Politics should not chase the ultimate good but avoid the ultimate bad, argues philosopher David Enoch. And the ultimate bad, he says, is serious suffering.
In this episode, we discuss David Enoch’s paper “Politics and Suffering.” Starting from Judith Shklar’s “liberalism of fear,” David argues that the worst thing politics must avoid is not cruelty, as Shklar held, but serious suffering. Because the stakes tend to be very high in politics, minimizing serious suffering outweighs nearly everything else. He explains why we should reject negative utilitarianism, and why he wants judges and officials to think in terms of four liberal fundamentals (well-being, liberty, autonomy, and equality). He suspects a broadly liberal system is most likely to minimize serious suffering. We press him on the implications: Ukraine’s decision to fight, partiality toward one’s own children and one’s own state, nonhuman animals, and future generations. David explains where he is unsure—for instance, whether animals experience the kind of suffering that can’t ordinarily be traded off. We close with his charge that much political philosophy resides “on the sunny side of the street,” and with his current book project on “shameless liberalism.”
Guest
David Enoch is Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the University of Oxford, where he is affiliated with Balliol College, and holds the Rodney Blackman Chair in the Philosophy of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He works in moral, political, and legal philosophy. His book “Taking Morality Seriously” (Oxford University Press, 2011) defends the objectivity of morality. “Politics and Suffering” appeared in the journal Analytic Philosophy in 2025. His book manuscript “Liberalism: A Battle Cry” argues for what he calls shameless liberalism.
Hosts
Suffering & Social Change is hosted by Adriano Mannino and Nils Althaus. Adriano teaches philosophy at the Munich University of Applied Sciences and was previously a Technology & Human Rights Fellow at Harvard and a postdoc at UC Berkeley. Nils is an independent researcher and science journalist for leading outlets in the German-speaking world, and originally a biochemist.
Mentioned in this episode
David Enoch, “Politics and Suffering” (Analytic Philosophy, 2025)
David Enoch, “Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism” (Oxford University Press, 2011)
David Enoch, “Shameless Liberalism: A Vision” (lecture abstract, University College London); the book manuscript discussed in the episode is titled “Liberalism: A Battle Cry”
Other papers by David Enoch: “Against Public Reason” (Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 2015), “Against Utopianism: Noncompliance and Multiple Agents” (Philosophers’ Imprint, 2018), and “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy” (Ethics, 2017)
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear” (1989) and “Putting Cruelty First” (Daedalus, 1982)
John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules” (The Philosophical Review, 1955), “A Theory of Justice,” and “Political Liberalism”
Negative utilitarianism and the world destruction argument against it
The nonidentity problem and the procreation asymmetry population ethics
Chapters
00:00 Cold open
00:58 Introducing David Enoch
02:09 From Shklar’s liberalism of fear to serious suffering
05:17 Does serious suffering outweigh everything else?
07:53 Why politics and not ethics in general?
10:25 The four liberal fundamentals
12:48 The umpire and the two-tiered view
15:35 Can liberty and autonomy be outweighed?
20:35 Deontological constraints and high stakes
23:02 Does suffering aggregate differently?
25:03 Freedom or death? The case of Ukraine
31:05 Individualism and communities
34:54 Is cruelty worse than suffering caused by nature?
38:48 National borders and partiality
46:43 Animals: pain or serious suffering?
54:16 Future generations and population ethics
1:01:07 Should the population be smaller?
1:08:01 Why write about suffering only now?
1:11:17 Political philosophy on the sunny side of the street
1:15:32 Should philosophers take sides?
1:17:45 What makes liberalism shameless?
Transcript
Lightly edited for readability: filler words, false starts, and repetitions removed, some sentences smoothed, no changes in content.
Cold open
David Enoch (0:00:03) The thought that what we should focus on in politics is not seeking the ultimate good but avoiding the ultimate bad. And so in this paper, I claim that the ultimate bad is serious suffering. If you showed me that some other political system minimizes serious suffering, I’d go for it. But it seems to me that the kind of political system that is likely to minimize serious suffering is going to be a broadly speaking liberal one.
Adriano Mannino (0:00:31) I think I can kind of get the intuition that when nature inflicts that on me, it’s a tragedy. But there’s something maybe even worse when other agents inflict that on me.
David Enoch (0:00:45) Why is it that cruelty is so bad? And it seems to me that any plausible story is going to go through because of the suffering it tends to create.
Conversation
Adriano Mannino (0:00:58) This is the Suffering and Social Change podcast. I’m Adriano Mannino, and our guest today is David Enoch. David is professor of philosophy at Oxford University and also at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has very wide-ranging interests across moral, political, and legal philosophy, and really doesn’t need much of an introduction in philosophy circles. But since these circles tend to be pretty small, we will list a bunch of his great and influential books and papers for you in the show notes. Today we’re here to discuss one specific paper that David has recently written, titled “Politics and Suffering,” and also, if time allows, some related chapters in a new book manuscript of his titled “Liberalism: A Battle Cry,” where he defends what he calls shameless liberalism. David, thanks so much for being with us today.
David Enoch (0:01:52) Thank you for having me.
Adriano Mannino (0:01:54) Would you like to start, perhaps, by describing what you’re all about in this “Politics and Suffering” paper, how that project came about, and what the main views and arguments are that you defend in this paper?
David Enoch (0:02:09) Sure. The project started with me reading Judith Shklar, which I had not done before. I was never referred to it in grad school or anything like that. In fact, I was referred to it first in a very negative review of a funding proposal that I sent. This was someone who was extremely unsympathetic to analytic philosophy and to what I was writing about. And at the end of the really negative, and both unflattering and not impressive, review, he or she said, “And if they’re going to do that stuff, at least they should read Shklar.” So I thought I’d give it a quick try and was shocked by how unbelievably insightful some of her stuff was, despite her not being an analytic philosopher and despite its many flaws. The stuff that was relevant here, in the more famous paper, “The Liberalism of Fear,” and in “Putting Cruelty First,” is what is sometimes called pessimism: the thought that what we should focus on in politics is not seeking the ultimate good but avoiding the ultimate bad. This kind of negative picture immediately struck a chord with me.
(0:03:26) It was clear to me that there’s something important and right about it. So this was a kind of starting point. On the other hand, I thought that Shklar was making some important mistakes, especially in identifying what it is that is so bad, the ultimate bad, the summum malum, the thing to be avoided. For her, it was about cruelty. But my thought, and one that I developed in the paper, is that it can’t be that the worst thing is on the agent’s side, on the side of those performing actions and making decisions, like cruelty. They shouldn’t be looking inside and trying to avoid cruelty. Cruelty can be closely related to it, but that can’t be the ultimate bad. The ultimate bad has to be on the receiving side of action. And so in this paper, I claim that the ultimate bad is serious suffering. I try to characterize very quickly what this serious suffering is.
(0:04:16) It’s not just about any headache that you have. It’s about the kind of serious suffering that we don’t find to be the natural material for normal trade-offs. Not the kind of stuff where you say, “Well, I’ll be less comfortable today, I’ll be more comfortable tomorrow.” Not that kind of stuff; much more serious suffering. And I try to flesh out at least some of the details, which we can discuss, of course, to the extent that you want, about what would and would not follow for politics from this kind of view. But the main insight: I remember, for instance, Shklar ridiculing, in another text, I think, some communitarians for their hyper-optimistic, perhaps naive views of the world and polities and communities. And she uses the phrase, “They seem to be residing on the sunny side of the street.” That was my feeling about so much of political philosophy. It was doing ideal theory; it was aiming for the stars. But that’s not what we should do when we’re doing politics. We should try to minimize serious suffering.
Adriano Mannino (0:05:17) As you said, you argue that serious suffering is, in a sense, the summum malum, the ultimate bad, at least when it comes to politics. And you make some really strong claims. You’ve alluded to them. I think you say rather explicitly that in politics, we should be concerned with minimizing serious suffering as best we can, at the expense of potentially, literally, all else. I think you say, quote, “whatever it takes,” we should do to try and minimize serious suffering. Now, I take it your view is not that other things, such as autonomy, liberty, equality, and so on, don’t matter. Rather, you believe that some other things matter a lot, but serious suffering, at least in aggregate and in politics, where the respective stakes tend to be really high, tends to outweigh, and perhaps vastly outweigh, those other things. Is that a correct position?
David Enoch (0:06:10) The kind of thought that I find both attractive beyond the ability to resist, I mean really irresistible, but also extremely dangerous in some other ways, which we’ll talk about in a second, is perhaps best put in direct trade-off terms. I’m going to use a bit of a caricature, but still. Many of us think that states should support the arts and academia and indeed philosophy. That’s nice. And if need be, we can come up with arguments that will make it plausible. But what if the state can prevent serious suffering: one person watching a loved one die in pain, or a young person dying of a disease, or whatever? You can fill in the details. So how many good articles in philosophy are worth how many of those cases of serious suffering?
(0:07:05) It just seems that, at least at this point, when we’re doing direct comparisons, it’s just ridiculous on its face. Saving one child from a horrible death and one parent from watching their child die a horrible death is just orders of magnitude more important than any contribution to any philosophy department, and other things as well. Now, this is about philosophy; it’s not yet about, say, human rights. We should talk about them as well, and there I will qualify the claim to an extent. But the thought is that if you don’t feel, at least in such directly comparative contexts, the strength of the consideration having to do with serious suffering, you’ve never experienced serious suffering, you’ve never cared about anyone who has, and your imaginative abilities leave something to be desired.
Adriano Mannino (0:07:53) Could you maybe elaborate a bit on the political restriction that you seem to place on your claim? Why is it that in politics, rather than other areas, the stakes involved in terms of serious suffering tend, in your view, to be extremely high? Isn’t it, for instance, also the case that many political decisions are rather small-scale, administrative, and so on? If we include many of the decisions that judges have to make, for instance, there it also seems quite intuitively inappropriate that they should basically only be looking out for suffering.
David Enoch (0:08:26) These are importantly different cases, actually. I am perfectly willing to concede that there are going to be some political decisions that are sufficiently low-stakes so that this doesn’t come into play. But I don’t think that there are that many of them. And anyway, I think that even if my claim is only true of the others, it’s already sufficiently strong and radical. So that, I think, is not that threatening. Judges are a different case, and ethics is a different case. So let’s talk a bit about it. You started by asking why I restrict it to politics. What about ethics in general? There used to be this claim, I think it was called negative utilitarianism, of people who thought that not just in politics but in general, when it comes to deciding what we should do, pain, or maybe suffering, should get absolute priority over pleasure or over hedonic pluses.
(0:09:19) So it’s minimizing the hedonic minuses that gets absolute priority. And I see the appeal of this view. For instance, when I teach utilitarianism, I always start with the negative side. It’s much easier to get people on board with the thought that pain is bad, that more of it is worse, and that we should try to minimize it, than with the thought that pleasure is good, that more of it is better, and that we should try to maximize it. But that’s more about presentation than about substance. If you take negative utilitarianism seriously, you reach some unacceptable conclusions. One of them is called something like the world destruction argument. The one assured way of minimizing suffering is making sure that no creature that can experience suffering exists. But I’m not sure I’m happy to say that this would be an improvement compared to what we have now. The natural thing to say is, yes, but you would also lose all the good stuff, except that if you’re a negative utilitarian, the good stuff can never outweigh the bad stuff. So that’s why this view, as a kind of general moral view, seems to me to be unacceptable.
Adriano Mannino (0:10:25) In terms of the good stuff, what would these things be? Does this bring us back to what you call the liberal fundamentals in your book manuscript, or mostly to positive well-being, which I guess is part of those fundamentals? Maybe you could elaborate on those briefly as well, so we have them on the table, too.
David Enoch (0:10:42) Good. I will in a second. Again, I want to distinguish between these contexts. In a general moral context, what the good stuff is will depend on your general moral theory. If you’re a hedonist, it’s just going to be positive hedonic states, like maybe pleasures or maybe happiness, or maybe desire satisfaction or something like this. But you’re right that we’re not in principle limited or constrained by anything along these lines, and we can think that other things are intrinsically of value. We think that taking part in close, intimate relationships is of value, and not just in virtue of the pleasures it allows or the suffering that it alleviates. Sure, I do think that. But the question is, is this enough to offset the negative weight of some serious suffering? And negative utilitarians will say no, nothing is. Regardless of your view of the positive stuff, nothing in the positive stuff can outweigh the negative stuff.
(0:11:37) And again, this, I think, is a view that is highly problematic. When it comes to politics, things are different, partly because the stakes are high, as you implied. And here is something that’s not in this paper but in the book that you were kind enough to mention: I think that liberalism is to a large extent defined by its concern with the following things, which I call the liberal fundamentals. Well-being is one, of course. There’s some room to maneuver about what exactly the conception of well-being is, but yes, it is a part of the state’s business how well people’s lives are going. So that’s one significant point. And the others are not going to be huge surprises, nor should there be at this stage: a conception of liberty, a conception of autonomy, and a conception of equality. These are, I think, the starting point for liberalism as a political philosophy.
(0:12:29) They needn’t be the ultimate moral starting point. You may think that all of them are based in some way on some fancy version of utilitarianism, or a better version of consequentialism, or on some other view entirely, and all of that remains to be seen. That depends on further details. I do want to come back, if it’s okay with you, to the point about judges, because judges are, I think, an interesting case. And this is going to be one of the political restrictions on the no-matter-what thought, the thought that we should minimize suffering no matter what. I take it it’s a well-known fact about politics, and about many other things, that we want to distinguish between, as it were, what ultimately matters and the considerations that we want to be operative inside the system. There’s a famous paper by Rawls, from before he became Rawls, before “A Theory of Justice,” “Two Concepts of Rules,” in which he describes how, say, when you are playing baseball, it’s okay for Major League Baseball, the corporation that runs all of it, to shape the rules of the game partly with an eye to popularity or to TV attractiveness, or something like that.
(0:13:43) But suppose you’re an umpire at home plate and you call balls and strikes. Americans will know what it means; for those who are not, it doesn’t much matter. It’s just whether the ball the pitcher pitched was in this imaginary rectangle, in the right location for the batter to hit. So if you’re an umpire calling balls and strikes, then it does not make sense for you to think in terms of what would make the game more popular for those watching it on TV. Within the game, you should just consider whatever it is, the height of the belt, the height of the knee, something like that, and not anything else, despite the fact that it’s perfectly okay to shape the whole game partly with considerations of popularity or whatever. So I’m talking about something analogous. I am happy to think about serious suffering as trumping pretty much everything, pretty much all the time, at the level of what matters.
(0:14:41) But that doesn’t mean that I want my officials and my politicians and my decision makers and my judges to think in those terms. Whether I want them to think in those terms will depend on whether having them think in those terms will in fact minimize serious suffering. And this is not an obvious question to answer at all. It’s partly empirical, but even the parts that are not empirical are very, very complicated. So there’s room for the following view. I think it’s my view, at least my tentative view. It’s a view that says that if you showed me that some other political system minimizes serious suffering, I’d go for it. But it seems to me that the kind of political system that is likely to minimize serious suffering is going to be a broadly speaking liberal one, with all of the agents within the system being primarily motivated by these four liberal fundamentals. So that’s why I go for a kind of two-tiered view.
Adriano Mannino (0:15:35) As you just mentioned, you make a case in your manuscript for those four liberal fundamentals: well-being, where I guess an aversion to suffering is one component, liberty, autonomy, and equality. Now, I’d guess that many of our fellow liberals would perhaps object that it’s not clear to them why certain liberties, or autonomy, also understood in a positive sense, not just in the sense of maybe non-invasion, should necessarily be less important than a concern for suffering, especially when it may also affect very many people, as I think you would admit is also usually the case in politics. I think in your paper you discuss a possible trade-off involving restricting and infringing on many free speech rights in order to reduce serious suffering.
(0:16:29) Maybe we could sharpen up that potential case and objection and imagine that even more important individual freedoms would be curtailed or very heavily restricted in order to better reduce suffering. So is there something to this, I guess, also very liberal thought that perhaps there are rights at play here? Then, of course, we need to talk about how they may or may not aggregate. But even setting rights aside, maybe certain freedoms, and certainly autonomy, can also be thought of as a kind of good that individual lives can have or lack, whether or not we conceptually and terminologically file it under well-being. And then isn’t it also plausible that these individual stakes might similarly add up, might aggregate in a manner quite similar to and comparable with how individual suffering stakes aggregate? And if it is indeed the case empirically that the stakes are large not just in terms of well-being or its suffering component but maybe in terms of all of the liberal fundamentals, why is it obvious that your claim is correct?
David Enoch (0:17:43) Okay, so a lot’s going on there. Let me make three points: one about the distinction between intra- and interpersonal considerations, another about deontological constraints, and another about aggregation. Let’s see if we can go through all of those. One thing we can ask is, intrapersonally, in the life of a single person, what counts for more? That is an important question. We do such trade-offs all the time. You go to the dentist; it means that you’re happy to sacrifice, as it were, your comfort this afternoon in order to achieve some more of it later on. That’s fine. And maybe you accept a job that is not ideal in some respects but that gives you some more money that will allow you to better take care of your kids or have more fun next summer, or something like that. All of that’s fine. So the question here is, does serious suffering in a single life necessarily crowd the plate?
(0:18:37) Does it necessarily outweigh all other considerations? I’m not sure about this. I’m not sure that rights are the best thing to look at, either, because typically, when we ask about how well a life is going, especially in the intrapersonal case, I don’t know that rights have a role to play. Rights are more about restricting the behavior of others than about the well-being of a specific person. But yes, we can ask this. We know that people who have undergone serious suffering will sometimes still have a valuable life, as they themselves will testify. So I’m not sure what to say about this. It still seems to me that if you are at the point of decision, suppose you had to decide whether to undergo some serious suffering and also have your most recent paper accepted by an excellent journal, or avoid both, then there has to be some very fancy instrumental story to justify you in choosing the paper.
Adriano Mannino (0:19:32) Maybe it’s about producing serious suffering.
David Enoch (0:19:35) Exactly. That can be true, too. The whole system, well, actually, it’s important: unless you are extremely neurotic about it, what it produces is some discomfort. It’s not serious suffering. I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to ruin the joke. I just meant that it’s important not to give the wrong impression about the kind of serious suffering we’re talking about. So I’m not sure exactly what to say about the intrapersonal case. The interpersonal case is different. There, the question is to what extent, for instance, it is okay for me to help you with your paper when I could instead prevent some serious suffering befalling someone else. And it seems clear to me somehow, maybe partly because of the aggregation point, that nothing can justify that. Or, if not nothing, then very close to nothing. So that’s the thing about the intra- and the interpersonal.
(0:20:26) When we’re doing politics, the interpersonal case, as between different people, becomes obviously and immediately relevant. So that was one point. The second point is about deontological constraints. This is the term we use for moral rules that apply to action, that forbid some kinds of actions, and that typically do it in a non-consequentialist way. So these will be things that you’re not supposed to do even if they maximize utility. Some of us believe that there’s a deontological constraint against lying. If you believe that, you think that merely showing that some lie will maximize utility or bring about the best consequences does not in itself suffice to justify telling the lie. And we like to divide deontologists into absolute and moderate deontologists. Absolute deontologists believe about some deontological constraints that they should not be violated no matter what.
(0:21:22) Moderate deontologists, by contrast, believe that deontological constraints should not be violated most of the time, and that merely showing that more good will happen in the world if you violate one does not justify the violation, but they are open to the possibility of exceptions, typically fairly rare exceptions. So if all hell will break loose, then lie. But it will require some fairly extreme result. The crucial point here, I think, both about politics and about serious suffering, is that even if you accept deontological constraints, as long as you accept only moderate deontological constraints, those that come with thresholds such that above the threshold it’s okay to infringe on them, then deontological constraints to a large extent drop out of the picture of politics, just because the stakes are so high. So you’re saying something like, “In your own life, don’t lie just because it will make something nicer,” or whatever. But if it’s to save the life of an innocent, okay, go ahead and lie.
(0:22:20) But so many political decisions are at the scale of saving the lives of innocents. So the constraint against lying doesn’t apply. Sorry, it’s not that it doesn’t apply. It applies in a way that is isolated from its influence on action by the fact that we are past the threshold. And I think that that’s the case almost always in politics when serious suffering is involved. This, of course, has immediate implications for the kind of cases you describe. So sure, we have all these rights. That’s fine. But if you are in the position of a decision maker and you can minimize serious suffering, it’s just more important. So that’s an important point.
(0:23:02) And lastly, there’s the point about aggregation, which I mentioned in the paper in a very tentative way, and I’m still not sure what I think about it. It seems to me that I was on to something interesting, but it probably can’t be defended exactly in this way, and I wasn’t able to make progress. Maybe you guys will help me with that. It’s the thought that aggregation behaves differently in these different areas. What I mean by this is primarily interpersonal aggregation, aggregation across different people. When it comes to serious suffering, it seems to me that we can easily aggregate. Take a situation in which one person suffers tremendously and a situation in which two people suffer tremendously: it seems clear to me that the second situation is worse than the first. And furthermore, maybe I can even put cardinal values on how much worse it is, or at least approximate cardinal values. The more people suffer, the worse. That seems to me very clear. To give a full account of this aggregation may be hard, but the fact that there is this aggregation seems to me hard to deny.
(0:24:06) On the other hand, when it comes to some of these other things, like, say, a right to free speech, I don’t know that aggregation is as straightforward. Suppose the regime decides to restrict the speech of some people, and then we add another person to the set of people whose free speech is restricted. Is it worse? And is it worse by the same kind of margin? If you ask me the same about serious suffering, my answer is very clear. If in some state there’s a group of people who suffer tremendously and you add one more person to that group, you’ve done very serious harm, roughly proportionately. With free speech, it doesn’t feel to me to be working the same way. If it’s true that aggregation is more straightforward when it comes to serious suffering than when it comes to some of these other things, that means that as the numbers rise, it is much more likely for the suffering to outweigh other considerations.
Adriano Mannino (0:25:03) I see this. If we think in terms of deontological side constraints or rights, then maybe it’s not obvious how and if those aggregate. But I wonder if the potential challenge here could be restated in terms of non-well-being-related interests or claims that people may have. I think in political history, both domestically and internationally, a preference for accepting a lot of very serious suffering and death, perhaps in warfare, over being subjugated to the rulers of another nation, or being enslaved, or similar, has been quite common. Or take what’s currently going on in Ukraine, say.
(0:25:57) It would be in the Ukrainians’ power, it seems, to just end all of the suffering that’s going on by accepting a form of subjugation. And I certainly get a kind of intuition that says, look, what’s at stake here from the point of view of other liberal fundamentals is something like individual freedoms, or maybe interests and claims against inferiority, or something similar. And if I think of those other individual stakes as individual interests or claims, then I’m no longer sure that I have fundamental doubts about how and whether those aggregate. So I guess two questions. One is, will you agree that empirically we have often seen, and we see, a preference to accept very serious suffering and also death in order to avoid, say, forms of subjugation, or to preserve freedoms, ones that are maybe more important than free speech? And second, what are your thoughts on maybe framing what’s at stake in terms of the other liberal fundamentals also in terms of something like individual interests, or maybe claims, that would then maybe aggregate similarly?
David Enoch (0:27:15) Good. I think that examples are tricky in several ways, and I’ll use the Ukraine example, although somewhat speculatively. I’m not an expert on the facts, obviously. But first, you put together serious suffering and death, and I would like to keep them apart. I see the point of “give me freedom or give me death” kind of stuff, to an extent. One way of making theoretical sense of it would be to say that an unfree life is not worth living, or a specific unfree life is not worth living. And I can sort of see that. How about the following slogan, though: “Give me freedom or give me torture.” Or “Give me freedom or give me torture for my kids.”
(0:28:08) I don’t think it’s the same. I’m not sure I can defend it theoretically, but certainly, intuitively speaking, I don’t think it’s the same. That’s one thing. The other is that, of course, subjugation may have instrumental effects, including ones in terms of serious suffering. If you expect being subjugated to Putin’s Russia to be translated, in the very foreseeable future, into some other horrible results, then, of course, you should take that into account. But there’s also the following extremely troubling thought about the case of Ukraine. It’s possible that this decision by many to pursue freedom at all costs is irrational. So hold constant now the bad instrumental effects of defeat by Russia, or indeed of just not even starting the war.
(0:29:05) Let’s assume that they would not be as bad in terms of serious suffering as the effects of the war, or at least the effects of the war on the Ukrainian side. This raises other issues, but okay. Now, suppose also that at the time of the beginning of the hostilities, people on the Ukrainian side knew that. What should they have done? The mere fact that we act in some ways, of course, doesn’t show that that’s the right way to act. It may sometimes show some things about our deep value commitments, and that’s important. The depressing thought is that while we’ve seen unbelievable heroism on the Ukrainian side, and we’ve also seen other things on the Ukrainian side, it’s not impossible that they should have given up on day one, that that was the rational thing to do.
(0:29:55) Again, I’m not judging anyone. Of course, Monday morning quarterbacking is not ideal in this way. Had they known what we now know about how long it will take and what the prices will be and so on, I don’t know what the rational thing to do would have been. It doesn’t seem obvious to me at all. As to the thought that perhaps some of these other considerations are more easily aggregated, so as to neutralize what I call the speculative argument from the paper: this is an interesting question. I’m not sure what I think about that, partly because, as I said, I’m not sure about this argument to begin with. But does it matter how many people are in Ukraine under the scenario in which they’re subjugated?
Adriano Mannino (0:30:43) My intuition says yes, I think.
David Enoch (0:30:45) But in the same way? Suppose they’re 10 million; suppose they’re 10 million and one. Does this make the same kind of difference as, intuitively, we think it makes whether 10 million people suffer terribly or 10 million and one people suffer terribly? So I’m not saying that it doesn’t aggregate. I’m saying that it doesn’t aggregate as quickly or as straightforwardly. But I’m really not confident about that.
Adriano Mannino (0:31:05) That makes sense. I wonder if there’s a bit of a tension here with the individualism that you argue for and defend in your book. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think you’d say that all of the four liberal fundamentals can ultimately be cashed out in an individualistic way. If I got you right in the book, you basically oppose collectivist readings of any of the four fundamentals. Now, take claims against inferiority, or maybe even non-inferiority, say non-subjugation, as a more collective good. If that sort of good, or those stakes, behave very differently, doesn’t that suggest that for the respective liberal fundamental, which I guess in this case would mostly be some form of social equality, we’d maybe have to go for a not purely individualistic interpretation?
David Enoch (0:32:01) I think there’s something you said in characterizing my view in the book that is correct but may also give rise to a false impression. The correct thing is that I think that the things that ultimately matter are individual. So, for instance, the value of autonomy, the value of shaping one’s life on one’s own terms, with one’s own decisions and so on: that value applies to individual autonomy. It’s about me doing it and you doing it and someone else doing it. We may talk about the significance of community autonomy, but that’s going to be much further down the road. Yes, there’s a sense in which ultimately the fundamentals are about individual liberty, individual well-being, individual autonomy, and equality between individuals. Sure. But, and this is crucial for me, this still allows extremely significant room for collectivist considerations. For instance, there is huge and important room for the significance of communities, though not because I think, like perhaps some communitarians, that communities matter in themselves.
(0:32:59) Whether you prosper is important in itself. Whether your community prospers is not important in itself, but it can be extremely important because it’s relevant to whether you prosper. The way our lives go, often we are a part of communities. It’s important for us how our communities do. The communities of which we are a part form a large part of the options from which we can then choose more or less autonomously. Or if your community prospers and mine doesn’t, this may have a strong effect on equality, and so on. So while you’re right that at the ultimate level I am an individualist, this leaves a lot of room for the significance of non-individualist considerations, just not ultimately. And I think this is also the way of dealing with these kinds of places where it seems that collectives matter intuitively. The thing to understand is that they matter, but they matter in virtue of something about individual stuff mattering.
Adriano Mannino (0:33:52) So you’d say that of autonomy as well as the other liberal fundamentals. And there you’d still be skeptical that individual autonomy stakes aggregate in a manner similar to individual suffering stakes. So if two people see their autonomy severely restricted, that’s not necessarily twice as bad, whereas in the case of suffering, it is.
David Enoch (0:34:20) That is a tougher case for me, I think. I’m not sure what I think about it. My inclination is to say I’m going to defer that question to the intrapersonal level. So the question now is how, in the theory of well-being, just in how well my life goes, you are going to be trading off questions about my autonomy against questions about suffering and other hedonic states, and maybe other things entirely. I’m open to that possibility. And then the political, interpersonal thing is going to fall out of that. But you’re right that the autonomy case poses a greater challenge to this aggregation point than, say, political rights.
Adriano Mannino (0:34:54) I thought that might perhaps be another way to try and make the case for Judith Shklar’s framing, that it’s all about cruelty. I’m ultimately skeptical about this, but I think I broadly agree with what you say about deontological constraints and rights. So basically, if the aversion to cruelty were about that, then I don’t really think I could steelman her view. But what if it’s about, say, individual interests, and maybe they are well-being-relevant as well: individual interests not to be, say, actively tortured as opposed to tortured by nature? So maybe if I’m being tortured by another agent, that’s the ultimate and ultimately unbearable form of subjugation, or something along those lines.
(0:35:49) Again, I’m just trying my best to steelman her side here. I’m not sure I would ultimately care about the cause, especially when I’m in the state of suffering unbearably. I take it that will be one leading response. But I think I can kind of get the intuition that when nature inflicts that on me, it’s a tragedy and incredibly bad, and it should potentially be a huge priority to avoid that, morally and politically. But there’s something maybe even worse when other agents inflict that on me.
David Enoch (0:36:26) I’m willing to admit that there is something worse, but not in the relevant way, I think. One thing to do would be to insist on what is explanatorily more basic. Why is it that cruelty is so bad? It seems to me that any plausible story is going to go through because of the suffering it tends to create, or wants to create, or intends to create, or something like this. So the badness of suffering, I think, is just explanatorily prior to that of cruelty. That’s a part of the point that I hinted at earlier on, namely that surely what matters here is something on the receiving end of action rather than on the agent’s side. So that’s one thing. And the other is just to think about examples. Suppose that someone you love is going to undergo serious suffering.
(0:37:18) And suppose you can choose now whether the serious suffering will have been caused by cruelty or by some natural disaster. And assume for now that if it’s caused by the natural disaster, the suffering is going to be worse. The suffering itself is going to be more painful. My question to you is, how much more painful should it be? What’s the highest value of the difference in how painful it is that you should tolerate just in order for it to be created by nature rather than by cruelty? And my answer, of course, is zero. If you really love that person, you want them to suffer the least. And that’s it. Nothing else enters the picture. And I think what this example shows to an extent, but what is even clearer in politics, and of course this comes up in other parts of political philosophy, is that the distinction between stuff that is natural and stuff that is, say, political is at the very least suspicious, and there are borderline cases and so on.
(0:38:18) With regard to many natural disasters, you can’t say that it was cruelty that caused them. But politics is relevant because the state could have, I don’t know, built houses better, or made sure that emergency services are better equipped, and so on. You can add whatever you want. And this is, I think, a point that I make in the paper. It’s not as if the only way in which politics is relevant to serious suffering is if the serious suffering is caused by cruelty. It can be relevant because of the potential to alleviate suffering, or other related things.
Adriano Mannino (0:38:48) I think that’s quite hard to resist. I guess another way, then, to challenge this picture, even if it seems quite appealing and hard to resist from first principles, is in terms of the very radical implications that it may have. If you’re right, then concern with political cruelty, say, is to a first approximation just instrumental, as is maybe everything or almost everything else when we compare it to the incredibly high stakes in terms of serious suffering. And while reading your paper, I was wondering whether you’re maybe downplaying, if I may play devil’s advocate here, the extent to which the implications falling out of your picture may be quite radical.
(0:39:40) I think you have one footnote where you say that, for the purposes of your paper, you’re trying to remain neutral on the boundary problem: what’s the appropriate scope of political care? For instance, might this overriding imperative to minimize serious suffering primarily or exclusively apply in one’s own nation-state, and not globally, in a fully impartial manner? One immediate tension here is with the basic equality that you endorse as part of the liberal fundamental of equality. I guess it’s maybe also built into the way in which you propose to care about well-being: everyone’s well-being, as an individual who ultimately matters, counts equally. And so it seems to me that, prima facie, if it’s all about reducing serious suffering, the nation-state and any partiality to it should also be, to a first approximation, of instrumental significance at best, just like concern with minimizing cruelty, say.
(0:40:49) And so don’t we, at least by default, face potential implications such as that politics should perhaps, to a first approximation, be about reducing suffering worldwide as best we can? Then we can ask empirically, what are the most serious and widespread sources of suffering? And maybe what will fall out of that is something like specific, say, health-related interventions in global development aid and cooperation, or something along those lines. And then, yes, maybe you have to do whatever it takes to acquire power in your rich, Western, maybe, nation-state. But actually what you should be up to is just trying to redirect resources toward solving this global health problem, say, that’s causing enormous suffering.
David Enoch (0:41:39) Okay. First of all, just a correction that I think is important theoretically but not practically. I don’t think that all other things are only significant instrumentally. I’m actually quite a pluralist about which things matter intrinsically. And I’m open to the possibility that, say, cruelty does matter intrinsically. The world is in a worse state if there’s cruelty in it than if there isn’t. I’m open to that thought.
Adriano Mannino (0:42:07) Oh, yeah, I didn’t mean to deny that.
David Enoch (0:42:09) It’s just that because of the trade-offs, and because suffering will crowd the plate, it will tend to be important in a very practically impotent way. That’s why I said it does seem to matter theoretically, but not practically. So that’s one point. About the boundary problems, I should say, when you started talking about boundaries, I thought you were going to ask about animals. And I feel more nervous about that question than about the boundary between states. We can get to that, too. But about the boundary between states, I think you drew together two things that are best distinguished. One is whether everyone’s serious suffering counts. And the other is whether it counts equally, or whether we’re going for global impartiality. So forget states for a second. Let’s talk about parents. It seems to me that there is no inconsistency in thinking that all children’s serious suffering counts, and that it crowds the plate, and so on, but also that I have both a special duty and a special privilege to give more weight to my children’s serious suffering, or potential serious suffering, than to yours. I’m going to insist that there’s no contradiction, and I’m going to suggest that there isn’t even a tension. What would be very weird is if I thought that the serious suffering of my children matters but that your children’s suffering in a similar way somehow, miraculously, doesn’t matter. But the thought that it should carry the same weight with me is a further claim, and it depends on what we have in general to say about partiality and impartiality. In the parents’ case, I know where I stand. It seems very clear to me that it’s okay for you to give greater weight to your children’s well-being than to mine, and that applies to serious suffering as well. It doesn’t mean that you deny either the reality or the moral significance of other people’s children. But it’s consistent with saying yes, there is something to say about the parent-child relationship, or about the family, or about some other things here, perhaps themselves justified in indirect consequentialist terms, perhaps not, that makes it the case that it’s okay for me to prioritize my own children.
Adriano Mannino (0:44:14) To a limited extent, right?
David Enoch (0:44:15) To a limited extent, that’s right. Although in the children’s case, to a limited but significant extent. The way people sometimes put it in the distributive justice literature is, I have a duty to read a bedtime story to my children, but not to your children. Well, suppose that your children are bedtime-story-deprived, so that the marginal value of reading a bedtime story to your children is higher than that of reading to mine. By how much should it be higher to make it the case that I should not read to my children but to yours? To the extent that we can even ask or answer the question with a straight face, it’s going to be a very high value. So it’s not, like, by a factor of two. It’s going to be something much more significant than that. It’s not a coincidence that I shifted to talking about the parent-child relationship, because it’s the kind of partiality most of us are most happy with.
(0:45:05) When it comes to nations and states, I am much more worried. I just want to note that it’s a different topic. You may think that while the thought that serious suffering counts globally is extremely plausible, the thought that it should count equally for all states, regardless of whether the serious suffering occurs in their citizens or in others, is a further step. And I’m not sure what I think about it. In the parent-child case, I know. I reject it. I go for partiality. If you have a moral theory that does not accommodate this kind of parent-child partiality, your moral theory is out. I don’t need more to be convinced of that. But in the case of the nation, the nation-state, it’s much less clear to me. I suspect that I will accept partiality if, but only if, it has some instrumental payoffs.
(0:46:02) And furthermore, if it has instrumental payoffs, I’d judge them impartially. So the mere fact that, say, Israelis will do better if Israel prioritizes them over others is not good enough. I have to see that the general system in which nations prioritize their own is overall beneficial. Whether that’s the case, by the way, is a good question. I’m not sure. With parents, I think it is this way, at least in many cases. And if it’s not, I still go for partiality. But in the nation case, it’s going to depend on such instrumental considerations for me.
Adriano Mannino (0:46:43) And indeed, you foreshadowed it. My next question is, what about nonhuman beings, nonhuman animals in particular? There it also seemed to me that if the concern is just with serious suffering intrinsically, and we agree, as we should, I think, that many nonhuman animals are at least very likely, and maybe many more are nontrivially likely, to be able to experience serious suffering as well, and if we accept, which I think is just a straightforward empirical fact, that they vastly outnumber us, do we face a potential implication along the lines of: politics should perhaps, to a first approximation, be animal politics, as it were, or politics on behalf of the animals? And here again, I think you’ve partly answered that.
(0:47:36) I think my broader concern was this: whatever other principles you use to erect a kind of boundary around this overriding imperative, within the boundary, to minimize suffering, why isn’t that kind of boundary overwhelmed by suffering stakes, impartially considered, as well? So while, obviously, intuitively I’m very much on board with what you just said about parenthood and partiality there, I still wonder whether there is not a tension in your view here. If you’re not an absolutist about anything, including partiality in that domain, then you at least could face empirical circumstances where all the money that you’re pouring into your children’s lives, which I suppose must be at least a couple hundred K, at least that tends to be the norm in rich countries, could achieve quite a lot. If you look at the empirical data about what you could achieve globally to save children from extremely serious suffering, it might actually be an order of magnitude difference, so way more than just a factor of two. And so I still retain some doubts there, and even stronger doubts, obviously, for national partiality. And then, as just mentioned, speciesism. I think you also use the label “humanism” for the kind of view that you defend, this concern with, in the first instance, serious human suffering. And then I think you cite Shklar in a slightly adapted way by saying this kind of humanism is monogamously and faithfully married, you at least hope, to all of the liberal fundamentals. But just as serious suffering within our nation-state, as you argue, can maybe outweigh concern with autonomy, liberty, and equality, why isn’t the same the case for the human boundary? Maybe there are pro tanto reasons to favor humans or humanity, although then I guess we have to talk about individualism versus collectivism and other things again. Maybe there are really quite weighty pro tanto reasons that should lead us to favor humanity. But why can’t those similarly just be overwhelmed, vastly outweighed, by suffering stakes?
David Enoch (0:49:53) Definitely, definitely nervous about that. And I’m not sure what I want to say, but here are a couple of things that can be said. Sorry, let me first strengthen your point. The stuff about partiality cannot possibly do work here. The thought that we should be partial to our own species seems to me indefensible intrinsically, and instrumentally entirely implausible. The thought that nation-states still overall do good, that the fact that they can privilege their own overall does good, at least has some plausibility to it. The thought that us privileging ourselves, our species, does overall good is entirely implausible, perhaps because there’s such a huge imbalance of power.
(0:50:43) So in this respect, your point is even stronger. Okay. Here are two things that can, I think, be said here, but again, I’m not sure about any of them. Notice that for me, it’s about serious suffering. It’s not about pain. Pain itself, I think, is the stuff of trade-offs. Even fairly serious pain is the stuff of trade-offs. You can say, “I understand that I will suffer this pain now, but it will allow me to be more focused on my paper later on, so I won’t take a painkiller.” And that can make perfect sense. Not always, of course, but sometimes it does. There’s no mistake there. So if we’re just talking about pain, while it counts in animals as well, it is not the stuff that just crowds the plate, that is beyond trade-offs.
(0:51:41) And you said something like, well, surely we’ll agree that many animals experience serious suffering. I want to doubt this “surely,” at least to an extent. What is clearly true, what I cannot see for the life of me how anyone would deny, is that they experience pain, and furthermore, that their pain matters. But if it’s pain and not serious suffering, then their pain is the stuff of trade-offs. It still means that we treat them poorly, in horrible ways. But if this line of thought can be defended, then it will block the inference to “we should just minimize the pain of insects,” or whatever, and that this crowds out everything else. That is important. I want to highlight the kind of theoretical worry here, or not worry, sorry, liability. In my paper, I don’t put forward a theory of what serious suffering comes to. I say something like, you know it when you see it, or when you feel it, or when you see someone you love feel it, or something like that. And at least for most of my purposes in the paper, I think that’s okay. But if you want to avoid this line about animals by relying, say, on the distinction between mere pain and serious suffering, then it ceases to be okay. At this point, I probably need a substantive theory of serious suffering such that it’s not plausible to think that insects experience it, maybe even chickens, maybe even cows. And that seems to me like probably the way to go. I don’t know how significant it will be, because, for instance, horrible stories about how cows behave when you take away their calves seem to indicate something.
(0:53:30) I don’t know if it’s something very close to serious suffering, not to mere pain. We know that at least many mammals mourn loved ones, children, sometimes friends. So it’s not as if nothing can be said here. But still, there is this liability: what do you mean by serious suffering, other than the examples, such that it makes it plausible, and not ad hoc, to say that at least a vast majority of nonhuman animals, while they clearly experience pain and while we should try to minimize it, don’t experience a kind of untrade-offable serious suffering? I think this is the line I would like to take on this. But to say that I’m not confident is going to be an understatement.
Adriano Mannino (0:54:16) Interesting. And I guess, finally, another population that may include an overwhelming amount of expected suffering, I suppose, is future generations. I think you also have a footnote very briefly arguing that the case you make should be confined to the “real suffering,” quote, “of real existing people,” and that therefore we can set the complications and intricacies of population ethics aside, including the non-identity problem and so forth.
David Enoch (0:54:53) For the purposes of this paper.
Adriano Mannino (0:54:56) Right, yes. And I’m not sure I agree. This is another way in which the case you build in that paper might have more radical implications than you acknowledge. I think most, perhaps all, theorists in population ethics believe that creating new beings that then suffer, especially knowingly so, is extremely bad, and that their suffering is maybe morally on a par with the suffering of people who already exist and whom we can help. What’s a lot more controversial is whether we should think similarly about the importance of the potential happiness of those who don’t yet exist and whose existence depends on our choices. Hence, most theorists have endorsed what is known as the asymmetry, which roughly says that we have very strong reasons to avoid creating lives that will be marked by severe suffering, or even just negative lives in terms of well-being and maybe other things that matter, whereas we don’t necessarily have strong reasons, or any reasons at all, to bring into existence new happy lives or lives that are good in other ways. And we may even deny the asymmetry and just take on board the first part, which is that we have reasons to avoid creating suffering, especially serious suffering, within new lives, and that maybe those reasons are similar in strength to the reasons we have to avoid causing suffering to preexisting people, or to relieve, reduce, and prevent their suffering. Then, as far as I can see, you probably can’t really maintain the view that you can set population ethics and population policy aside. But I’m curious about your thoughts here.
David Enoch (0:56:50) I’m generally not sure about many of these things. I do think that it’s okay to discuss some things without discussing everything. And I think that there’s a plausible case to be made that when we’re doing politics, real-world politics, it’s okay to neglect at least some of the more abstract theoretical problems. That doesn’t mean that it’s okay to neglect future generations, which I think we shouldn’t. But I think things here will depend on other things. You talk about future people. I would distinguish, like many in the literature (I should say I’m not up to speed on all of the literature), between future people and possible people. When you’re talking about future people, you may talk about the set of people who will exist 100 years from now, whoever they happen to be. Or you may talk about this guy and that guy and this other guy, the set of those. So you may, as it were, characterize them de dicto, under this description, whoever they may be, or de re, as picking out the specific people. I think it’s much more natural to suppose that the well-being of future people matters than that the well-being of possible people matters. That’s important partly because, as you know, because of the non-identity problem, many of the people we can talk about are only possible. We can’t identify them de re, because who will exist will depend on whatever we do. We can identify them as the group of people who will exist, but it’s not clear to me that the same moral status applies to them. I think this comes up often in the effective altruism literature and so on. When you’re talking about a specific person who will exist, so a future, not merely possible, person, then I find both the thought that their serious suffering matters greatly and the asymmetry highly plausible.
Adriano Mannino (0:58:41) I see. But as you may have just hinted, there are designators of future people available to us, along the lines of “those who will in fact experience serious suffering if we make procreative choices X, Y, Z.” And it seems to me that this has to be good enough, because otherwise we face implications like this: suppose you were to perversely try and create a kind of concentration camp for new humans, yet unborn, or indeed animals suffering on factory farms. While you make those decisions, you could argue, “Oh, I don’t know which particular cows or chickens or, God forbid, human beings I’m going to create. All I have is a designator like ‘those, whoever they are, that will suffer if I make this procreative choice.’” And it seems clear to me that this must be an insufficient basis for setting it aside.
David Enoch (0:59:42) With many cases, I do agree. But I do think that at this point, sorry, let me take a step back and rethink the dialectic. I put forward a thesis restricted in scope. You say, “You can’t afford this restriction. You’re cheating. You’re saving the theory by restricting its scope in ways that are only motivated by the hope to save the theory.” That’s really the accusation. But it seems to me that what you’re now putting forward is this very general population ethics kind of thought, to which we need to reply. That will be, I think, somewhat analogous to this: suppose I said that we can’t create suffering when we know we’re going to create it, and then you say, “Well, but how can we know anything? Maybe we are deceived by an evil demon.” That is an important philosophical problem, of course, and we should discuss it at some point, but I think it’s okay to cordon off our discussion without solving skepticism for now. And it seems to me that at this point, in at least my discussion, the non-identity problem, population ethics, the effective altruism kind of things become closer, not the same but closer, to a general skeptical worry. I’m not belittling it. It doesn’t mean that you don’t need an answer. But it does raise doubt about whether it’s a legitimate move in our dialectic here.
Adriano Mannino (1:01:07) I see. Interesting. This might be the one point where I really disagree. Let me push a little more, if I may. I was a bit surprised by your analogy with philosophical skepticism, because to the extent that we’re concerned with serious suffering, we can foresee that, for instance, if we have population policy X, the population is going to grow, and we can foresee that fraction Y of this population is then likely to experience very serious suffering. Very unfortunately, there’s a real paucity of empirical data here about how people subjectively rate their well-being. But the little data that there is suggests that cross-nationally and cross-culturally, something between 10 and 20% of people will say that their lives contain more suffering than happiness, and also maybe that they’d rather never have been born, and similar things.
(1:02:11) So I think we can make reasonable guesses about what the population-level effect is going to be on serious suffering and the number of individuals experiencing it. And these are live debates. As I’m sure you know, many people are now worried about a reversed population bomb and the fertility crisis, and an increasing number of people are therefore pushing pro-natalist policies. So I think it’s becoming a live debate. And it seems to me that, by default, from a point of view that is focused on preventing serious suffering, it would be better to maybe keep the population rather smaller than to allow it to get bigger, just because we can foresee that if a certain fraction of the population will experience severe suffering, there just will be less of that
(1:03:06) if we keep the population smaller. Now, earlier you alluded to this famous objection to a very radical view, negative utilitarianism, that says, well, then maybe the ideal population size is zero. As you argued, we wouldn’t be committed to that, because the view is not negative utilitarian, not even negative consequentialist. But maybe we would be committed to something like: okay, let’s secure our future as a civilization, as a society. Let’s make sure we have a viable population size. But beyond that, maybe let’s have a population policy of minimizing the number of additional individuals that are born, because that’s, as you said, a pretty surefire way to minimize the amount of serious suffering.
David Enoch (1:03:47) I think I’m open to that. That does not sound to me like a reductio. I’m open to that possibility. It’s going to depend on more things than merely running surveys. I don’t think that just asking people to report is a very good way of determining whether a life is worth living or whether there’s more suffering than happiness in it. I should say I don’t know this empirical literature, and I’m definitely not an expert on empirical methodology. Maybe they’re doing things that are just marvelous methodologically. I kind of doubt it from my armchair, but I’m not sure; I’d have to see that. The mere fact that people report such things does not suffice, it seems to me.
(1:04:23) It would take more to convince me. For instance, I’d like to know whether they say this consistently or just in some moments. There are also problems in the opposite direction. From what I understand, and it also makes sense, there’s a fairly robust phenomenon of adaptation. It means that people adapt, not to everything, but to many things. However bad those things look from the outside, they may actually not feel that bad from the inside, at least after a while. I think it’s going to be very hard, methodologically, to reach any conclusion here. Maybe it’s better this way.
Adriano Mannino (1:04:56) Yes, maybe I shouldn’t have argued in terms of that data, because I suspect it’s also enough to just go for the move that you also go for in the book and elsewhere: let’s just talk common sense. You agree, that’s why you wrote this paper, and it’s a basis for your argument, that there’s a hell of a lot of serious suffering out there. On the default trajectory, if society continues to procreate as it does, we can just foresee that there will be these subpopulations that will be suffering very seriously for a variety of reasons, some natural, some political, and so on. Then the next thought would just be, again, common sense: by default, that amount of suffering would be less if the population overall were smaller. Maybe we don’t want to make it so small that chaos breaks loose, various systems collapse, and we have instability. But if we can have a minimally viable, stable size, then maybe, beyond that, the view should have something very important to say about what population policy should be.
David Enoch (1:05:58) Even some weaker, more plausible claims, like: at least we shouldn’t dedicate resources to making the population continue to rise, or decline at slower rates. That seems to me like an entirely possible position.
Adriano Mannino (1:06:12) I think that by itself wouldn’t be the possible reductio. The possible reductio would be that politics should, to a first approximation, be about just that. In a way that’s parallel to the earlier point, that maybe, on certain assumptions, politics should, to a first approximation, be animal politics, maybe, if we follow this latter line of thought, politics should, to a first approximation, be population policy, or something like that.
David Enoch (1:06:43) This raises other issues. Again, I’m not sure what I think about them. One issue is whether we should be impartial between those already existing and those who are not. Is it okay to be partial to those already existing, in a picture that’s somewhat similar to the one I sketched about parenthood and maybe, although that’s not clear, about nations? I’m not sure. There may be some secondary, epistemic, not extremely profound but practically important considerations. One is, well, we know what’s going on with people now. If you ask me what’s going on a generation from now, I don’t know. Maybe extremely benevolent, all-powerful AIs will make sure that nobody suffers seriously. I don’t know. Or maybe they will just cause suffering, or maybe a bit of this and a bit of that.
(1:07:36) If everything is discounted, at least partly, by probabilities, then this seems to justify, in a derivative way, a kind of partiality toward the present, or those existing, or something along these lines. I think that that alone suffices to at least negate the stronger claim that politics should be just about, or primarily about, population ethics. But I do think that it can be about that as well.
Adriano Mannino (1:08:01) Interesting. Maybe to bring this to a close at a more meta level: I was also wondering why, if I may ask, it took you so long to write about suffering. That’s salient because you built a long and very impressive career in practical philosophy, working in a really wide range of topic areas. And then, I think it was in 2025, I saw this paper published, titled “Politics and Suffering.” And of course I thought, given my really strong interest in suffering, that I need to read this. And then I see that it’s by this guy Enoch, whom I obviously knew, but from...
David Enoch (1:08:43) Where have you been for 20 years?
Adriano Mannino (1:08:44) Yeah, from quite different topic areas. And so I was wondering.
David Enoch (1:08:50) Okay, so first I should say that I wrote it earlier. It took some time to publish, I think partly because it’s a work in analytic political philosophy, but it’s also about Shklar. The Shklar people are not that much into analytic philosophy, and analytic philosophers are not that much into Shklar. So that made it harder to publish. But I don’t know that I have... I mean, do you have, like, a plan of what you’re going to write when, with a strong preference for the most important stuff early on? Do you?
Adriano Mannino (1:09:26) A bit of one, not necessarily a great one.
David Enoch (1:09:29) Okay, I don’t. I do have some: I knew that I wanted to defend morality’s objectivity from before I started my dissertation. So sometimes I do have such things. But more often than not, something will seem interesting to me, or important, or will be really annoying, and then I’ll read and think and then eventually write about that. That’s the way this developed. I don’t think that it means it’s less important than other things I’ve worked on. I wouldn’t expect a linear relation there. But perhaps another thing is that I am not a politician. I’m not a decision maker. Decision makers should prioritize important decisions. Philosophers, at least to an extent, should prioritize interesting stuff.
Adriano Mannino (1:10:19) But to an extent that can be overridden by enough suffering?
David Enoch (1:10:23) Well, okay. Let me say the following. If I thought that the masses were just awaiting my word, then I think this would create different obligations on what I should write about. But, to take it to an extreme, seeing that nobody listens to us, I think the set of constraints is different. Okay, so it’s somewhere in the middle. Maybe you can find an occasional person who is interested. That’s great. But I do think that it’s important not to suffer from a serious case of hubris about how much of a difference we’re making. Maybe it’s important to try and make more, but still. And these facts affect the kinds of considerations that should govern. We do have, to an extent, the luxury of working on stuff because we’re interested in it. That’s, like, the main advantage of an academic career.
Adriano Mannino (1:11:17) So maybe making this a bit less personal, sorry, and indeed more collective and institutional: another thing that’s of course salient is that suffering doesn’t seem to be a very big deal in political philosophy or theory. It’s a bit more of a deal, certainly, in normative ethics, but also not that big.
David Enoch (1:11:35) How about politics?
Adriano Mannino (1:11:38) It seems to me certainly much less of one than it should be. I guess it depends on our empirical view. If you look at broadly liberal forces, certainly their rhetoric, and I guess also their policies, are targeted much more at other liberal fundamentals, it seems. Maybe there are good reasons not to talk very explicitly in terms of suffering, but I kind of doubt it. And substantively, sure, many center-left cause areas, and also some on the center-right, are instrumentally linked to suffering. Obviously, it’s a fundamental human concern. But as far as I can see, there’s not nearly enough focus on that. I was wondering about your thoughts on political philosophy and theory. Is it, for instance, the case that if one has the kind of view that you defend in the paper, then there’s just less work to do for political philosophers and theorists and more work to do for empirical scientists? Or what do you see?
David Enoch (1:12:46) I think that that’s a part of it. And then it’s sort of justifiable, to an extent. There’s also another part, a little bit more pernicious. And Shklar was right: there are all these political philosophers who reside on the sunny side of the street. This is extremely common. When I was an MA student and I read Rawls’s “Political Liberalism” for the first time, I remember writing a paper with the title “Mission Impossible.” And one of the things I insisted on was that this book could not have been written in Tel Aviv, let alone in Gaza. You had to be in a place like Cambridge, Massachusetts, or maybe Oxford, where I am now, in order to imagine this kind of stuff. If you want to write political philosophy that is actually relevant to people’s lives and politics, then things are going to be different.
(1:13:42) But maybe they’re not going to be as exciting, and maybe it’s going to be more depressing. And real people are sometimes sweaty. It’s so much nicer to talk about an ideal discourse, or about what the disagreement between reasonable people looks like, or about the liberty blah blah blah. I have a lot of patience for this if it’s understood as a theoretical project. It’s okay to do analytic metaphysics. It’s okay to ask how many possible worlds there are. It’s okay to ask what would be a criterion of legitimacy in a world in which everyone’s reasonable. That’s fine. But don’t pretend that any of this is directly relevant to the kind of politics we need to do. And I think that if political philosophy just divorces itself entirely from the kind of politics we need to do, that’s a very impoverished picture of political philosophy. With so much of political philosophy, it doesn’t really surprise me that it does not have anything to say about suffering. And also, at the end of the day, it’s not clear to me how much there is to be said rather than, say, to be done.
Adriano Mannino (1:14:37) I see. But then what would you say is your ideal for how political philosophy and theory should be conducted? If we take seriously the importance of minimizing serious suffering, does that, for instance, mean that there should be a big rapprochement between normative theorizing and empirical work?
David Enoch (1:15:00) Also. I think that’s clearly true anyway. But that doesn’t mean that the way to do it is to ask our normative questions on questionnaires that you let some website distribute to thousands of people. That’s not what I’m talking about. But real facts, for instance, what policy causes what effects in the real world, that seems to me to be extremely important. We can do principles that don’t depend on these facts. That’s fine. But if you want to talk about policy, then yeah, facts matter. I’m hoping this is not a shocker.
Adriano Mannino (1:15:32) And I guess another upshot might be that political philosophy and theory should then maybe become more strategic and more shamelessly, as you also say, take sides. Here I guess some people might object that this is maybe not exactly appropriate, given the role of academics as truth seekers. But I take it you would push back against that.
David Enoch (1:15:56) I would do that to an extent. But again, if you are, and there have been philosophers like this, even contemporary ones, someone who has the ear of decision makers, if you are in that position, you should take that into account. Truth ceases to trump everything else. But most of us aren’t. If I ran for office, I think I would get my mother’s vote, and I’m not entirely confident even of that. It’s not as if either decision makers or the masses are awaiting what I say. So I’m in a position in which I can give truth a much, much heavier weight than I would had I been designing policy or effectively advising those who design policy. But yes, if you are in a position to have an effect in the real world, you had better take that into account. And at that point, the thought that “Oh, no, no, but I’m just doing theory, so it’s all about truth and evidence, and that’s it” ceases, I think, to be defensible.
Adriano Mannino (1:16:57) But I guess there are not necessarily hard and unchangeable facts about what social impact an academic has.
David Enoch (1:17:06) That’s true. And that means that there are going to be changes in the conclusions that follow as well. Suppose that now, when I publish my book, suddenly everyone will start listening to me. This will have an effect on what I should publish in my next book. And if I now foresee this, it should have an effect on this book as well. And if I could have foreseen it 20 years ago, that should have had an effect on that as well.
Adriano Mannino (1:17:31) Yeah.
David Enoch (1:17:32) I’m willing to bet a lot of money against the thought that all decision makers will suddenly listen to me. I mean, that’s the hope. I’m going for this. I’m trying to save the world with a book. But that doesn’t mean I also expect to succeed.
Adriano Mannino (1:17:45) I think that’s a good place to end. I was going to ask you to please plug your book a bit more, and maybe the concept of shameless liberalism. We’ve talked about the four liberal fundamentals as you see them: well-being, with its really perhaps even overriding suffering component, autonomy, liberty, and equality. But what is it exactly that makes your view shameless?
David Enoch (1:18:10) As I put it, it’s shameless in two directions. First, it is shamelessly confident in those ultimate principles, and especially, it doesn’t lose its confidence at the first sight of disagreement. I think Frost said many years ago that the liberal is someone too broad-minded to defend their own side in an argument. So it’s not like that. It’s not hyper-neutralist. It doesn’t pretend that it’s the referee in some game. It is shamelessly confident in the liberal fundamentals. On the other hand, or anyway, additionally, it’s also shamelessly pragmatic when it comes to implications, when it comes to policy recommendations, when it comes to real-life politics. So it’s fully committed to these principles and values, and it’s fully willing to compromise on anything in order to achieve a greater deal of those things. It’s supposed to be deeply pragmatic, but in a way that is fully grounded in these liberal fundamentals.
(1:19:01) As for the main targets in the book: the book is not primarily about defeating the illiberals. It’s primarily about getting the liberal camp in order, so that we are better prepared to defeat the illiberals. The main targets there are, say, hyper-neutralist Rawlsian views of political liberalism, some views that go by the name of political realism, especially in political science departments, and also the kind of relativism, maybe subjectivism, that’s in the air, with some people thinking that even if you just think there’s a truth of the matter, you’re already not liberal. So it’s against those targets.
Adriano Mannino (1:19:40) David Enoch, thank you so much for your time and insights today.
David Enoch (1:19:43) Thanks so much for having me.






