whatever you want to do. But really, I’m focused on this: once you are using distinctively political resources like your vote, put that on the side of the diverse coalition that includes the poor, and not on the side of the wealthy and the ethno-religious majority of your country.
Adriano Mannino (1:08:21) What about the argument, which I’m sure has held quite many people back, that your vote is just so unlikely to make a difference? And if you’re not a millionaire, billionaire, or trillionaire, your money may be very unlikely to make a difference, as we’ve also just seen. Although I don’t know, maybe Musk’s money, Musk’s hundreds of millions, did make a difference. But in the environment that we’ve seen, in that blue wave, it certainly wasn’t enough. So what’s your general reply? As we’ve mentioned, you’ve been at this for more than two decades and have thought deeply about electoral tactics. My vote doesn’t matter, nor does my money. Why should I still pursue these tactics?
Neil Sinhababu (1:09:02) I grant that it’s very improbable that it will make a difference. But if it does make that difference, it’s the biggest thing you and anyone you know will ever do in their lives. If you’re talking about major national elections, who knows how many millions of people you will save? And with some of these issues we’re talking about, it could be the rest of humanity. You only have a small chance of doing it, but the effects are tremendous. I had a colleague here named Zach Barnett who wrote up this beautiful, beautiful account of why your vote matters so much. And I’ll spell out how this works. Here’s the way I like to explain it. Imagine that you were the only voter and the only citizen. We’ll start with that base case, and then I’ll expand to the big polities we’re actually in.
(1:09:57) If you were the only voter and the only, say, taxpayer and person to live under the laws and all that, well, you might find it worthwhile to vote, and maybe even to donate some money. Well, you’re the only voter, so who are you donating to? But at least it’d be worthwhile to vote, just to have your own tax dollars sent the way one party says rather than another. That’d be a fine use of your time. And the laws you live under, you’d want to optimize those for yourself. That’d be worthwhile. So in the one-person case, it makes sense to vote. Let’s see what happens when we expand the number of people. Let me also make one other assumption here: that you care about what happens to others. It works best, and I’ll do it my way, where I’m a utilitarian and I care about everybody and all beings that will be.
(1:10:48) You can contract it in a more complex way if you want to. Maybe you’ll come out with no reason to vote, and I’m happy with that for the people who are selfish. If they’re doing that, they may have less reason to. Okay, great. But for me, if you care about everybody, then you have plenty of reason to vote, because here’s what happens as the population expands. The effect that your vote has expands in a linear way. With every new taxpayer, there are some new tax dollars coming in. That just expands in a steady way. As the number of people governed by the laws expands, the impact of the laws gets bigger and bigger. Linear. On the other hand, what happens to the probability of determining the outcome? That’s going to decline, obviously, as things change, but it doesn’t correspond to the linear growth of your effect.
(1:11:46) You can see this in how elections usually cluster around the 50-50 mark, for all kinds of reasons, median voter kinds of reasons. Given that elections are more likely to be at that midpoint, or somewhere around the midpoint, than anywhere else, your probability of tipping the balance is actually better than you’d think. The linear rise in your power as the population expands actually outpaces the decline in your outcome-determining power. So it turns out that as things get bigger and bigger and bigger, your ability to affect the world gets more and more awesome. So if you’d vote in the one-person case and you care about others, you definitely should vote in the many-people case in general.
(1:12:42) Now, you might be in a really weird place. You might be somewhere where you know how the election is going to go, because you’re voting in the DC presidential election, and that’s always going to go Democratic. Okay, I’m not talking about that case. But in general, definitely if you’re in a swing state. And if you’re not in a swing state, well, there are a lot of lower offices that matter. Don’t forget about those. A lot of those are going to be important ones. It’s easiest if you’re in a swing state; that’s one thing. If you’re in a state where there’s a clear partisan division and you can tell this party is better than that party, then you don’t even have to put too much effort into it. Maybe if there’s a guy in your party who’s really, really corrupt, then you’ve got to study it and be like, “Okay, is this guy so corrupt that I’ve got to get rid of him?” And sometimes he will be, and then you get him out. But otherwise, vote for your preferred party, if they have coherent ideologies to some extent. Vote in a swing state for president. If you’re in any kind of constituency where your voting will have some effect, it makes a lot of sense.
Adriano Mannino (1:13:48) I think what you just explained is a great argument. I guess I am still worried about a potential counter along these lines: even if the expected value, as philosophers and decision theorists say, looks good, because, as you just explained, as the population that you can affect goes up, the probability that you’re affecting it doesn’t go down by as much, still, even in close elections, the probability that you will actually be the difference-making vote is minuscule. Staying informed might be quite a time investment; actually voting is not. But then we’re talking about quite a lot of money. Sure, if you invest sufficient amounts in a highly cost-effective way, maybe the probability difference that you make is actually a bit more than tiny.
(1:14:47) But still, there are moral opportunity costs here. Another thing you could do with quite a lot of money is just save children from suffering and dying from malaria, or save people from literal hellish torture, suffering from cluster headaches and other unimaginably painful conditions, with a really high degree of certainty. So that’s the opportunity cost, which then raises an issue that philosophers have called moral aggregation. If you do the political thing, maybe what you do is provide some probability of a significant benefit to very many. But the other thing you could have done with the same resources is save people, with something close to certainty, from really great harms.
(1:15:42) And that, I think, worries me a bit. Although then perhaps there’s a rejoinder along the lines of: if you do the political thing, you can do it together with many others. And so you may do your part in a kind of collective cooperation, where the collective that you’re part of may then have much more than a tiny chance to affect things. But I guess that raises further moral and also decision-theoretic issues. But are you satisfied with a small probability of really high stakes, or do you have an opportunity cost worry? I mean, I guess you’re giving 10% to the children, right?
Neil Sinhababu (1:16:20) Yeah, exactly. I do both. Maybe there’s some decision-theoretic argument for concentrating. But on the other hand, having a portfolio of good causes keeps you connected to good causes in a way that translates over in certain ways. I keep in touch with broad development issues in a way that may have been helpful for understanding USAID issues to some extent, just so that I could see why it is that private donors are not going to be able to jump in for this. What was USAID doing that was special? Some of it was leveraging certain kinds of power that the US government has to get things to certain places. Sometimes the military is out there, and it has its logistics network, and you can ride that when you need medical supplies to get there.
(1:17:16) Okay, well, you can put them on things that are going for whatever reason. I can’t really defend it that strongly, but I do both, in fact. I think expected value might be higher on the political side, just because of how much money given the right way matters. The study that I’m really impressed with on this: in 2004, the Bush administration was considering this tax change for how overseas profits were taxed. And a group of corporations spent, I believe it was 287 million, something like that, lobbying for it. Enormous amounts of money, especially by that time’s standards. But what they got out of the tax change, this foreign tax exclusion holiday or whatever it was called: they made 62 billion in profits out of getting that tax change.
(1:18:17) So it was a 221-to-1 leverage ratio, I think. So when I started out donating to Democratic leaders, and doing it in a way where I can show up at fundraisers, I was thinking to myself, what can I do to get that kind of leverage on my GiveWell-style foreign aid? Because if I can get the malaria pills going out at a 221-to-1 ratio over what I’d be doing with GiveWell, oh, I am like a god now. The kind of benefit I can dispense on the world is tremendous. But it turns out that there are all kinds of other complicated things I’d need to have in place, like a DC lobbying operation to match what those guys were doing. So I can’t actually do it that way, I figured out. But there are little things that one can do through these things to influence the US political system in the ways that you would be able to push.
(1:19:11) So I’ll tell you a little bit about that. The big way is that I try to donate to Senate candidates. I’ve been doing this since 2010. I’ve been giving $5,000 a year to Jeff Merkley, the senator from Oregon. Here’s why I picked him. I don’t have any connections to Oregon. But the thing was, I saw what he did in the state legislature, and it was absolutely amazing. I’ll tell you the story from the beginning, all the things he does. First, he’s the Democratic leader, but Democrats are in the minority. So what he does is he finds somebody in the district of the Republican leader and heavily supports that person’s challenge to the Republican leader.
(1:20:05) She gets so worried that she fundraises for herself instead of her lower-down party members, and she survives the challenge, but her party’s majority doesn’t. Democrats then have a 31-29 majority in the state House. They have larger majorities in the Senate, and a governor, so the House is the weak link. At 31-29, if two people defect on anything, it doesn’t pass. So they have to figure out what to do about this. And Jeff is not your threatening type of guy or your shouting alpha-male type. He’s this really soft-spoken, gentle person who will slowly explain things to people over and over again until they see it their way. And he does this within his coalition, basically telling everybody, “We have to vote as a bloc.” This is not like the UK system, where stuff like that gets locked in by other rules.
(1:21:00) No, as the parliamentary leader in Oregon, you actually have to make the bloc. And he makes the bloc by just convincing everybody. And they pass all 12 items of their agenda, plus all kinds of random other stuff to solve problems I didn’t even know existed. They just pass all these things on 31-29. And I’ve seen this, and now he’s running for Senate. I’m like, “Can we put a man into the US Senate to get Democrats to coordinate effectively? Because we’re having all kinds of coordination problems.” So I decided I’m going to give to this guy. I’m here in Singapore with a salary paid here, but I’m a US citizen born in the US, so I’ll put my money over there the best I can. And Jeff Merkley is the guy. So I donate $5,000 a year to what’s called his leadership PAC. This is not money he can use on his own reelection.
(1:21:51) I don’t really want to donate to that, because he’ll win in Oregon. I don’t need to waste money on something that’s already going to happen. It’s money for him to give to other people for their reelection. He’s going to give it to other Democrats, often running in Senate races. So what happens then is I have the guy who I agree with on all these things. The way he won me over, as far as his own views: I just asked him, “What should you do about global poverty?” I had a fellow political activist who put me on an online Q&A with the senator, because I was a blogger back in those days. So I asked him, “Do you have any thoughts about that?” And he laid out the case for third world debt relief in just beautiful terms, saying, sometimes you have a dictator who runs up huge debts on luxuries and on security services to oppress the people, and the people finally overthrow him, and then they’re stuck with the debts from all that dictator’s personal enrichment and oppression of them.
(1:22:54) And he’s like, “This is really unjust. We need to stop that.” You’re an Oregon state House guy, and you see that so perfectly. It turned out he’d gone all around Africa in his younger years thinking he’d do international development work, but then went back to the US and went to law school and became a senator. So now he’s in the Senate. I’m like, “This guy, I am going to increase this guy’s power as much as I can, because he’s just great.” So, $5,000 a year for him to give to other Democrats so that they owe him favors, and I can coordinate the Senate as much as possible around a great legislative tactician who has great values. And I recommend Jeff Merkley’s leadership PAC to anybody. If you were going to donate to senators anyway, if you’re the kind of person who, when the election comes around, sees all these Senate races and wants to put your money in, well, this is something you do beforehand, back in January of the election year. You go ahead and do it, because you know you’re going to want to do that.
(1:23:53) And so you do it in a way that coordinates the party: now they owe favors to the guy who’s a great coordinator and has great values. That’s the best way to do it, I think. And just to give you a sense of where the money goes: there are these fundraisers you get to go to. This is part of the deal, and I recommend this to anyone who does this. With $2,500 or more, you can spend a day and a half in Oregon drinking wine with a bunch of lobbyists and me. And there are some local Oregon folk who donate too.
Adriano Mannino (1:24:22) Could be worse.
Neil Sinhababu (1:24:23) Could be worse. The Oregon wine country is nice. Go out there and try some of the stuff out.
Adriano Mannino (1:24:30) Reducing suffering and having way too much fun in the process.
Neil Sinhababu (1:24:36) Exactly.
Adriano Mannino (1:24:37) So as you just explained, you’ve been very interested in tactics for the Senate. As you just said, “if you’re going to donate toward the Senate.” But should we? Or is there a case for saving up, say, for presidential races? A take that’s out there, and that I’ve heard a lot, and I don’t necessarily agree but I’m curious about your thoughts, is that it’s certainly more salient and obvious that and how presidential races matter, especially if the worse side is running an especially terrible candidate, as it recently has. Then you have a pretty stark choice. And what I’ve personally also been impressed by is that if you look at US presidential electoral history in the past couple of decades, many elections have been incredibly close.
(1:25:28) I believe Bush versus Al Gore was decided by 537 votes in Florida. Biden won by, I believe it was 42,000 votes. And other races have also been close. And here, obviously, the argument you gave earlier becomes all the stronger. I think it’s also interesting that the whole space is, it seems to me, surprisingly tractable at the more micro level. One might be under the impression that maybe one can run randomized controlled trials to try to figure out the cost-effectiveness of specific measures in the global poverty cause area, but not in politics. But it turns out, as I learned some time ago, that’s actually not true, because there’s a pretty well-developed applied political science running experiments about what increases voter turnout in really crucial, hingy places, and what persuades voters.
(1:26:27) So when it comes to presidential races, the contrast between either side can be extremely stark, and the stakes can be obvious. The math, I think, is in some ways easier; I think you can get a better handle on what you’re actually buying in terms of probability. So I was wondering, is there a case for, say, focusing on presidential races over Senate races? Or what would you say? Maybe you could also fill our listeners in a bit more on why the Senate matters so much in your view. And then maybe also, with a view to 2028, what your current thoughts are about what the coalition that you favor should be doing, and what you’re planning to do with a view to the upcoming elections in 2028.
Neil Sinhababu (1:27:14) If you have some cost-effective way of affecting the presidential race, go for it. But I don’t recommend donating large amounts of money directly to the presidential campaigns. Because often, as far as I can see, you get some kind of diminishing-returns effect, where they’re just so heavily funded, so much money is going in there, that they are...
Adriano Mannino (1:27:39) Sorry, isn’t it often the case that much of that money in the big campaigns also goes to ineffective stuff, and there are always cost-effective options that are going neglected? Or is your sense that it’s still unpromising because returns rapidly diminish?
Neil Sinhababu (1:27:55) Well, you have a whole bunch of options about where to donate. And I would be surprised if the major presidential campaigns, the number one thing that everyone thinks of first and that thus just naturally gets a bunch of dumb money thrown at it, ended up being the most cost-effective, just given how that works. Now, if you are good at targeting seats, the amount of advantage you get there is good. And if you can affect Senate coordination: this isn’t just about who wins the election. This is about having networks of favors going on in certain ways that leadership PACs set up. I want my guy making friends with other people who will then vote his way on things. And this is something I realized when I was donating to a congressional race in the US as an out-of-state donor.
(1:28:52) There’s absolutely no way I can influence this guy, and he doesn’t know where the money is coming from. Presidential campaign donations are kind of like that. Who gave this money? What were their interests? Well, leadership PACs keep track of you, and they know who you are and what your interests are. You get to talk to the senator, and you get to talk to the fundraising staff and the campaign staff. You get to talk to the insiders on these wine tours. On top of that, you get to talk to the lobbyists and figure out what they’re thinking about what’s going on in DC, which is often just amazing informationally. So you get certain kinds of advantages that are specific to this kind of method. Now, if you have some way of affecting the presidential election that is not just giving money to the major campaigns, which a lot of people do, then go ahead and try that. I’d be very interested in seeing more people do things like that. There are a couple of other things that are awesome targets for donation.
(1:29:46) One of them, and we’ve just passed the point where you can do it: in off years, state secretary of state races are incredible leverage, because in a lot of states, they control voting when the election comes around. So if you’re trying to prevent disenfranchisement of minorities, if you’re trying to make sure that there are enough resources to run the polls everywhere, that, for example, states with many Hispanics have Spanish-language voting materials, this matters. There was a really tight race in Arizona about this, where one of the big items of the Republican candidate for state secretary of state was that there will be no Spanish-language voting materials at the polls. Some reporters went to his mansion in the hills to interview him, and they found out that he was fine with having Spanish-language no-trespassing signs.
(1:30:37) But no, no materials for all the grandmas who wanted to vote. Anyway, I got a bunch of my friends together to donate to the Democrat in the state secretary of state race. It turned out the race was called for the Republican on election night. But Katie Hobbs, the Democrat, actually won on late ballots. It was that close. She was state secretary of state in 2020, when Biden won and Arizona was a key state. So who knows? For all I know, that election may have hinged on me and my friends throwing that money in, because it was that close, with the election night flip. And then that gets you the right person in place, who will actually have the Spanish-language voting materials and all the good stuff to make sure everybody can vote. If you have that person in, maybe that gets you Biden in 2020.
(1:31:30) So who knows? The kinds of influence you can have if you figure out the right things: state secretary of state, it’s really big. So you can do all these things. There are a lot of things to do. Leverage is huge if you find the right things. One last thing I’ll say about the Senate in particular. We often have backlash: you go one way, and then it gets polarized, you go the other way, and backlash goes back and forth. People look at the presidential level, and the backlash goes on because of what’s happening there. But the Senate is really interesting in this way: there’s really not much backlash at that level. And it may actually be one of these things where at the presidential level, they try to do something, but they fail for a reason that is invisible to the normal swing voter.
(1:32:22) It’s because of the Senate. It’s because of the filibuster in the US. It’s because of all these weird Senate procedural rules, where if you have Jeff Merkley trying to smooth your way past the obstacles, it may help. So you have a presidential thing that could be backlashy, and a Senate thing where, as far as I can tell, the backlash effect is actually negative. There’s no backlash effect, or it’s counter-backlash. Because otherwise, your president tries to do something but fails because of the Senate. And then the media, as it will, has to find a reason the thing failed. And the triumphant opponents of it basically say it was bad because of this: more backlash. But if you get it through the Senate, then you get a much happier situation, where people enjoy the benefits, if it’s a good policy.
(1:33:13) Take some of our social welfare policies. Social Security, when we passed that almost a hundred years ago, was making new Democrats over and over again as time passed, for decades and decades. So we had that, plus Republicans hated it, and they kept trying to attack it, and the backlash hit them. Newt Gingrich got destroyed in Congress. Bush tried to privatize it. He expended his second-term political capital on trying to privatize Social Security, and it failed, and it basically wiped out his domestic agenda after that, because people could see Democrats can actually block stuff. That was a really big moment. So you have this invisible body that is really making things go, and it doesn’t get affected by those swings.
(1:34:04) For short-term things, if you’ve got to do AI risk, look, do whatever you can. I’m not going to stop anybody from doing anything on that issue. But on broad, general things that I can foresee for a nice long time, the Senate is a really good place to put your money, and little things like state secretaries of state. And you can also find a local office, if you have something local that works. Definitely play that. But obviously I can’t give general advice on local things. You’ll have a locality that’s a certain way.
Adriano Mannino (1:34:28) Very interesting. Turning to the midterm results, the blue wave that we’ve just seen: I’m wondering what your thoughts are on how that may or may not change the broad strategic picture, or also some of the tactical nitty-gritty. Ever since Trump came to power in 2016, I for one have been deeply worried about US democracy, including existentially. I think the US, as an old democracy and the most powerful democracy on this planet, is geopolitically crucial. Imagine a scenario where the US democratic backsliding really were to go on and the US were to truly slide into autocracy or even dictatorship. Then you could have a global situation where you have three nuclear superpowers that are all autocracies or dictatorships, two of which, China and the US, are probably soon going to be AI superpowers as well.
(1:35:26) And then the picture starts to look extremely grim for the entire future of democracy, and especially liberal democracy, on this planet. This is one thing that has convinced me that the US is extremely important, and trying to stabilize it. And even when he lost to Biden: it’s well known in political science, and there are many contemporary and historical examples, that such figures can come to power again even after an electoral loss. So one thing I’m wondering, and I’m still trying to make up my mind about, is to what extent the midterm result, this blue wave, should reassure me. To what extent should one still prioritize preserving US democracy versus maybe now moving into more aggressive, progressive strategies?
Neil Sinhababu (1:36:18) US democracy, I think, is going to be important for all the major geopolitical reasons you describe. I’m really happy to see our enormous Senate numbers. It looks like 56 this time, if Alaska and Mississippi finish up the way I think they are going to finish up. Even if it doesn’t mean that much right now, because of weird things about Trump and how he operates, there are the effects on 2029, if we can just make it till then: the prospects for the US making some kind of really big reform. There are ways to get constitutional reform done. You’ll need majorities, but it may be easier than passing a constitutional amendment.
(1:37:14) I can tell you my completely extreme strategy for getting constitutional reform done with a bare majority, if you’d like to hear it. There is a power to create states in the US Constitution, and you can do it even by carving new states out of existing states. So, for example, if you really need to do some constitutional reform, you can get in touch with, say, good Democratic states like California, New York, Illinois, and basically say, “Guys, can we turn your thousand most Democratic precincts into states?” This obviously is not the way you want to keep the system. This has a very short-term purpose. So you state up a thousand precincts, and then use the power there, either through constitutional conventions or passing legislation or whatever, to pass the constitutional amendments you need.
(1:38:13) You do a bunch of things in there. You pass your constitutional amendments, and then, finally, at the end, you undo all the new states. Also, one thing that’s very important in this: you have to detach the federal system and future constitutional changes from state boundaries. You’d have to do something like set up the Senate so it’s a proportional representation kind of body, or something like that. You have to disconnect it from states, because once you disconnect the federal system from states, nobody can use this again to do what you did and undo it. It’s a one-way thing if you disconnect properly from states: the state creation power is now nullified as a way to ever do it again. So what would you do if you had this constitutional change? The main things I was thinking about this for in previous years were just democratic reform.
(1:39:11) Let’s create a system in which you get rid of gerrymandering by having the districts drawn in some computer-driven way. I think competitive districts is a good way to go, but you can have a bunch of criteria. The Senate: we really cannot keep going with these arbitrary, state-driven Senate boundaries that give Wyoming two senators and California two senators despite vast population differences. This is just making the Mountain West ridiculously powerful for no good reason. We’ve got to get rid of the Electoral College and go to a national popular vote. And if we have some kind of voting rights protections coming down, that’s good. But now, one other thing...
Adriano Mannino (1:39:50) But, sorry, aren’t these changes very unrealistic for the time being?
Neil Sinhababu (1:39:56) No, I don’t think so. Once you get the big Senate majority and it’s 2029, you can do this in the way I’m talking about, at the most extreme. Also, maybe just getting the option out there as something that could be done is useful for putting a gun to the head of whoever doesn’t want to do it. “Do you really want that, or do you want to just vote on it, and we’ll pass some things together?” State creation is cheap. It’s just ridiculous how cheap it is to do something that big. You just need a bare majority, the way you pass ordinary legislation. You need to get rid of the filibuster, because they can filibuster it. But if you can do that, then you can pass legislation. And at 56, we’re within shooting distance of a filibuster-proof majority. So that can be done. But we can also just undo the filibuster, which I think really does need to be done.
(1:40:49) Why are we having supermajority requirements that can be so easily abused, and that kept getting abused, even on healthcare reform, all these things? It creates this bizarre situation where, since the budget can’t be filibustered, Democrats can pass Obamacare, and they have to beat the filibuster to do it, but Republicans can just strip out all the funding budgetarily with 51. So we just have to get rid of this. The supermajority requirement is just pointless. There’s also another supermajority requirement I’m looking at, and I really want to get rid of this one. This is not something people talk about, but we have weird requirements on treaties. I would like to make it much easier for the US to plug into international institutions, so I don’t want obstacles to that. Also, if we’re doing constitutional things, and this is the new thing I think about, maybe there’ll be energy for this if we get some kind of mid-level AI problem that really scares people, or something like that. If we find some reason that we really need international institutions, we could do something constitutionally to get closer with other countries and unify institutions with them in some way. I don’t know exactly what it would look like.
(1:42:12) I don’t know what that looks like, but that could be the beginning of expansion beyond nation states. I think if we stick with nation states, there are all kinds of doom that are going to come and hit us, from war to technological risks. We saw what happened with the pandemic, trying to coordinate around that. These borders are just not good for you.
Adriano Mannino (1:42:38) We’ll return to the international level and its dynamics very shortly. Maybe just one more question on the US strategy. Are you worried that if your coalition were to pursue this more forward, aggressive strategy, really trying to finally end the kind of tyranny of the minority that often currently rules, the other coalition might just take this as a declaration of war? Because they’re not stupid, of course, and they might see where this is going. And they might be very well aware that there’s a real chance that this will permanently lock them out of power. Couldn’t this fundamentally threaten domestic stability at a time where it might be quite needed? As we’ve been discussing, it’s also a time of technological upheaval, and so on.
(1:43:30) You can certainly justify those moves strategically from your point of view. Maybe you also have a kind of meta-fairness argument, if the tyranny of the minority is unfair. I’m somewhat of two minds here, because if and to the extent that we have very stable, perhaps also demographically fixed majorities and minorities, I think the minority maybe has a case for thinking it’s kind of unfair if you always have majority rule, as opposed to taking turns, or as opposed to there being some element of randomness. Maybe you can make a fair division case for that morally. But even if not morally, what about the strategic case? If the other side realizes that you’re about to permanently lock them out of power, aren’t you basically incentivizing them to declare war?
Neil Sinhababu (1:44:27) They may do that. But keep in mind that when we do this, we have control of the presidency, and it’s going on in big Democratic states. So our military power relative to the situation far exceeds theirs. We can secure the key precincts effectively with the help of the state governors. The war games are games we win. If you’re talking about the guys with the basement arsenals riding up to try to shoot up the precinct, no, we can beat them. They might try to do that. But look, we left some stuff on the table from the Civil War when we didn’t do this. And sadly, that needs to be taken care of now. If that’s what it is, that’s what it is. So if we’re talking about the actual situation as it comes up, as far as war itself goes, it’s a war we win.
(1:45:26) It’s probably something we win with minimal casualties. And as for the casualties we would sustain by going on under a system that is broken in all these undemocratic ways, a system that allows disasters to happen: we’re going to get something really bad if we don’t fix this system, and that probably leads to higher death tolls overall. So that’s what I’m thinking. And especially, the opponents can see what is going on too, if we control that kind of power, and I think they will generally be intimidated from doing the attack. Also, the moves I’ve been talking about: the internationalization, that’s a tricky thing. I don’t know how they’ll feel about that. But everything else is just, no, we’re making the system genuinely democratic, by not making it something you can gerrymander and not making the Senate so weird. So that’s the upside over there.
Adriano Mannino (1:46:18) So to conclude, let’s finally move to the international level, which we’ve been foreshadowing and which you have very interesting views about. For decades now, we’ve had the UN in particular as perhaps the leading international, geopolitical institution that’s supposed to facilitate global cooperation. Do you think it has had significant, important, valuable achievements? Or is it basically a failure? What’s your main take on what we’ve already achieved and where we still need to go?
Neil Sinhababu (1:46:55) I see the UN as kind of a placeholder institution. We wanted to try to centralize power into it, and if people did that more, then it could be more powerful. But there has not been the will on the part of major, powerful countries to do that. And as time passes, and as the risks to humanity get greater, I hope what we can do is help people see that the risks of proceeding as separate entities are just too great. It’ll have to come from people appreciating that. And hopefully it won’t take some kind of tremendous disaster to make people appreciate that. If there’s a tremendous disaster, there are so many ways the political fallout could go that maybe people turn away from it. So there are all kinds of concerns here. But I think there is some hope for that now, politically, in part because of the way that the people in charge of Silicon Valley have made themselves so unpopular and created these incredibly powerful, dangerous technologies.
(1:48:05) With that combination, actually, if you’ve got to have the dangerous technologies and you’ve got to take them out of private hands, you might as well have some unpopular people running them, so that you can actually get the will to get this done. Maybe that will energize some kind of movement for taking care of these things internationally. If this power is being used to hack things, even at the low levels we’re seeing now, I do not know what is coming in the future. But as awareness rises that this is dangerous power, the sentiment rises in favor of: okay, as things get more and more like a military technology that we know can destroy things, we don’t want those to be in private hands. So let’s centralize control of those. Then the governments get control of them. But since they’re in the control right now of such wealthy people, some kind of international movement to control their power will be needed.
(1:48:59) Otherwise, it all moves to some poor country that you can’t control so easily, the way that Elon Musk tried to move everything to Texas. So these kinds of things are going to get us, I think, to push toward some kind of global framework. I don’t know how much the young of today are connected to nationalism and such. I’m a little bit optimistic that they may be more internationalism-friendly, to the point that as time passes a little, you’ll be able to build international institutions as they politically come into the system and gain some power. We’re seeing them do some amazing things. In the US elections, voters swung back hard. Everything we were afraid about from two years ago, they saw what this means, and they came back hard. I do think that part of what happened two years ago, and I wonder how much it was Elon Musk’s control of Twitter, was the tech bosses, who we thought were not going to be quite that malevolent: they may have done a lot of things in 2024 that we didn’t realize they were doing.
(1:50:02) So at this point, taking power away from those kinds of figures is important. International cooperation is really important just to control their wealth. One of the things Elizabeth Warren did right when she was promoting the wealth tax was that there was so much funding for international enforcement and going after anyone who tried to make the money run away. With international cooperation around this, if we manage to make it something where the poor countries get their cut of it, they may be interested in supporting everybody else and not letting anyone set up data centers in their places, because they have a collective action problem among themselves: if they let someone do that, it goes to one and not the others. So maybe among them, they may be able to say, “Okay, we’ll give you a payout from all of this money we’re getting from taking away money from a bunch of rich people. You’ll get the benefits of any drugs we design using these data centers,” or something like that. That kind of move is one that I can see a lot of interest in as things proceed.
Adriano Mannino (1:50:59) So I take it your ultimate vision would be something like a liberal democratic world state. Is that correct? A proper state with a proper monopoly on violence and so on. But obviously, as I’m sure you’re well aware, the salient worry is that this is just extremely unrealistic. Why would autocratic, dictatorial Russia or China in particular ever give up their nuclear weapons, which, if push comes to shove, they can unilaterally deploy?
Neil Sinhababu (1:51:29) For Russia, I do not have a great answer, except: go, Ukraine, Slava Ukraini, all that, because they may be resolving the problem for us at some level. China is an interesting body in this way. And here is what I would in the end hope to be able to offer them. I don’t think Xi Jinping will take it, but some leader down the line might be willing to take a certain kind of deal. Suppose you get the rest of the world aligned under a liberal democratic kind of framework, and you have one last autocratic institution. China might be it. And then you go to the leader of China and you say, “How would you like to be the first emperor of the world?” I mean, constitutional monarch emperor of the world, but emperor of the world, and the capital is going to be Beijing, the world capital.
(1:52:22) You can give someone some glory. You can really make China come out looking good if it’s the one that shakes hands with everybody. My man, whoever you are, or my woman, if they do it that way, your face will be on money forever. As long as there is money, they will put you on it for being the first emperor of the world. So we can offer them some rather amazing things once you get down to that situation. From right now, it’s hard to see, but I do think that this system has some real favors to trade to whoever the autocrat is. Because in the end, with autocratic systems, you can get certain kinds of goods for yourself for some time, but first of all, you’ve got to deal with all your political rivals. Second, if you have children or other people you care about, does the system really do this for them? Well, constitutional monarchy actually gives them something, so they can keep their line going for a bit. And as long as it’s all ceremonial, it’s just a fun time for whoever is doing it.
Adriano Mannino (1:53:28) What about the risk if something goes wrong? Weapons are getting centralized, you have a central police force, and so on. Then, if you have a kind of coup or authoritarian takeover, the consequences are all the worse. And I suppose if you were to offer the Chinese to be the first or whatnot, then I take it the Americans would just be way too worried to agree. But what about this worry: sure, democracy is in a sense a way to share power and get all the benefits that come with that, if it’s stable. But a democracy is also, by definition, a state, which comes with a monopoly on violence. And so, if something goes wrong and you have a state, then maybe the consequences are all the worse, relative to maybe a looser international federation of states with a lot of bilateral and multilateral treaties and so on.
Neil Sinhababu (1:54:25) One of the big advantages you have in the world government is that you can destroy a whole lot of the weapons, because at that point, you don’t even have the borders around which you want to fight. The weapons that police need are so much smaller than the weapons that militaries need. So a lot of the destructive power just goes away. Now, if you have police, in that case, against police, you can do civil disobedience types of things that keep them in check to a large extent. If it really is something where someone’s trying to overthrow the system, police often will not actually want to kill large numbers of civilians who are standing there. It’s one thing if Vladimir Putin gets to push a button and launch a missile that will blow up a Ukrainian apartment.
(1:55:17) But if it’s just local policing people seeing even their neighbors on the other side of the line, well, then there’s a lot more reluctance. So the ability to just get rid of a whole lot of military weapons is tremendous here. I think that’s something you can actually do when you have a genuine world government.
Adriano Mannino (1:55:39) I do like the vision and the aspiration. Another worry, of course, is the time frame. Even if there’s a realistic chance that this may ultimately come to pass, with great benefits, in the meantime a lot can go wrong. So maybe we should just be pursuing more short-term strategies, especially, as we’ve mentioned, in an age of really rapid, maybe truly unprecedented technological upheaval. It’s also very salient that when we look at the AI technological frontier, currently the US is in the lead, and maybe rather clearly, but China is a fast follower. And there are basically no other live players, at least in terms of pushing the frontier, or fast-following and then maybe getting to push it yourself. So here, wouldn’t it be, first, an extremely urgent matter, and perhaps also just a simpler matter, to bring those two superpowers to the table and find some cooperative arrangement? If there’s a lack of trust, maybe you need to work out a mutual verification regime and so on. So would you agree that maybe for now, in the immediate term, this should be the top priority?
Neil Sinhababu (1:56:51) Oh, yes. I totally agree with that. The thing that I have is the ultimate solution, and your solution aids mine. If we can get just any kind of international cooperation, even as a precedent for future deals, that is tremendous. I know that people who work on arms control are often very fond of the chemical weapons treaty. They’re not great battlefield weapons, so it’s not like you actually reduced death and violence that much. But the fact that we could at least agree on something was a precedent for future agreement of important sorts. So what you’re talking about, I’m totally in favor of doing all that now. But really, if you want a solution that will prevent all the next problems: we have AI now, but goodness knows what it’ll be 20 years from now. Maybe we’ll have something else that’s the new thing that could kill us all. As technology progresses, maybe with AI, we’ll figure out something that will eventually be a solution that could also kill us all. That’s something that I expect could happen over and over again. So this is not the last battle, I think, and I want the solution that just wins all the future battles.
Adriano Mannino (1:58:05) So maybe a final question to you. As a citizen of the world with Indian roots, an American now living in Southeast Asia, do you think there are cultural barriers here, or are they often overstated? What can we do to tear those down? Again taking AI risks and AI discourse as an example: in the US, there are many people who say, “Well, we just need to beat China, and we can’t trust them.” And maybe there’s a bit of cultural resentment here. There’s also, obviously, quite justified moral outrage, I suppose, about the Chinese political system. If we really believe, as you do and as I do, in the importance of democracy, whether intrinsically or instrumentally, then that’s also a factor, of course.
(1:58:57) But still, I often have the sense that people just jump to the conclusion that you can’t talk to the Chinese, or that they would be uninterested. I think you had mentioned it: why would we believe that once the Chinese Communist Party truly realizes what’s at stake in AI, they wouldn’t take those risks seriously, or would take them less seriously than the Americans tend to do, with their accelerationist big tech elites? So I was just wondering whether you have any comments on that, also on cultural issues and maybe prejudices, and on what we could do about these things.
Neil Sinhababu (1:59:34) There are cultural divisions. There are also ways of solving cultural problems. I don’t know Chinese culture well enough to know what the effective means of engaging are, but maybe getting NBA players on board is important, because they like basketball in China. Who knows what it is? But there are all kinds of things you could try to do, and that good political leadership in the US really could try to do, in terms of global outreach. Donald Trump is the worst here, but a Democratic administration can do this kind of thing.
Adriano Mannino (2:00:21) Well, but to be fair, the Democrats have recently also been pretty hawkish toward China, right?
Neil Sinhababu (2:00:26) Oh yes. Look, right now, here’s one big thing that’s going on. Even with Anthropic, which is one of the nicer ones, the nice AI company, as it is, there are just lots of donations going into the US political system around a very nationalistic AI vision. And Dario will talk about the Chinese as the enemy and all that. And that’s really just not helpful here, I think. Maybe this is something that they’re doing because it’s the Trump administration. I don’t really know what the real deal is with this. But...
Adriano Mannino (2:01:02) To me, it seems quite sincere. And you can understand it, right? The system is quite terrible as it is today. But...
Neil Sinhababu (2:01:09) Yeah. But on the other hand, existential risk is even more terrible. We’re facing some really bad things. What I would want to do is make some kind of deal about how we are going to use these things: “Okay, your government will control your data centers, ours will control ours, and some technologists will be able to oversee what the groups are doing. We’ll have some rules about how to use them. Just use it on stuff that makes medical advances, on stuff like that. Have some kind of access restrictions to keep randos from making bioweapons out of it.” So some kind of good regulatory framework is needed. I’ve talked to a guy who’s trying to get more US-China cooperation, who’s interested in talking to me because Singapore, where I am, is a potential neutral ground for cooperation.
(2:02:02) I hope this guy can make use of what we have here. If we can be of any use to that in Singapore, I would really like this to be a center for cooperation between the US and China on this. If there’s anything I could do for that, I’d be all over that. We just need that to happen. I don’t think that our interests are fundamentally misaligned here. There’s the issue of Taiwan, but when I talk to Chinese people about it, they don’t want to fight Taiwan. They’re their people, as they see it. This isn’t some kind of messed-up Russia-Ukraine thing. It’s really more of a “Yeah, they are us” kind of feeling that I think people have on the ground. So I think there are a lot more opportunities for cooperation than people think. I worry that one of the forces that’s working against us here is that defense contractors do want to get arms races going.
(2:02:53) So they have been trying to cultivate some kind of enmity so that they can get sales of all kinds of weapons to the US. That’s just a danger in the system, and a force for lack of cooperation that is really dangerous. Even if you don’t get wars, you get lack of cooperation on this technology, and that’s really bad. So any way we can get things to work regarding “let’s use AI for globally beneficial purposes, prevent maniacs from doing terrible things with it, prevent disasters from happening with out-of-control AI agents,” all that kind of stuff, we really need that, and I hope there is some way. I think there are ways it can be done. We just need to get everything set up so that they will be done.
Adriano Mannino (2:03:44) Neil Sinhababu, thank you so much for your time and insights today.
Neil Sinhababu (2:03:48) Thank you so much, Adriano. It’s been a wonderful time. See you next time.







