On a scale of one to ten, some cluster headache patients rate their pain “at eleven and more.” In our opening episode, we explain why suffering this severe is at the center of our podcast.
We begin with the activist Matt Ball, whose severe illness led him to conclude that “the irreducible heart of what matters is suffering,” and with the philosophers David Enoch and Roger Crisp, who have argued that sufficiently extreme suffering may outweigh almost everything else. We read reports from cluster headache patients, ask whether pain scales are logarithmic rather than linear, whether some suffering is lexically or “infinitely” worse than other, lesser suffering, and we describe the hot-cold empathy gap, which makes severe suffering hard to grasp from a calm state. We also discuss anesthesia as science and technology at their best, Viktor Frankl on psychosocial and political pain, Henry Dunant and the first Geneva Convention, how liberal democracy can shield us from the worst abuses of power, AI-enabled totalitarian surveillance, animal suffering and factory farming, whether AI systems might suffer, and questions in population ethics.
Content note: extreme pain, surgery without anesthesia, suicidality, and animal slaughter.
Hosts
Suffering & Social Change is hosted by Adriano Mannino and Nils Althaus. Adriano teaches philosophy at the Munich University of Applied Sciences and was previously a Technology & Human Rights Fellow at Harvard and a Postdoc at UC Berkeley. Nils is an independent researcher, science writer, and journalist for leading outlets in the German-speaking area, and originally a biochemist.
Mentioned in this episode
Matt Ball, co-founder of Vegan Outreach and One Step for Animals; his memoir “Losing My Religions” (free online) and “The Accidental Activist” (Lantern Books)
David Enoch, “Politics and Suffering”
Roger Crisp, “Pessimism about the Future” (Midwest Studies in Philosophy)
World Health Organization, fact sheet on road traffic injuries
Adriano Mannino and Nils Althaus, “Saving ‘Suffering’” (American Journal of Bioethics, 2025), a reply to Nelson et al., “Is Suffering a Useless Concept?“
Michael Brady, “Suffering and Virtue” (Oxford University Press)
Jennifer Corns, “Suffering as significantly disrupted agency” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
Cluster headaches: the overview by OPIS, Jonathan Leighton’s Organisation for the Prevention of Intense Suffering, and Alfredo Parra, “Quantifying the Global Burden of Extreme Pain from Cluster Headaches” (Qualia Research Institute)
Andrés Gómez-Emilsson, “Logarithmic Scales of Pleasure and Pain” (Qualia Research Institute)
Felicia Knaul and colleagues, “Alleviating the access abyss in palliative care and pain relief,” the report of the Lancet Commission
Johan Gustafsson, “Money-Pump Arguments” (Cambridge University Press, open access), with a chapter on the continuity axiom
The hot-cold empathy gap, described by George Loewenstein in “Hot-Cold Empathy Gaps and Medical Decision Making” (Health Psychology, 2005)
Adam Booser, “The Astonishingly Slow Progress Towards Surgical Anesthesia: Part I” (Missouri Medicine, 2021)
Dave Roos, “How Did Doctors Operate Before Anesthesia?” (History.com), the source of the quote from Ira Rutkow
Charles Darwin’s autobiography (Darwin Online)
Frances Burney’s account of her mastectomy in 1811 (OUPblog)
Viktor Frankl, “Man’s Search for Meaning,” whose German title is “... trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen”
Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value” (Journal of Democracy, 1999)
Henry Dunant, “A Memory of Solferino” (International Committee of the Red Cross)
Adriano Mannino and Nils Althaus, “Künstliche Superintelligenz und das Ende der Demokratie” (in “KI und Demokratie,” Springer, 2026; in German)
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” reprinted in “Political Thought and Political Thinkers” (University of Chicago Press)
Lewis Bollard’s farm animal welfare newsletter
Yang and colleagues, “Flies Cope with Uncontrollable Stress by Learned Helplessness” (Current Biology, 2013), and Ries and colleagues, “Serotonin modulates a depression-like state in Drosophila responsive to lithium treatment” (Nature Communications, 2017)
Čeko and colleagues, “Common and stimulus-type-specific brain representations of negative affect” (Nature Neuroscience, 2022), from Tor Wager’s lab
Chapters
00:00 Cold open
01:03 What this podcast is about
01:57 Matt Ball and unbearable suffering
05:44 Should extreme suffering take priority?
07:50 Crimeless victims: disease and car crashes
12:58 Who we are
16:34 What is suffering?
21:30 Cluster headache in patients’ own words
26:22 Are pain scales logarithmic?
28:26 Can pinpricks outweigh torture?
33:15 The hot-cold empathy gap
37:01 No world map of suffering
40:58 The miracle of anesthesia
47:52 Psychological and political suffering
52:23 Democracy and mass suffering
56:01 Henry Dunant and the Geneva Convention
1:00:35 AI, surveillance, and the liberalism of fear
1:05:48 Factory farming and animal suffering
1:15:57 Could AI systems suffer?
1:18:55 Depressed fruit flies
1:20:57 Neurotechnology and its risks
1:23:56 Do the numbers count?
1:27:21 Is a larger population progress?
1:32:30 Self-help and what comes next
Corrections: Frances Burney’s operation took 20 minutes, not four hours. The Frankl passages are from “Man’s Search for Meaning.”
Transcript
Lightly edited for readability: filler words, false starts, and repetitions removed, some sentences smoothed, no changes in content.
Cold open
Adriano Mannino (0:00:01) If you add up all of those rare physical and mental health conditions that plausibly cause severe, often debilitating suffering, then the picture can start to look quite grim, actually.
Nils Althaus (0:00:14) This is one of the central themes that Adriano and I keep encountering: the difficulty or inability to grasp and communicate the badness of severe suffering.
Adriano Mannino (0:00:25) Our guests are experts in philosophy, in the natural and social sciences, or in sociopolitical and philanthropic practice. Talking to them brings out, for us, that their fields have of course been concerned with suffering in one way or another, but not really in a truly focused way. This leads to a situation where concern for suffering is, in a sense, trivial (suffering is bad, who would have thought?) but at the same time also highly nontrivial and novel in both theory and practice, if it’s pursued in a focused and systematic way.
Conversation
Nils Althaus (0:01:03) This is the Suffering and Social Change podcast with me, Nils Althaus.
Adriano Mannino (0:01:07) And me, Adriano Mannino.
Nils Althaus (0:01:09) Today we’re going to talk about what this podcast is all about, and we’re going to show you some ideas and stories that played a crucial role in shaping our outlook and in convincing us to start this project. You will have guessed from the name that we care a lot about suffering, and especially about severe forms of suffering. We both have been interested in moral and political progress for a long time. I guess you could say it has been a sort of North Star for us: the aspiration of making the world a better place, and all the questions this raises from the point of view of science, that is, natural and social science, and philosophy. I am a science writer and journalist, and originally a biochemist.
Adriano Mannino (0:01:52) And I’m an academic philosopher, a social entrepreneur, and a policy consultant.
Nils Althaus (0:01:57) But before we get into who we are, we’d like to introduce you to someone else whose story has played an important part in this. His name is Matt Ball. He’s a social activist and lives in Tucson, Arizona. He devoted much of his early life to the fight against exploitation, oppression, and injustice, and he probably would have done that for his entire life had he not fallen seriously ill. Around the age of 30, Matt Ball was diagnosed with Crohn’s disease, a chronic inflammation of the digestive tract, and he started to develop violent attacks of this disease that were extremely painful. Of one of the worst attacks, he later wrote that it was hard to form any coherent thought at all, but when he did, he wanted to die. And he added: literally, not figuratively. He also wrote that in this state he was mostly just a ball of writhing, wordless agony. That disease alone would have been a lot, or too much, to take for most of us.
(0:03:01) But Matt had to go through maybe even worse experiences. He suffered several cases of pneumothorax, a collapsing of the lung, and the worst one was so dangerous that doctors had to drill a hole into his chest to relieve the pressure. This had to be done without general anesthesia, because that would have suppressed his breathing. The pain was blinding agony, as he wrote in his book “Losing My Religions.” And in the coming days, he would sometimes scream so hard because of the pain that nurses would literally come running. This is how he describes it. There is more, but I’m going to stop here. These experiences are certainly extreme, and many of us, fortunately, don’t have to go through anything of comparable severity. But what happens when you do? How does it impact you? How does experiencing unbearable suffering change your outlook on life?
(0:04:01) This is, at least to me, the most intriguing part of this story. Do you conclude that anything can be overcome, since you did overcome such an experience? Or do you conclude the opposite: that suffering can actually be much worse than you thought, literally unbearable, and that it’s therefore much more important than you thought? For Matt Ball, it was the latter. He wrote a book and a blog later on, and he was quite unequivocal about that point. So let me read you a short passage from his book “The Accidental Activist,” where he writes a letter to a young Matt: “The single most important lesson I’ve learned in the past 20 years is that the irreducible heart of what matters is suffering. Back then, even though I was absolutely sure I knew everything, I really didn’t know anything about suffering. Since then, though, I’ve developed a chronic disease and experienced times when I thought I was going to die.
(0:05:03) “Times when I wished I would die. Back then, I worried about abstractions and words and principles. I argued about exploitation, oppression, liberation. I didn’t take suffering seriously. Now, knowing what suffering really is, and knowing how much there is in the world, all my previous concerns seem, well, to put it kindly, ridiculous. I don’t know how I could convey this to my younger self, who had never really known suffering. Yet it seems clear to me now that when we make a decision, we should decide based on what leads to the least amount of suffering.”
Adriano Mannino (0:05:44) What’s remarkable here, I think, among other things, is the epistemic shift: the change in Matt’s views about what matters most through this lived experience of unbearable suffering. He didn’t stop being an activist after this, but he became an activist for something else, namely for a life free from severe suffering for all sentient beings. Now, in the passage that Nils just read, Matt chose some very strong words and made some very strong claims. It’s certainly implausible, at least to me, to describe other moral and political concerns as ridiculous, for instance the concerns he mentions with oppression and exploitation, or with happiness, for that matter. But setting this overly strong language aside, I do think that Matt gets at something really important here. As philosophers such as David Enoch and Roger Crisp have recently argued, all of those other concerns can be very important, and it can at the same time also be true that when suffering gets sufficiently extreme, it should take priority over everything else, or almost everything else.
(0:06:47) Even if one is skeptical of this, it’s certainly interesting that the concern for severe suffering is a very salient point of overlap between most of the moral views and theories that are commonly defended. Another question that Matt’s claim raises is what the practical upshot of his newfound laser focus on suffering is at the end of the day. It certainly seems that in the real world, oppression, exploitation, and other injustices very often do lead to severe suffering. So one might wonder how this shift in moral perspective matters in practice, if at all, because it might just be the case that combating oppression and exploitation is the very best thing we can do to reduce suffering in the empirical world. However, Matt himself believes that this is not necessarily the case. And I think, Nils, you will later tell us a bit more about why and how that is.
(0:07:50) But one thing we can immediately note, I think, is that the kind of suffering Matt himself experienced isn’t necessarily treated as a top political priority in our society. Society doesn’t currently spend much political airtime, as it were, on trying to make as much progress in biomedical science as possible, for instance, or on finding out which diseases cause the most intense suffering in the first place. Perhaps that’s at least partly because this kind of suffering isn’t inflicted on us by other people who are actively harming us, maybe with bad intent, or treating us unjustly in other ways. So what we have here is, in a sense, crimeless victims. Similarly, society isn’t particularly worried about the fact that more than a million people globally still die in car crashes every year. More than 20 million people, I think, suffer severely disabling injuries in crashes.
(0:08:53) If you think about it, that’s more than 200 million people every decade. Now, it’s not the case that society is entirely indifferent to this, of course: we have seatbelts, we have airbags, and so on. But even installing and then requiring seatbelts took us an embarrassingly long time and was preceded by literally decades of heated debate in the ‘60s, ‘70s, and even into the ‘80s in some countries. This sort of debate looks kind of ridiculous in retrospect, at least to most of us. And today, the available evidence already suggests that we could cut the remaining fatalities and injuries by maybe 80 or even 90% if we transitioned to an ecosystem of self-driving cars. But unfortunately, this sort of tech policy has nowhere been treated as a priority. Perhaps that’s again in part because there’s no clear agent we can point to who is actively or intentionally causing this. But if Matt Ball is right, that’s ultimately a bias.
(0:10:00) I already mentioned the importance of scientific and technological progress, and we’ll return to how it can actually be a very double-edged sword when it comes to its effect on severe suffering. But if that’s the case, if technological progress and deployment can also cause a lot of suffering, then that just reinforces the point that science and technology are crucial to consider when thinking about suffering and social change. The same, needless to say, is true of politics, not least because politics and public policy have a very large influence on scientific and technological development themselves, though they are in turn also strongly influenced by the technology that’s already deployed in society. More generally, politics is arguably all about power, and when power is abused, mass suffering has very often been the consequence. This is, of course, where a concern with oppression, for instance, indeed aligns very closely with the prevention of suffering.
(0:10:59) In terms of politics, we’ll return later on to how protecting liberal democracy especially can arguably provide a strong shield against cruel abuses of power, and how there’s a lot that we can do to help save democracy, in the US, for instance, and elsewhere around the world, based on current applied empirical research. Beyond politics, in terms of civil society, the humanitarian and human rights movement has of course been focused on suffering in many ways, and its demands have arguably been crucial to domestic and international politics going well, or at least not terribly. However, to this day there is still no explicit right to freedom from unbearable suffering, though there are of course many other rights that are indirectly and importantly related to the prevention of suffering. The fact that there is no such explicit right, which might be a very meaningful and important right to institute, may be part of why suffering, and unbearable suffering in particular, still quite often goes neglected.
(0:12:08) This is actually a general theme, by the way, that Nils and I have encountered in speaking to our podcast guests and doing our research. Our guests are experts in philosophy, in the natural and social sciences, or in sociopolitical and philanthropic practice. Talking to them brings out, for us, that their fields have of course been concerned with suffering in one way or another, but not really in a truly focused way. This leads to a situation where concern for suffering is, in a sense, trivial (suffering is bad, who would have thought?) but at the same time also highly nontrivial and novel in both theory and practice, if it’s pursued in a focused and systematic way. So this is the idea of our project in a nutshell.
(0:12:58) But who are we, the podcast hosts? As already mentioned, I myself have a background in philosophy, and I helped found several NGOs and think tanks in the areas of human and animal rights, AI safety, and democracy protection. I think my interest in preventing severe suffering has been more intellectually driven than Matt Ball’s, although a childhood experience at the hospital, several weeks that were pretty hard to bear, may also have played an important role. I spent about a decade doing social entrepreneurship and public policy in a philosophically inspired way, but then I decided to return to academia a couple of years ago. I finished my PhD in ethics in Munich. Then I worked at UC Berkeley, at the Kavli Center for Ethics, Science, and the Public. Since September of last year, I’ve been a Technology and Human Rights Fellow at Harvard, at the Carr-Ryan Center for Human Rights, and now I’m about to take up a tenured professorship in Munich again. But Nils, you actually have a much more diverse and interesting background and path than me.
Nils Althaus (0:14:08) Well, I of course wouldn’t call it more interesting, if you ask me, but it’s true that my career was maybe even more of a zigzag than yours. I studied biochemistry originally, and I was pretty set on becoming a researcher. After my master’s, and after actually spending some time in a biochemistry lab, or a biology lab rather, I felt I needed to change. I distanced myself completely from the sciences. I started to do musical comedy and stand-up comedy and started acting. I got into movie acting, played several roles in movies, and also wrote a lot: sketches, an audio play series for Swiss radio, and my own solo shows, which I played up and down the country on small, medium, and some large stages. I did this for about 15 years. During that time, I also came into contact with moral philosophy and, embarrassingly, had to find out that many of the things and problems I had been pondering had already been discussed in thousands of pages. That led me to try to get up to speed and immerse myself in moral philosophy.
Adriano Mannino (0:15:28) How many wasted pages, though, among those thousands and thousands?
Nils Althaus (0:15:33) That’s maybe up to you to decide. But anyway, I tried to pick the ones that were not wasted. I’m still developing my moral views, as probably even any professional philosopher would say. But the trajectory certainly is pointing toward a strong focus on alleviating and preventing severe suffering. And as a second strand, I always thought that technology was a core determinant of the trajectory of the world. Eventually, after those 15 years on stages and in movies, I decided to keep writing but to pivot to a more serious and more focused approach to writing, and I became a science writer for the science sections of various German and Swiss newspapers. I have also written a few academic papers. We’ve recently co-authored some, and I have a book project going at the moment. Those are a few words about me. But now back to the podcast and our upcoming episodes.
(0:16:34) The description of our podcast contains the following sentence: “How do we stop the worst, personally and collectively, from happening?” This is our project in a nutshell. Our leading hypothesis is that stopping the worst from happening involves mostly, or maybe always, preventing or stopping severe, perhaps unbearable suffering, especially on a large scale. As Adriano mentioned, we will be talking to experts from many different fields, hence the tagline of the podcast, “Conversations Bridging Science, Ethics, and Politics.” You will be able to find links to the work of our guests in the show notes, and we’ll include links to the people we mention in this episode, too, for example the philosophers David Enoch and Roger Crisp, whom Adriano already mentioned.
(0:17:22) If we wanted to proceed highly systematically, including in this episode, I guess we should now ask: What is suffering, even? What is unbearable suffering in particular? And how would philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists describe or define suffering? We will try to do this in future episodes, but for now we’ll mostly rely on a “you know it when you see it” attitude, and we’ll point to further examples. But just briefly, since we, as I mentioned, recently co-authored a very short paper on the concept and badness of suffering, here are a few thoughts, just for a taste. A common analysis of suffering says that suffering has two components: first, an unpleasant feeling, which philosophers often call a negatively valenced experience, and second, an occurrent desire that the feelings stop.
(0:18:21) Now, these may sound like the same thing, but it’s not at all obvious that they are. Just one example: masochistic desires. They may be about wanting unpleasant feelings or pains, so you don’t want them to stop, you want them to continue. Michael Brady, for example, is a leading proponent of such an account of suffering: an unpleasant feeling and a desire against it. Other philosophers, however, such as Jennifer Corns, disagree and have proposed that suffering is something else, namely, in her case, significantly disrupted agency. This concept of suffering does not necessarily involve the presence of any conscious feelings or occurrent desires. In our paper, we responded to other authors (the paper is by Nelson et al.), who have similarly suggested that there can be suffering in the complete absence of phenomenal consciousness: no experience, no feeling whatsoever.
(0:19:22) Although we think this is partly maybe just a semantic, verbal issue, we have also argued that it is important to keep the concept of suffering tied to subjective states like feelings and desires. This is for various reasons. For instance, we already have other terms, such as ill health and ill-being, to describe the states that unconscious medical patients are in, and we should reserve the term “suffering” for something else, something that is not covered by these terms. Furthermore, it’s really hard to give a plausible account of the intensity of the alleged suffering of a completely unconscious patient. The intensity of suffering clearly seems to be about the intensity of an unpleasant feeling, of something that the patient himself or herself feels, or about the strength of the desire that the feelings stop. None of these are there in an unconscious patient. How intensely an unconscious patient suffers may be a nonsensical question.
(0:20:24) And when suffering becomes unbearable, something happens at this subjective level, even if it’s not trivial to spell out what exactly. But we think, and we argued, that it’s morally crucial to keep this concept of unbearable suffering alive, especially given the plausibly huge moral importance of the respective phenomenon. So that was just a taste. As I just mentioned, there are also questions about what pain is and how it relates to suffering. There’s the interesting case of pain asymbolia, which is a very rare condition. Patients with pain asymbolia report that they are feeling pain, but also that it does not bother them at all. In this case, it’s certainly implausible to say that they are suffering, even though they feel pain. This raises some tricky questions that we are planning to examine in future episodes, but we’ll bracket them for now and use the words “pain” and “suffering” more or less interchangeably here.
(0:21:30) Okay, so now let’s get a bit more concrete. There are some examples of extreme suffering that we have encountered along the way and that especially motivated us to work on this topic. Adriano, do you want to start with one of the examples?
Adriano Mannino (0:21:47) Sure, yes. One condition that we’ve recently done some work on is cluster headache. We’ll discuss it much more in future episodes with empirical researchers and activists, such as Jonathan Leighton and others. Unfortunately, cluster headache has been very neglected in both scientific research and public health, like many other rare but extremely painful conditions. Although I should say that cluster headache is actually not that rare at all: I think it affects about one in 1,000 people, so roughly 10 million people globally. And if you add up all of those rare physical and mental health conditions that plausibly cause severe, often debilitating suffering, then the picture can start to look quite grim, actually. You may start to feel a bit like you’re surrounded by a literal sea of suffering that you mostly cannot see, because, of course, the sufferers themselves are very often unable to visibly participate in our society.
(0:22:52) The few people who have actually studied cluster headache more systematically, or indeed the ones suffering from it, often describe it as something like the most painful condition ever known to humankind. The condition is a neurological disorder characterized by episodes of extremely severe headaches, usually on one side of the head, typically around the eye and the temple. Those episodes tend to last between 15 minutes and three hours. During these attacks, patients often wince and scream; they will throw themselves around quite violently and hit themselves, desperately trying to distract themselves from the pain somehow. And of course, very understandably and tragically, during such episodes the patients’ suicidality tends to go up dramatically, which is why the condition is also known as suicide headache.
Nils Althaus (0:23:50) It is certainly hard to describe such pain, especially when you’ve never felt it yourself, which hopefully applies to most of us. But we thought it’s still probably worth a try. And if we do try, we thought we should use the words of actual patients and not our own. So we’re going to give you some brief patient reports and quotes. I should probably add a trigger warning at this point. We are genuinely uncertain how much we should expose ourselves and everyone else to descriptions and images of extreme suffering. But overall, we suspect that staring into the abyss a bit more is really quite important, even though dwelling on it will be painful and probably counterproductive. We do think it’s important to know how bad things can get, and it’s important if we want to be able to reflect adequately on what matters most and how we should prioritize things in philosophy, science, and politics.
(0:24:57) Maybe the best way to do this, or at least the best one that we could think of, is to listen to patients who experienced such suffering themselves and emerged from the abyss, so to speak. So let me read you some brief patient reports. Here’s one from a recent patient survey: “If you want to understand what it means to live with cluster headache, imagine that someone is stabbing a knife in your eye and turning it for hours. Imagine the worst pain. Imagine daily torture, gratuitous, incomprehensible. Imagine yourself suffering alone, terribly. Imagine being a prisoner in a straitjacket of suffering. Imagine the desire to finish with pain and the desire to finish with yourself.” And here’s another patient quote, just two short ones to go. This one reads like this:
(0:25:57) “Imagine constantly living in fear, not knowing when the next attack will happen, insisting that your wife leave the room when you get an attack because you don’t want her to see you in such pain.” And then there’s a third patient, who said this: “On a scale of one to ten, from no pain to worst imaginable pain, you rate your pain at eleven and more.”
Adriano Mannino (0:26:22) These patient reports are very hard to read and absorb, but I personally do agree that it’s important to consider them. I think we’re talking here about forms of suffering that are really incredibly hard for outsiders to imagine, and I think we definitely owe it to these people to listen very carefully when they emerge from the literal hell that they’re describing. Now, of course, a rating of eleven out of ten doesn’t make literal sense, but I think this patient is probably getting at something that’s also suggested by recent studies, namely that the standard pain scales, which tend to range from zero to ten, may mask the fact that the difference between the worst pains and lesser pains may actually not just be tenfold but perhaps a hundredfold, a thousandfold, or even more.
(0:27:23) When considering a scale ranging from zero to ten, it is tempting to assume, for instance, that the difference between pain intensity ratings of, say, eight and ten would be the same as the difference between ratings of two and four. But if you look into this, that actually seems quite inaccurate. As some researchers have suggested, maybe those scales from zero to ten should better be interpreted logarithmically, such that a pain at level nine would perhaps be ten times worse than a pain at level eight, and pains at level eight would again be ten times worse than pains at level seven. Or maybe, and that would be yet another hypothesis, perhaps also suggested by many patients saying that the pain is just off the charts, some pains are actually, in a sense, in a different category than others: infinitely worse, as it were, than lesser pains, or lexically inferior, as philosophers would say. But I’ll return to this.
(0:28:26) One thing that’s very interesting in this connection is that even those empirical researchers who take these issues very seriously still seem to assume that all forms of pain and suffering can ultimately be put on one and the same scale. I’m thinking here, for instance, of researchers such as Jonathan Leighton, Alfredo Parra-Hinojosa, Felicia Knaul, and others who are coming at this from the perspectives of psychometrics, neuroscience, and health economics, and whose work we deeply respect and admire. Those researchers might agree that some forms of suffering may be thousands of times worse than others. But those, too, would still be on the same scale with a mild, barely noticeable pinprick, say. In moral philosophy, that’s a very controversial hypothesis, to say the very least. And here, I think, more bridge-building between the disciplines would be really valuable.
(0:29:30) Because, as mentioned, in academic philosophy very many people take seriously the view that one just cannot model the badness of pain or suffering with a single scale and a single number that ultimately represents the whole amount of suffering, all summed up, in a state of affairs or in a person’s life. And I think our common-sense morality very much agrees here. Intuitively, if you can either save each of a gazillion people from a barely noticeable pinprick or use the same resources to save a single person from torture-level suffering, I think it’s clear that you should do the latter. The same also seems to apply within one and the same person’s life. Consider a choice: you could choose a life where you experience quite a lot of torture-level suffering but otherwise a lot of happiness, for perhaps a very long time.
(0:30:29) Or you could choose a different, sufficiently longer life containing the same happiness and also a one-second, barely noticeable pinprick every other day. I think it’s pretty clear that you would choose this latter life with pinpricks, basically no matter the total number of pinpricks. This, of course, suggests that torture-level suffering is, in a sense, infinitely or lexically worse, as philosophers say, than lesser, more bearable forms of suffering. Maybe it’s just not true, ultimately, that pinpricks and torture are on one and the same scale or dial of pain. Just as there is clearly a qualitative difference between pleasure and pain, I think pains themselves might also differ in kind and not merely in degree. Some pains seem to have the quality of being agonizing or unbearable, and others clearly lack that. Others might be genuinely distressing but bearable, or they might not even be genuinely distressing but merely bothersome.
(0:31:35) So perhaps there’s even this third qualitative category of merely bothersome pains, and then there would be, as mentioned, the genuinely distressing ones and then the truly unbearable ones. Actually, a very similar view was quite famously suggested for pleasures by John Stuart Mill some 200 years ago. He argued that some pleasures are of higher quality than others: not just better in quantity on the same unidimensional scale, but better in kind. Oh, and since we’re talking some philosophy here, which we’ll do in greater detail in some upcoming episodes, I should probably also flag that there’s, of course, a decision-theoretic debate to be had here, for those interested. I think we’ll put something up in the show notes about this. The so-called continuity axiom in rational choice is the one that needs to be given up, in particular, in order to sustain such a view.
(0:32:42) But I think this is among the easier, perhaps the easiest, of the standard axioms to give up. For one thing, giving it up does not make one vulnerable to so-called money pumps. But anyway, pinpricks not being able to outweigh torture seems quite plausible as a matter of ethical substance. Yet it is currently not reflected at all in the way psychologists, neuroscientists, health economists, or other empirical researchers are attempting to measure suffering and its badness.
Nils Althaus (0:33:15) And as you just mentioned, Adriano, perhaps part of the explanation is that the worst experiences are just very hard for outsiders to imagine. And perhaps this problem of, you could call it, informational access runs even deeper than that, because it may be hard for the sufferers themselves to fully grasp just how bad the worst experiences are, especially when they’re not experiencing them at the very moment when they’re evaluating them. There is a phenomenon in psychology that is supported by good evidence. It’s called the hot-cold empathy gap. By “hot” are meant emotions that are strong, visceral, very affective emotions: pain, anger, excitement. They can also be very positive emotions, being blindly in love, things like that. And the “cold” in the hot-cold empathy gap is about calmness, states where you’re calm, where you don’t have strong emotions, where you can reason through what you want to think about.
(0:34:20) So the idea of the hot-cold empathy gap is this: when you’re in a cold state, a calm state, you can’t imagine what it’s like in a hot state, and vice versa. People are also bad at predicting how they will behave in a hot state. And it goes even further: even if they can imagine and predict what they will be like in the hot state, they might not take that knowledge seriously and really act on it. So why is this important for unbearable suffering? You could say unbearable suffering is the paradigmatic hot state. You maybe can’t understand what’s at stake when you’re thinking about unbearable suffering in a cold state. This is one of the central themes that Adriano and I keep encountering: the difficulty or inability to grasp and communicate the badness of severe suffering. And there are two versions of those empathy gaps.
(0:35:20) One is interpersonal, so between persons, and one is intrapersonal, so inside of one person. An example of the interpersonal one is the physician-patient empathy gap. Physicians usually make decisions in a pain-free state, and those decisions systematically undervalue patients’ pain because they’re made in a cold state. This can lead, and sometimes does lead, to inadequate pain management, so there’s underdiagnosis and undermedication by physicians. And then there’s the intrapersonal hot-cold empathy gap. As an example, there’s this preliminary result that Adriano hinted at, namely that cluster headache patients have a very high suicidality during attacks. When the attacks pass, the preference for ending their life subsides and decreases down to the level found in the general population.
(0:36:20) This is a recent finding and has to be confirmed, but this is the current state of the science. So unbearable suffering may be a kind of transformative experience where one person is deeply at odds with himself or herself at different points in time. They might have different views, desires, and preferences at those moments, and maybe there is no simple way to reconcile these diverging preferences and merge them into one single view. To put it a bit more poetically, as Walt Whitman would put it, we may indeed contain multitudes.
Adriano Mannino (0:37:01) We’ve talked about cluster headache quite a bit now, and perhaps this was the very first time that you heard about conditions like that. We ourselves started thinking about such conditions way later than we think would have been ideal. Part of the reason was that while there are World Happiness Reports and the like, there really are no world suffering reports or world maps of suffering. And the existing measures of health or well-being in health economics and psychology do not really capture suffering well at all. This, we think, is clearly a suboptimal and actually also a pretty odd state of affairs from a moral point of view. Morally, both commonsensically and in academic moral philosophy, there is clearly more and stronger agreement that reducing suffering matters, especially severe suffering, than there is agreement that, say, increasing happiness or lifespan matters. And yet suffering remains greatly understudied.
(0:38:00) Of course, there is still a body of research out there. Some preliminary studies, for instance, have suggested that there are actually a number of conditions that may be a lot worse than some paradigm conditions that are quite well known to be very painful, such as kidney stones. But unfortunately, we don’t really have a good overview. That has also made it much harder to systematically study the practical question of how to most effectively provide the kind of pain relief that the sufferers need. For instance, with regard to cluster headache again, there is promising evidence that some hallucinogenic compounds, such as DMT or psilocybin, provide highly effective relief to those sufferers. But this hasn’t really been studied in a very systematic fashion yet. And unfortunately, patients’ access to such treatments is also often quite limited, for questionable sociopolitical reasons, I think.
(0:39:02) Similarly, going to global health more broadly, health economists like Felicia Knaul, whom I already mentioned, have recently documented what they have called a global pain crisis, that is, a widespread lack of access to simple, straightforward pain-relieving medicines, especially in low- and middle-income countries. Every year, millions of people around the world, including many children, are dying from diseases like cancer and are doing so without any access to morphine, which, of course, often leads to immense agony. The situation could long have been mitigated by providing the same morphine tablets that we get in rich countries when we are in severe pain, especially at the end of life. From a cost point of view, this would have been extremely cheap, and it could be done, and could have been done long ago, in a very targeted and safe way.
(0:40:04) But unfortunately, it’s been neglected for years and is only recently being discussed in a more salient way, thanks to health economists like Knaul and her collaborators. It’s particularly salient here that science, biomedical and technological development, and sociopolitical factors interact in very close and important ways. In order to bring about real change for the sufferers, we usually need to address several, or all, of the relevant factors at once. Those can be scientific and technological, but then, very importantly, also sociopolitical and cultural. In our upcoming episodes, we’ll discuss with experts what the most effective ways are in which we can each contribute. So this kind of practical question will be very important to us.
Nils Althaus (0:40:58) As you just mentioned, Adriano, there are close interactions between technology, science, and social and political factors. We will zoom in on politics shortly, but I first wanted to highlight a last striking example of a technology that has been extremely beneficial: the miracle of anesthesia. Just to caveat this, I am often more pessimistic than others about the net ethical effects of technology, especially in the case of the technology of our age, artificial intelligence. But anesthesia is certainly one area that shines a bright spotlight on the potential of science and technology to relieve suffering and help those most in need. Anesthesia is something that most of us, me included, take for granted. But I think it’s still quite notable that our bodies can be cut open without our going through any pain whatsoever.
(0:42:05) Now, there’s a long history behind anesthesia. The first record of anesthesia is from around 4000 BC in Mesopotamia, which is Iraq and Syria now. The compound used at the time was alcohol. Later on, the use of natural compounds such as morphine from the opium poppy, cannabis, and mandrake was documented as well. But the possibilities were crude for thousands of years, and I think it’s fair to say that before the 1840s, especially in Europe, there was basically no pain relief during surgery. Maybe one interesting approach to make this a bit more salient is this. Think about this question: What do you see when you’re picturing a surgeon? It’s probably someone who is calm, in a cold state, self-controlled, precise, with precise movements and dexterity, operating high-tech precision tools, taking their time.
(0:43:07) This used to be very different. Two hundred years ago, in the first half of the 19th century, surgeons had to be strong, unforgiving, and very quick, and they had to be the people with the best stomachs. Why? Because there was no anesthesia. Patients would scream, they would beat, they would kick. It was common practice that so-called dressers, strong men, would restrain the patients. As a surgeon, you had to keep going without throwing up or collapsing yourself. In an article in the journal Missouri Medicine, Adam Booser writes the following words: “So gruesome was surgery before dependable anesthesia that surgeons felt like they were ‘going to a hanging,’ and they would often shed tears and vomit after their patients’ forced torment.” And it’s actually documented that many students gave up medicine when they witnessed a surgery.
(0:44:08) One of them was Charles Darwin. He witnessed the surgery of a child that went wrong, and this turned him away from medicine. He said, “Nor did I ever attend again ... The two cases fairly haunted me for many a long year.” In the case of Charles Darwin, maybe this was a good thing. I mean, he did discover evolution. But then again, he might have revolutionized medicine. So who knows? We’re not sure. Anyway, with regard to speed, there’s a quote by Ira Rutkow. He’s a retired surgeon and medical historian, one of the experts on this topic, who wrote several books on anesthesia and the history of anesthesia. He says in an article, “By the 19th century, doctors knew anatomy and they knew how to stop the bleeding, but they couldn’t stop the pain, so they would try to perform an amputation of an arm or a leg in 25 seconds.” So this was the surgeon at the time. He was fast.
(0:45:07) It was a “he” at the time. Robert Liston, for example, was known as the fastest surgeon in London and was very famous for that. There are very few accounts by people who had to undergo surgery in those times. Maybe the most famous one is from Frances Burney. She was a novelist and a playwright, and in 1811 she had to undergo a four-hour mastectomy, the removal of breast tissue, for a painful tumor. She said, “I began a scream that lasted unintermittingly during the whole time of the incision, and I almost marvel that it rings not in my ears still, so excruciating was the agony.” So this was an untenable situation at the time, and it was horrible. Many people just did not choose surgery for this very reason, because it was so painful. And we as a society have basically solved this. It started in the 1840s with ether.
(0:46:08) Then other compounds came along: nitrous oxide, chloroform. I’m not going to give you the whole history of anesthesia. Just fast-forward to today: surgeons routinely perform operations lasting 10 or 20 hours on patients in their 80s and 90s. That was something entirely unthinkable even a few decades ago. I think that we have achieved this is quite mind-blowing. We can completely erase extreme pain. We can turn off all conscious experiences with medical compounds, and all of this without turning off all the other vital functions of the brain, and there are many. This clearly is, at least to me, science and technology at its best. Maybe a last point to illustrate the progress: in the late 1940s, the anesthesia-related death rate was about 64 per 100,000 procedures. That has fallen to roughly 0.4 per 100,000 for otherwise healthy patients today.
(0:47:12) So taking away the pain is safer than it has ever been in the history of humankind. Now, of course, there are caveats to this. There’s the amnesia hypothesis: some scholars hypothesize that patients do sometimes suffer when they’re under general anesthesia but forget the experience. There is postoperative cognitive dysfunction, especially in elderly patients. But still, I think, overall, it is very safe to say the situation has improved massively. Today, general anesthesia is chosen by more than 300 million patients annually.
Adriano Mannino (0:47:52) Okay. We’ve now talked about physically caused suffering a lot. But we don’t by any means think that physically caused suffering is somehow more serious or more important than more mentally or psychologically caused suffering. But you have to start somewhere. We could now read further reports from people and patients suffering from severe depression, anxiety, existential despair, and so on, and describe how a year of that can feel like an utterly unbearable eternity, striking fear and panic into someone’s every minute of every day and night. Here, again, one problem is that many people just have very little idea how bad things can truly get, because the worst forms of psychological suffering, too, are very often hidden from societal view. You actually have to look into clinical psychology in order to have a perhaps meaningful grasp of what’s really going on. And if you do that, I think you’ll see things that would really not be shown in a documentary on television.
(0:48:58) So, yes, we’ll certainly place equal emphasis on more psychologically or mentally caused forms of suffering in our upcoming episodes. But I think we should move on for now to politics and sociopolitical causes of suffering. Here, I think it’s worth bearing in mind, as we speak of different causes of suffering, that the boundaries between those causes aren’t necessarily sharp, and also that multiple different direct or indirect causes are usually present at once.
Nils Althaus (0:49:29) Yep, I agree. But at the same time, some sets of causes have a very obvious political dimension. I’m thinking of the causes of warfare, genocide, or many forms of oppression. In this area, there are many, many accounts. The one that we chose to highlight is by Viktor Frankl. He was an Austrian psychiatrist, and he survived the Holocaust. He was a famous psychiatrist before the war and actually after the war as well, very well respected. But during the Second World War, he was in several concentration camps, and he eventually wrote a book on his experiences, on the torment he had to go through, which is called “Yes to Life in Spite of Everything.” In this book, he talks about many examples of very severe physical pains.
(0:50:32) But he also makes links to psychological pains. Let me give you a very brief excerpt from this book about one of the physical pains he talks about. He says, “Like nearly all the camp inmates, I was suffering from edema. My legs were so swollen and the skin on them so tightly stretched that I could scarcely bend my knees. I had to leave my shoes unlaced in order to make them fit my swollen feet. There would not have been space for socks even if I had had any. So my partly bare feet were always wet and my shoes always full of snow. This, of course, caused frostbite and chilblains.” There are many of these harrowing examples. But as I said, there’s another idea that he expresses, which is this: the physical suffering he had to undergo was made much worse by the degradation and the humiliation that he had to experience, by the fact that someone else takes pleasure in causing the suffering.
(0:51:40) In one passage, Viktor Frankl describes receiving sharp blows from a guard with a stick without knowing why. He then says, “At such a moment, it is not the physical pain which hurts the most, and this applies to adults as much as to punished children. It is the mental agony caused by the injustice, the unreasonableness of it all. ... The most painful part of beatings is the insult which they imply.” So we are back to injustice and oppression, and this is a clear example of how they can be very tightly linked to suffering.
Adriano Mannino (0:52:23) Yes, they can certainly be tightly linked, and perhaps not just instrumentally but also conceptually, in some sense and in some cases. But of course, we are also back to technological development in the background, because, needless to say, without the application of industrial technology, Auschwitz would not have been possible, not quite in this way. But yes, the instrumental importance of politics is certainly very salient and obvious. Politics arguably is all about power at the macrosocial level, which then influences just about everything else that happens in society in one way or another. It’s about how power is shared or concentrated, perhaps in a very small number of hands. And when this goes wrong in society and power is abused or used very poorly, whether domestically or internationally, then the result is very often extreme cruelty, violence, and mass suffering.
(0:53:25) There’s, of course, a lot of research on this. For instance, and very famously, there’s research by Amartya Sen and others who have suggested that nondemocratic political regimes have caused or allowed many more famines than democracies have, which has led to tens of millions of deaths in the 20th century. The main mechanism that they have proposed, unsurprisingly, is that it’s much easier for nondemocratic, authoritarian regimes to basically ignore the preferences of large parts of the population. Then, for instance, there’s also the theory of democratic peace, which roughly says that democracies basically don’t go to war with each other and thereby really break the historical norm. This is an idea that was actually first introduced around 1800 by Immanuel Kant, and it’s also an idea that has since received quite a bit of empirical support from political science.
(0:54:27) So democracy seems very much worth protecting, not just intrinsically but perhaps especially from the point of view of preventing mass suffering. In some of our upcoming episodes, we’ll talk to political and social scientists who are currently researching this and proposing very specific ways in which we can each, individually and collectively, effectively help protect democracy and democratic institutions when they are under threat. I think some of their results are actually really encouraging and suggest that protecting democratic institutions, even in very large nation-states, is actually much more tractable, including for individuals and small groups of people, than one might initially believe. However, I think there are also extremely inspiring historical examples, as well as contemporary ones, showing that a lot can actually be done even under much more adverse, largely nondemocratic conditions, which thankfully, at least in many countries, are not, or not yet, the conditions that we find ourselves in.
(0:55:29) It does seem to be the case that democratic institutions are under threat in many countries, but they are still more or less working, and civil society is more or less working. So then, of course, this can be leveraged in order to help protect democratic institutions. But as mentioned, even where this is not the case, and certainly historically, for the most part, conditions have been nondemocratic and highly adverse, even there, I think, there are extremely inspiring examples showing that a lot can be done.
Nils Althaus (0:56:01) One story that inspired me in particular is that of Henry Dunant. That’s D-U-N-A-N-T, Henry Dunant. His story provides quite a striking example of how an unusual approach taken by a courageous individual can change the world. To quickly tell you the story: in 1859, Henry Dunant was a businessman. He was traveling in Italy, and he witnessed the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino. Italy was fighting the Second Italian War of Independence. Near the Italian town of Solferino, the Austrian army had fought against the forces of Sardinia-Piedmont and France. This battle would later help clear the way for the unification of Italy, so it was a pivotal battle in this war. But when Dunant arrived, there was no sense of historical triumph. There was only horror.
(0:57:01) The battlefield was covered with thousands of wounded soldiers. Many had no medical help whatsoever. They were left where they had fallen, and many were facing a slow and agonizing death. Dunant was so moved by this that he started to gather volunteers. He helped set up makeshift hospitals. He organized bandages and medical supplies. But even then, many of the wounded died. This experience marked him for the rest of his life. In 1862, three years after this experience, Dunant published a book called “A Memory of Solferino.” In this book, he described the almost unimaginable suffering he had seen on the battlefield, and he also made a radical proposal: states should sign agreements to protect wounded soldiers and the people caring for them. Now, at the time, this was a bold idea.
(0:58:02) There was no international humanitarian law in sight. And still, Dunant was convinced. Many people weren’t interested, and Dunant printed the book with his own money. He traveled across Europe and gave it to leading figures in politics and the military. He wanted to convince them that war needed humanitarian rules. Less than two years later, 12 states signed the first Geneva Convention, which became a cornerstone of international humanitarian law. Almost all of Dunant’s demands were included. In later conflicts, international humanitarian law would help protect civilians, prisoners of war, and wounded soldiers from some of the worst forms of suffering. Now, when you read about humanitarian law, it is often about breaches of this law, atrocities committed despite these international rules.
(0:59:01) And it is often also criticized for not being as effective as it set out to be. But I think we do have to compare it to the situation before, where there was no humanitarian law and there were no rules, and that was clearly much worse. So this was a remarkable achievement. But Dunant’s story doesn’t end here. Almost a century later, after the devastation of the Second World War, the International Committee of the Red Cross was given a unique mandate: it became the only organization explicitly authorized to carry out humanitarian work in armed conflicts. And you might have guessed it: the founder of the Red Cross, in 1863, again, was Henry Dunant. I think this story is really inspiring. Of course, Henry Dunant wasn’t the only one working on the project of international rules to avoid the worst suffering.
(1:00:01) But he clearly was a major figure, if not the major figure, and he clearly was a major influence. This is something that historians really agree on. Now, not everyone can be a Henry Dunant, obviously, but everyone can do something. And some things have really changed since his time. With all the information we have today and, for example, with money transfers reaching the most remote places on Earth in a matter of days, doing something has in many ways become much easier than ever before.
Adriano Mannino (1:00:35) Yes. As I mentioned earlier, there’s empirical research suggesting that there’s potentially a lot that we can do to help prevent abuses of political power in today’s world. For instance, there are perfectly legal and perhaps also highly tractable ways in which non-Americans, too, can help protect US democracy from authoritarian takeover threats. As mentioned, we’ll discuss the respective research with experts in some upcoming episodes. We think that protecting liberal democracy seems particularly important in the age of AI, and especially, again, in the US, given that AI capabilities are now quite likely reaching a level where they might allow an actor like the US government to grab absolutely unprecedented power. As Nils mentioned earlier, we recently co-authored some papers, and one of them was on this very topic area: the intersection of current progress in AI capabilities and how political power is or may soon be wielded, especially in the US but also around the world.
(1:01:44) We argued that AI agents will likely soon enable forms of surveillance that will be vastly worse than anything totalitarian states have been able to do in history. Imagine, for instance, scenarios where there are literally several spy agents for every citizen, tracing everything we do digitally, and increasingly also physically, because it’s all linked up and tracked. If you look into what’s already possible just based on publicly or commercially available data, you’ll see that these traces contain so much more information about our lives, preferences, views, and plans than we realize. It’s kind of shocking, just based on publicly and commercially available data.
(1:02:45) If you then include the fact that the US government and its national security apparatus obviously have access to data that goes far beyond that, you start to realize the enormity of the potential problem here. So far, I think the only thing that may have really saved us is that surveillance was basically bottlenecked by human labor. It wasn’t possible to just have a billion spy agents working day and night. But due to progress in agentic AI capabilities, such scenarios may now become a reality, or certainly a possibility, perhaps already at the current frontier of AI capabilities. You can imagine, again, several highly capable, smart spy agents able to plan over quite long time horizons, updating each other in real time and working at vastly superhuman speeds. It’s very easy to see that such scenarios would threaten the liberal rights that protect each of us from all kinds of extremely severe harms.
(1:03:45) And it’s also easy to see that those scenarios would threaten the system of checks and balances that’s supposed to backstop our rights. The same, we think, would be true under scenarios where powerful AI agents are not, or not just, misused but at some point also end up taking control themselves, be it gradually or more abruptly. So this is a rather bleak outlook. That’s why I think that, in terms of political philosophy and theory, it is particularly attractive to go back to political philosophers and theorists who did not emphasize the utopian vision in liberal democracy but who instead thought that liberal democracy’s main function is perhaps indeed to shield us from the worst dystopian abuses of power, from political cruelty and mass suffering.
(1:04:46) Among those, famously, are Cold War liberals such as Judith Shklar or Karl Popper. In some of our upcoming episodes, we’re planning to interview contemporary scholars who work in this tradition. Personally, despite the many obvious merits of liberal democracy, I have always found it quite plausible that the prevention of large-scale political cruelty, and of mass suffering as a result, is perhaps the most important advantage of liberal democracy over other political regimes. After all, history is just full of examples where powerful rulers essentially just mass-slaughtered people when push came to shove. Similarly, in international contexts, history is obviously full of cases where powerful, often technologically superior groups met comparatively powerless groups. And all too often, of course, the result was, again, mass slaughter and unimaginable, horrendous suffering.
Nils Althaus (1:05:48) And we can take this further. There’s one case where we humans have met a particularly powerless group, and this is the animals. And the sad result has been that we are slaughtering about 100 billion land animals every year, and more than a trillion fish. Of course, most of us don’t want to hurt animals. We don’t have the intention. That’s not what we set out to do. But it’s also convenient to use animal products, and often it is economically favorable to produce them in a way that is bad for these animals. A fast-growing broiler chicken breed simply yields a better return than a slow-growing breed. But as a side effect, it also results in the chicken collapsing under its weight, breaking its bones, lying around in ammonia from its excretions, getting inflammations on its feet, etc. And so most societies today do hurt animals in very bad ways, even though there was no intention of it.
(1:06:49) They didn’t set out to do that. Animal suffering can be especially hard to grasp, in part, of course, because it’s a different species. But there’s also another reason, namely that the suffering is kept out of sight, and often quite deliberately. The animal cause is something that we both are really passionate about. There is a lot of very severe suffering going on behind closed doors, and it concerns many different species. I’m not going to give you all the details; we could talk for a very long time. But there are the broiler chickens I just mentioned, and the laying hens: high-performance breeds lay eggs much more frequently than the traditional breeds, and this results in brittle bones and broken collarbones. Then there are the pigs in gestation crates, for example, who are restrained for months on end and can’t really turn around.
(1:07:52) Of course, there’s the slaughtering process, which is traumatizing in and of itself. But it’s worse, namely in that a low percentage of animals are not stunned properly before they’re slaughtered. So what happens, and it can happen to cows, to pigs, to turkeys, is that they bleed out alive, or they’re boiled alive while they’re conscious. Even though it’s just a low percentage that undergoes this kind of fate, that still means billions of animals every year. In ethics and politics, we often focus on the worst off, and of course we think of humans. But it’s actually quite hard to avoid the conclusion that huge numbers of animals are at least as badly off as the worst-off humans, especially when it comes to severe suffering. And one notable thing is that the features that distinguish us from other animals, say rational thought, culture, complex problem-solving, reasoning, etc., vanish when we suffer from severe pain.
(1:08:57) None of us contemplates the special hue of blue in a Monet painting while undergoing severe pain, or something like that. The pain consumes everything. In a way, you could say we become more animal-like. And we do not think that what is then happening to us is less important because it’s more animal-like. Quite the contrary: it seems very important. Here’s a good point to briefly return to someone we talked about in the beginning. You remember the story of Matt Ball. The thing that I just talked about, this resemblance between us and other animals, he clearly saw that, too. We told you that he changed his outlook on life and his activism after going through experiences of severe suffering. What we haven’t mentioned yet is that he had always been an animal activist. But before these experiences, he was mainly advocating for veganism.
(1:10:00) He co-founded and led the organization Vegan Outreach, which is an advocacy organization for veganism. This is what he meant when he said he was concerned with exploitation and oppression and injustice against animals. It’s in the animal area that he turned toward severe suffering. He asked himself, “Where can I prevent the most suffering?” This made him pivot toward focusing on reducing the suffering of chickens in particular, who, as I hinted at, lead especially terrible lives. He co-founded a different organization called One Step for Animals. Today he sees veganism as just one tool among many to reduce animal suffering, and indeed often not the most effective one. And I think I agree in many ways. Instead of trying to liberate all of the animals from oppression, or keeping your own hands maximally clean and leading the purest vegan lifestyle you can, I think we should adopt a more empirical and open-ended approach and try to prevent the most extreme suffering in the most effective ways possible.
(1:11:18) This is echoed by other animal welfare practitioners such as Lewis Bollard, whom we’ll also have on our podcast. He’s an animal activist and strategic thinker in the space, and he’s a big proponent of those big levers of change, of institutional change. For example, he’s a proponent of corporate campaigns, where it’s not about the individual consumer who should change his ways and his consumption patterns; rather, it’s about entire corporations being pressured into improving the welfare of animals.
Adriano Mannino (1:11:57) Yes. I think ideally we would probably protect each and every individual animal with very stringent rights, in ways probably very similar to how liberal democracies protect us humans. And as I already mentioned, I think it might be valuable to introduce a general right to freedom from intense, severe, perhaps unbearable suffering. It’s of course also true that many existing rights already make an important, indirect contribution to the prevention of suffering, but it might still add a lot of value to have one right that is laser-focused on extreme suffering. But anyway, regarding animal rights and the way to such a situation of protection by rights, if there is such a way at all (on some days I’m quite pessimistic here, unfortunately): the way there is certainly gradual, and I think it makes sense to eliminate the worst forms of suffering one step at a time.
(1:12:58) And by the way, even though liberal democracies are still treating animals terribly, I think it’s probably not a coincidence that their attitudes toward the animals tend to be at least less bad than they are elsewhere, in less democratic, more authoritarian political systems. That’s perhaps because liberal democracy is itself, or has been historically, a moral circle expansion, where you first abolish the king and the aristocracy, then abolish slavery and expand the right to vote to all races, genders, and classes. And the nonhuman animals, beyond our species, end up benefiting from that as well. But unfortunately, they of course lack any power, and so it’s particularly tough in their case. There’s also a very interesting, paradoxical situation where our ethical attitudes toward the animals have greatly improved over the decades and centuries.
(1:14:02) But at the same time, the suffering we inflict on them has also exploded by many orders of magnitude. For instance, cat burning was a popular form of public entertainment, actually until the 18th century. Things like animal protection laws, the very idea of that, only gained traction in the 19th century. So I think overall, looking back, we can say that our attitudes toward nonhuman animals clearly got better, and actually very significantly, quite massively so. And yet, at the same time, industrial technology has also allowed us to create factory farms in the 20th century, starting around 1920 or 1930, which has since, of course, amounted to mass production of torture-level suffering. I think this is perhaps the clearest example to date of how technological progress can be morally catastrophic, even in the absence of evil intentions.
(1:15:02) Another thing this brings out, again, I think, is the relevance of philosophy. For instance, we must ask how well we really understand the minds of nonhuman animals in making claims about the suffering on factory farms, say. This, of course, has many empirical aspects as well, so animal ethology, psychology, and neuroscience are clearly very relevant here. But also, and I think centrally, it’s a philosophy of mind and an ethics question. And needless to say, the methodological aspects of neuroscience, for instance, also pose philosophical issues themselves. So we must, I think, ask very specifically how confident we should really be that some, or perhaps many, nonhuman animals are experiencing a kind of suffering that is similar in moral importance to the very worst forms of suffering that we humans can experience.
(1:15:57) And speaking of nonhuman minds, in the age of AI there’s also the very thorny question of whether the AIs that we are now creating, which are clearly becoming increasingly complex and sophisticated, may also become capable of experiencing suffering, or, more broadly, states that are morally significant.
Nils Althaus (1:16:18) I think this is an instance of the future coming at us very fast. A couple of years ago, this would have been an entirely academic debate. And now there’s a serious ongoing debate among philosophers, computer scientists, neuroscientists, and also some of the leading AI labs themselves about this question of whether our current AI systems might have consciousness and welfare. It is quite an unsettling set of questions. Could AIs develop conscious thought, conscious intentionality? Could they develop emotions and perceptions that feel like something from the inside of the AI, so to speak? The human brain is a material object, and it seems clear that our mental lives run on it, or at least depend on it in some very direct sense. So as AIs start to approach and surpass the functional capacities of our human brain, and other animal brains, for that matter, we have to ask the question: Should we be worried that they will develop consciousness and the capacity to suffer that we have?
(1:17:30) In terms of intelligence-related capacities, these might soon reach superhuman levels in many dimensions: speed, memory, various reasoning abilities, planning abilities. In some, they arguably already have reached superhuman levels. Similarly, it’s not out of the question that these AIs might also be able to suffer at superhuman levels, in both intensity and duration, and maybe in vast numbers. There is an eerie similarity to factory farming in this development. We don’t want to hurt the AIs, but we want their products. And so they are arguably at risk, just like animals, of being exploited in huge numbers. That said, of course, the uncertainties are huge here. There are many boundaries, many obstacles. We can’t adopt the position of an AI to know what it feels like to be an AI.
(1:18:31) And no one is even close to knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness. But this uncertainty also cuts both ways. We could overattribute consciousness to systems, but we could also underattribute it. That is true for both AI systems and animals, especially if we go down the ladder of complexity to simpler animals, like insects.
(1:18:55) There’s the example of the fruit fly. Let me tell you quickly what the fruit fly does. The fruit fly displays a behavior that researchers call learned helplessness. What happens is this: the insects are subjected to a mild form of recurring stress, such as heat or electric shocks. Half of the flies can shut off the unpleasant stimuli by actively moving: they move, and the stimulus stops. The other half has no control over the stimuli. Whether they move or not, nothing happens; the stimuli come nevertheless. Now, the helpless half, which is at the mercy of the stress, develops a form of learned helplessness after some time. What does this mean? The flies move significantly less, they have a harder time remembering locations, and they lose the motivation to climb over a wide gap.
(1:19:55) From the outside, it is almost as if they were giving up internally. In other animals, in rats, for example, this exact behavior is harnessed as a model for human depression. And intriguingly, if the fruit flies are given antidepressants such as ketamine, fluoxetine, or lithium chloride (human antidepressants, obviously), they shed their passive behavior and move normally again. This result is hard to reconcile with the hypothesis that insects don’t have any experiences, any consciousness, or even with the hypothesis that they have only very crude and simple forms, because depression wouldn’t be the first place for us to start looking if we wanted to find feelings in insects. We would start by looking at simpler, more primitive feelings, such as pain, maybe, or pleasure.
(1:20:57) Now, it’s also interesting to think about how science and technology interact, especially neuroscience and AI. It is quite likely that AI will speed up the neurosciences and the biosciences in general. On neuroscience specifically, there are already new forms of deep brain stimulation that are currently being developed. This is done, obviously, with the aim of benefiting patients: to treat depression, addictions, chronic pain, and more. But these same neurotechnologies also pose great risks. The more we understand the brain, the more our privacy will be threatened, even in our own heads. Surveillance might extend into our brains. And of course, the more we understand how exactly the brain produces suffering, the easier it will also be to recreate and induce suffering, perhaps in ways that are even worse than the worst forms of suffering that exist today.
(1:22:02) So this neuroscientific knowledge is dual-use knowledge, so to speak. And there are information hazards here, where it can be dangerous to reveal certain information, certain things that we know about the brain. Perhaps some research should simply not be done, ruled out by society. We will have an episode with Tor Wager, who is a neuroscientist and pain researcher and has developed a neural signature for general negative affect. Basically, you look at the fMRI scan, and the signature will tell you whether the patient has a negative feeling or not. With him, we will talk about the risks and benefits of these technologies. These are very thorny questions. In terms of the biosciences more broadly, I would say advances in genomics stand out.
(1:23:06) There’s embryo selection, there’s gene-editing technology, and these, of course, will also be sped up by artificial intelligence. They are also poised to have a pervasive and transformative effect on society. So I think it is very warranted to take those risks seriously and prepare adequately for them. Even if the probability of some of these large-scale risks seems small, we have to think about the magnitude of the effect as well. So we should ask the question: How bad would it be if the risk materialized? If the scale of the problem is big, be it due to the severity of the suffering it causes, the number of individuals it affects, or maybe even the duration of the effect, interventions and prevention may be justified.
Adriano Mannino (1:23:56) Yes, and this question of scale brings us back to philosophy one last time, at least for today. For instance, the animals raise tricky ethical questions at the population level just because of their numbers, which are vast. If the suffering of individual animals matters, at least sufficiently, then we should prioritize them much more in public policy, in our charitable giving, and with our social activism, just on account of their huge numbers. This, of course, raises ethical issues, in part because it will indirectly come at the expense of human beings who are suffering and dying and who could be helped instead. In practice, we’re obviously usually operating under resource constraints. We have limited resources, and so we must prioritize, we must triage and decide where to provide help and where not to, for the time being. That then raises the question of whether there might be principled, impartial grounds for discounting animal suffering, at least to some extent.
(1:25:05) Maybe, as we go down the ladder of complexity in the animal kingdom and reach invertebrates such as flies or shrimp, there is a case to be made that whatever suffering they are capable of experiencing might be morally on the same scale as the milder forms of human suffering, perhaps. And as mentioned earlier, those milder forms of human suffering may not be measured on the same scale as the more severe, perhaps unbearable forms of suffering that we can experience. But then again, considering other animals, such as more complex vertebrates like pigs and chickens, it may be very hard indeed to argue that those animals are incapable of experiencing intense and perhaps unbearable suffering that is morally on the same scale as our severe suffering. If that’s the case, this argument from the numbers just comes back, because obviously pigs and chickens are also suffering in very large numbers. So that raises the question of whether we’re just facing a pretty strong case here for prioritizing the animals a lot more in our public policy and with our money and time.
(1:26:14) That’s certainly a kind of argument that we’re planning to examine a lot more in upcoming episodes. It also raises the further question of whether it might not be possible to go another way and try to defend a form of partiality toward humanity as a species, or maybe as a civilization, in some well-grounded way. Yet another way you might go in moral philosophy is perhaps to question this method of adding things up in ethics and ask whether there might be impartial and viable alternatives to it as well. Last but not least, I think it’s also noteworthy that similar issues related to the numbers also arise within the human population. For instance, there are many more people suffering from poverty globally than are suffering locally. Similarly, there are potentially many more future people, yet unborn, who may suffer avoidable harms, depending on what we do today, than humans who are presently suffering. So this raises very similar issues of prioritization and triage.
(1:27:21) Furthermore, there are obviously also difficult trade-offs between the good and the bad, between happiness and suffering. For instance, considering the human population again: a few decades ago, the human population was at about 5 billion. Let’s assume that 1 billion of those 5 billion people had lives that were perhaps marked by severe suffering and maybe negative on the whole, by their own lights. Now, empirically, that’s perhaps a vaguely plausible assumption. If you look at the number of people who lived in absolute poverty, and if you then also add up all the other physical, psychological, and social conditions that plausibly caused severe suffering, maybe ballparking that number at around a billion is plausible. Today, of course, the human population is slowly approaching about 10 billion. I think we’re at about eight and a half or so. Now suppose that of these 10 billion people, 1.5 billion are suffering severely and have perhaps negative lives.
(1:28:27) Then we can ask: Does this constitute progress, moving from this earlier stage of 5 billion people in total and 1 billion sufferers to a stage where there are 10 billion people and 1.5 billion are suffering or have negative lives? But before we consider this very briefly, I think I should again stress that these numbers, though perhaps vaguely empirically plausible, are still largely made up. As we mentioned earlier, there is just shockingly little empirical research about how many people are really suffering and how severely. There have been at least some preliminary surveys suggesting that across nations and cultures, somewhere between 10 and 30% of people actually judge that they experience more suffering than happiness in their lives, and also that they would, upon consideration, not want to relive their whole lives. But again, much more research is definitely needed here. So anyway, you can also treat it as a thought experiment: If we start with a population of 5 billion where 1 billion are suffering and then move to 10 billion where 1.5 billion are suffering, does this constitute progress?
(1:29:35) Now, if you consider the relative numbers, or the average level of well-being and ill-being, it would be progress, because 20% are suffering among the 5 billion and only 15% are suffering among the 10 billion. So on average, people are doing better in the 10 billion population. However, this average view is almost unanimously rejected in moral philosophy. There are many ways to see why it probably can’t be right. Just imagine another hypothetical world where everyone is suffering terribly. Actually, you might imagine the animal population that we’re creating on factory farms, unfortunately. But imagine just a population where all individuals are basically suffering terribly. If the average view were correct, you could improve that situation by creating a further person who also suffers very badly but slightly less. That makes the average better. But clearly, you’ve made the situation even worse. So one should then probably look at the absolute numbers instead.
(1:30:35) If you just add up the happiness of the happy people here and then subtract the suffering of the sufferers, it looks like there’s significant progress as well, moving from the 5 billion to the 10 billion world. But many moral philosophers disagree that things are as straightforward as just adding up the new people and subtracting the sufferers. If we look at the absolute number of sufferers here, it has gone up from 1 billion to 1.5 billion. So on this salient measure, the situation has certainly become significantly worse. All this raises very tricky questions in population ethics, which we’re also planning to discuss with some of our guests. In general, it is well known in the field that all views that look just at individual welfare, that is, at happiness and suffering, seem to have at least some implications that are basically unpalatable from an intuitive, commonsensical point of view. So perhaps one way to go is also to bring in some values that are just not about individual welfare.
(1:31:38) Perhaps, for instance, what we want at the population level is a civilization of some minimally viable size, sufficient for core civilizational projects, and perhaps ideally also with a liberal democratic political regime, to make room for a wide range of individual life projects. But beyond that minimally viable population size, perhaps the policy should then be to keep the population as small as possible, consistent with that minimally viable size. That’s because this may be the only way to avoid multiplying the number of individuals who will inevitably end up experiencing unbearable suffering if the population grows indefinitely. But again, these are very thorny philosophical questions, to say the least, and we’re going to explore them in greater depth in some of our future episodes.
Nils Althaus (1:32:30) Yes, and we’re of course very much looking forward to having you on this journey. This is all we have for now. Thanks a lot for listening and making it this far with us. We hope to have given you a good overview of the kinds of topics we’re going to discuss on this podcast. We have focused on broad societal and moral issues here. But as a last point, I also want to add that we plan to feature a bit of self-help centered on severe suffering, and we will try to do this in an empirically grounded way. The self-help literature is pretty much all about happiness and striving and reaching your potential, which is great. I would want you to reach your true potential, of course. But if you think about it, perhaps avoiding risks of severe suffering in your own life is even more important, and possibly also a necessary condition for your happiness and for reaching your true potential.
(1:33:34) So thanks again for listening. If you enjoyed this, you can help us a lot by subscribing to this podcast in your podcasting app, by subscribing to our Substack, and of course by spreading the word about the show. See you next time. Thank you.






